US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI2213

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002213 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CH, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: TAIWAN SCHOLARS URGE CAUTION OVER EXPECTATIONS FOR 
CROSS-STRAIT BREAKTHROUGH 
 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Taiwan cross-Strait specialists warn that 
there could be a domestic backlash in both the PRC and Taiwan 
if the two sides do not manage expectations for a 
cross-Strait political breakthrough in the wake of recent 
opposition visits to the Mainland.  During a May 16 closed 
door meeting of U.S. and Taiwan cross-Strait scholars, Taiwan 
specialists suggested that future cross-Strait interactions 
should focus on functional engagement, building on progress 
from the Lunar New Year charter flights.  Mainland Affairs 
Council (MAC) Chairman Joseph Wu told the group that Taipei 
is willing to engage Beijing on its recent agricultural and 
tourism initiatives using the New Year charter flights model. 
 Taiwan observers expressed suspicion over PRC motives, and 
judged that Beijing offered no substantive concessions over 
core principles during recent meetings with Taiwan opposition 
leaders.  Former MAC Chair Tsai Ing-wen cautioned that both 
Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian and PRC President Hu Jintao 
have only a limited window for flexibility.  If either fails 
to justify their policies in the coming months, Tsai warned, 
they may both face renewed pressure from respective domestic 
hard-line elements to ratchet up tensions.  End Summary. 
 
Trading Assessments 
------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Taiwan's Foundation on International and 
Cross-Strait Studies hosted a small group of U.S. and Taiwan 
scholars on May 14 for a closed door discussion on 
cross-Strait relations after the Anti-Secession Law.  The 
Taiwan side was composed of both Blue and Green scholars as 
well as several current and former government officials.  The 
U.S. delegation included Brookings scholars Richard Bush, 
Jeffrey Bader, and Huang Jin, Davidson College Professor 
Shelly Rigger, CSIS Associate Bonnie Glaser, and Center for 
Naval Analysis Director Michael McDevitt.  The U.S. 
delegation both offered an assessment of USG policy and 
conveyed views expressed by PRC scholars during recent 
meetings in Shanghai.  The Taiwan side focused on the recent 
visit of People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong and 
expectations over Beijing's next steps in cross-Strait policy. 
 
Diminishing Expectations 
------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) The Taiwan scholars were nearly unanimous in their 
assessment that Beijing did not offer any new political 
formulations during the recent visits by the KMT and PFP 
leaders.  Both Blue and Green scholars characterized Soong's 
recent visit in negative terms, alleging that Soong caved in 
to PRC demands for fear that Beijing would cancel Soong's 
meeting with Hu Jintao.  Former MAC Vice Chairman Chen 
Ming-tong was particularly scathing over Soong's rejection of 
any "two Chinas" model and his offer of a new "two shores, 
one China" formulation.  Several participants noted that even 
the KMT rejected Soong's formulation as tantamount to denying 
the existence of the "Republic of China."  While (Blue 
leaning) National Cheng-chi University Professor Chao 
Chien-ming argued that there may be potential flexibility in 
some of the language used during the visits to finesse the 
"1992" deadlock, both U.S. and Taiwan scholars characterized 
Hu Jintao's repeated public linkages of "1992 consensus" and 
the "one China principle" as a signal that the PRC is moving 
away from ambiguous formulations that would be politically 
acceptable to Taiwan. 
 
4. (SBU) Blue leaning Academia Sinica scholar Hsu Szu-chien 
characterized the recent KMT/PFP visits as a major boost for 
the Hu Jintao government.  Hsu said the fact that both the 
KMT and PFP agreed to cooperate with the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) to oppose Taiwan independence marked a major 
moral victory for Beijing.  The potentially most 
destabilizing aspect of the agreements between the CCP and 
two Pan-Blue parties, he cautioned, was the establishment of 
a regular dialogue channel for future contacts.  Hsu warned 
that if Beijing used these contacts to pursue future 
cross-Strait interaction at the expense of an official 
dialogue, the Taiwan public would soon grow wary of PRC 
motives, and the current positive public view on cross-Strait 
interactions could quickly sour.  Hsu added that high profile 
diplomatic setbacks could combine with disappointment over 
PRC actions to create another anti-China backlash in Taiwan. 
Tsai: Two Leaders, Same Challenge 
 
SIPDIS 
--------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Former MAC Chair (and current DPP Legislator) Tsai 
Ing-wen offered a similar assessment.  She said that both 
President Chen and President Hu are likely to enjoy only a 
limited window to pursue cross-Strait flexibility.  On the 
Taiwan side, Tsai said that in addition to seeking his own 
legacy in cross-Strait relations, Chen had promised the 
business community that he would make progress on economic 
and transportation links in his second term.  She said that 
Chen has been given room to maneuver by the DPP's success in 
the May 14 National Assembly (NA) election.  However, Tsai 
warned that Chen's flexibility could be soon challenged by 
two factors -- a refusal by Beijing to engage the Taiwan 
government on cross-Strait issues and/or a refusal by the KMT 
to cooperate with the DPP on domestic policy.  If the PRC and 
KMT either together or separately sought to marginalize the 
government, Tsai warned that the public, especially Pan-Green 
supporters, would lose patience with Chen's reconciliation 
policies.  Tsai also cautioned that Chen's constitutional 
reform agenda is very much unchanged, and has gained new 
momentum after the NA election.  While denying that Chen 
would stray from his May 20, 2004, inaugural promises, Tsai 
said that a combination of constitutional revisions and 
souring cross-Strait relations could re-ignite tensions. 
 
6. (SBU) Tsai stated that Hu Jintao has a similarly narrow 
window to engage Taipei in dialogue.  She asserted that the 
Anti-Secession Law (ASL) has given Hu temporary breathing 
space to pursue a more flexible policy course, but she warned 
that in the longer term, the ASL will become a burden for Hu 
and his successors.  Tsai predicted that once Hu's honeymoon 
is over, the PLA and other hard-liners would cite the ASL 
when attacking political leaders for any lack of progress in 
cross-Strait relations.  Tsai said that Hu should quickly 
seize this opportunity to open a quiet dialogue with the Chen 
government on how to bridge the "1992" deadlock.  She 
emphasized that any real interaction on the issue must be 
kept out of the media, noting that the very public 
discussions of "1992" and "one China" surrounding the 
Lien/Soong visits has made it more difficult to bridge the 
gaps between the two sides. 
 
Focus on the Functional 
----------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Academia Sinica's Hsu asserted that in order for 
both sides to avoid creating unachievable public 
expectations, the focus should be on functional contacts 
rather than political principles.  Hsu stated that the most 
useful role for the USG would be to encourage both sides to 
talk more about technical issues like transportation links in 
order to downplay expectations for a major breakthrough over 
"one China."  Former MAC Vice Chairman Alexander Huang 
offered a similar assessment, and noted that the Lunar New 
Year charter flight model offers a ready-made framework for 
the two sides to restart functional talks.  MAC Chairman 
Joseph Wu said that Taiwan was willing to use this model to 
engage Beijing on its recent offers over agriculture and 
tourism, but expressed concern over PRC Taiwan Affairs Office 
(TAO) Deputy Director Wang Zaixi's May 3 reiteration of 
problematic PRC formulations, including the demand that 
cross-Strait transportation links be classified as "domestic." 
 
Comment: Perfect, the Enemy of the Good? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) The domestic squabbling over political formulations 
that resulted from the recent Pan-Blue visits suggests that 
high-profile attempts to bridge the "one China" gap are only 
going to cause further internal divisions within Taiwan and 
could even risk undermining recent positive atmospherics 
across the Strait.  While a private dialogue to explore ways 
forward over the "1992" concept would be useful, the real 
short-term deliverable appears to be on functional 
engagement.  Progress using the quasi-official New Year 
charter model (increasingly referred to in Taiwan as the 
"Macau model") on transportation links, agricultural 
cooperation, and tourism would signal momentum in the 
relationship and could produce concrete achievements that 
would serve the interests of both sides.  PRC agreement to 
use the Macau model would also reduce the temptation on both 
sides to resort to exclusively CCP-KMT party-to-party talks 
to move forward on functional issues, a move that would only 
fuel Taiwan suspicions over PRC intentions. 
PAAL