US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI2229

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002229 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: POST-PRC SOONG ON SPECIAL BUDGET, CROSS-STRAIT 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 02214 
     B. TAIPEI 02126 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  In a May 17 meeting with the AIT Director, 
People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong stated that his 
party will continue to block the Special Defense Procurement 
Budget and all other proposals initiated by the ruling 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) until Chen Shui-bian 
publicly apologies for his criticisms of Soong during his PRC 
visit.  Soong said that while he does not hold a personal 
grudge, he must pay heed to the deep anger among the PFP 
members.  Soong also told the Director that in his meeting 
with PRC President Hu Jintao he had spent considerable time 
explaining "Taiwan's agony" and sense of separate identity to 
Hu and other Beijing officials.  He explained that he had 
offered the new "two shores, one China" formula as a 
compromise between PRC's and Chen Shui-bian's different 
understanding of the "1992 Consensus."  Acknowledging that 
the PRC was very reluctant to accept this new term, Soong 
said he felt Hu is ready to exercise flexibility as long as 
Taiwan does not pursue independence.  While it is clear the 
PRC will not soften its anti-independence position, he said, 
he believes his visit had moved the debate forward by 
prompting the PRC to agree to the wording "as long as Taiwan 
does not move toward independence, military conflict in the 
Strait is avoidable."  Soong said he believes President Chen 
was serious about finding a way to restart official talks 
with Mainland China at the time of their February 24 meeting, 
but that he does not know Chen's current mind or intentions. 
End Summary. 
 
PFP Stance on Special Budget 
---------------------------- 
 
2. (C) In a May 17 meeting with the AIT Director, People 
First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong stated that his party 
will continue to block the Special Defense Procurement Budget 
and all other DPP-initiated proposals until Chen Shui-bian 
publicly apologizes for his criticisms of Soong during his 
visit to the PRC.  Soong charged that Chen's accusations were 
tantamount to being "stabbed in the back" and had set back 
his negotiations with the authorities in Beijing.  He noted 
that Hu Jintao had actually chided him about his relationship 
with Chen, citing a traditional Chinese story about betrayal. 
 Soong told the Director that Chen's public broadside had put 
him into a very difficult position because he did not want to 
respond in kind to Chen while visiting the PRC and had 
deliberately kept his statements brief and low-key.  Soong 
told the Director that Presidential Office Secretary General 
Yu Shyi-kun apologized privately to PFP Secretary General 
Chin Ching-sheng, but that a private apology is not enough to 
compensate for Chen's verbal attack.  Soong said that a 
number of PFP "maverick" legislators have seized on Chen's 
actions, along with "the NA election fiasco," to boycott 
cooperation with the DPP (Ref A). 
 
3. (C) Despite internal discord within his PFP and his harsh 
treatment by the President, Soong told the Director that he 
is still willing to cooperate with the DPP "for the sake of 
Taiwan and people's livelihood."  However, Soong said that he 
is currently in "waiting mode" and that until Chen offers a 
public apology, negotiation with the DPP will be impossible. 
When AIT reminded Soong of his previous pledges to support 
the Special Defense Budget, Soong side-stepped, and said that 
the demand for a DPP apology has become an "emotional" issue 
for the PFP.  When AIT rejoined that for the sake of Taiwan's 
defense needs the KMT has continued to support the Budget, 
Soong replied, "if you believe the KMT really supports the 
Budget, then put it to a vote."  When AIT reminded Soong 
about his pledge to put Taiwan's interests ahead of his 
personal concerns, Soong signaled that he had to leave. 
 
Explaining Taiwan to the PRC 
---------------------------- 
 
4. (C) On his recent PRC visit, Soong told the Director that 
his primary goal had been "to create a bridge between Taiwan 
and the PRC."  He said that when he met Hu Jintao on May 12, 
after a short press conference, they dispensed with all 
banquets and formalities and talked very candidly until ten 
o'clock in the evening.  Soong said he followed up on the 
themes in his Qinghua University speech that afternoon, 
spending a considerable length of time explaining "Taiwan's 
agony" and why Taiwan is reluctant to talk to the PRC.  Soong 
said that he explained to Hu that over the centuries Taiwan 
had developed a "special socio-economic cultural identity" 
that could not simply be dismissed as a political tool.  He 
quoted the old Chinese proverb to Hu that "when distant 
people will not come to you, you cannot use force to compel 
them."  This idea, Soong told the Director, was part of the 
message that Chen Shui-bian had asked Soong to convey to Hu 
-- that the PRC needed to acknowledge the reality of a 
separate Taiwan identity and take the initiative to create 
good will.  Although he did not mention Chen's name, Soong 
continued, "both Hu and I understood what I was doing." 
Soong told the Director that he felt Hu received his message 
well and replied that "we agree to disagree." 
 
Reformulating "1992 Consensus" 
------------------------------ 
 
5. (C) Another part of the message Soong carried with him to 
Beijing was Taipei's willingness to consider new formulations 
for the "1992 Consensus" -- which the DPP refers to as the 
exchange between the two sides during and after the 1992 Hong 
Kong talks -- as a platform for restarting formal political 
dialogue (Ref B).  Soong told the Director that he wanted to 
find a formula that would permit the kind of flexibility that 
former Secretary Kissinger's Shanghai Communique created.  He 
noted that Chen Shui-bian had accepted the 1992 idea when it 
was worded as "in the spirit of the fruitful results of the 
1992 Hong Kong talks."  Noting that he personally preferred 
the term "two shores" rather than "two sides," Soong told the 
Director that his new formulation, "Two shores, one China" 
connoted "two separate administrations."  This would allow 
room, he explained, for Taiwan to call itself "ROC" and the 
other side to call itself "PRC." 
 
6. (C) When the Director asked why the Presidential Office 
reacted so quickly and so negatively to his new formula, 
Soong repeated his earlier statement that Yu Shyi-kun 
telephoned PFP's Chin Ching-sheng immediately afterward 
Chen's public rejection.  Soong said that Yu explained that 
Chen was actually pleased with Soong's formula and that the 
DPP would accept any PFP "retaliation" against its public 
rejection. 
 
7. (C) Regarding the PRC response to his proposed formula, 
Soong conceded that "they were very reluctant to accept a new 
term."  He told the Director, however, that "it is my feeling 
Hu is ready to exercise flexibility as long as Taiwan does 
not publicly push for independence."  In response to the 
question of whether the PRC is willing to talk to Chen 
Shui-bian, Soong said, "They are still hesitant but it is my 
feeling that they were talking to me not merely because they 
are pursuing a united front strategy."  Soong told the 
Director that he believed the PRC would talk to Chen 
Shui-bian if Chen accepted the "1992 Consensus" and renounced 
Taiwan independence.  The fact that PRC officials spent so 
much time discussing those two conditions during his meetings 
with them, Soong emphasized, indicated that "they mean 
business." 
 
Renouncing Taiwan Independence 
------------------------------ 
 
8. (C) The second of the "Six Points" that Soong reached with 
Hu stated that both PFP and CCP firmly oppose any "Taiwan 
Independence Movement" activities.  Soong told the Director 
that he is convinced the PRC "will not soften its 
anti-independence position."  He said that he explained to Hu 
that he was not asking for independence but rather that 
Taiwan be allowed to maintain the status quo of de facto 
independence and that Beijing not threaten Taiwan.  Soong 
said Hu had told him that if he were to lose Taiwan, he would 
not be able to face his ancestors and insisted that decisions 
on Taiwan were not his personal decisions and, thus, he 
should not be provoked by efforts to gain de jure 
independence.  Soong told the Director that Beijing wanted 
Chen to reiterate the "Five Noes" and that only in the last 
minutes of the meeting with Hu did the PRC side agree to 
include the final important sentence, "As long as Taiwan does 
not move overtly or covertly toward independence, military 
conflict in the Strait is avoidable" into the PFP-CCP "Six 
Points" agreement. 
 
Following up with President Chen? 
--------------------------------- 
9. (C) Soong told the Director that he does not hold a 
personal grudge against President Chen for his public 
criticisms of him.  However, Chen had insulted the PFP 
membership and the resulting anger within the party has 
limited his flexibility.  Soong said that, while he cannot 
judge Chen's current sincerity, when they met on February 24, 
Soong felt that Chen was serious about restarting talks with 
the PRC.  Soong told the Director that Chen had emphasized 
that his term in the presidential office was about to expire 
and that he wanted to leave a legacy.  Soong said that Chen 
had twice complained to him during their February meeting 
about former President Lee Teng-hui, noting that Lee had 
advised him to accept "ROC" and not to change the names of 
the state-owned enterprises.  "Let us see if Chen is sincere 
enough," Soong concluded, "to ask me to make a second PRC 
trip." 
PAAL