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| Identifier: | 05BOGOTA4570 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BOGOTA4570 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Bogota |
| Created: | 2005-05-16 18:25:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PTER ASEC PHUM KJUS SNAR CO |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 004570 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2015 TAGS: PTER, ASEC, PHUM, KJUS, SNAR, CO SUBJECT: GENERAL CRADDOCK MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ------- Summary ------- 1. (C) On May 11, President Alvaro Uribe discussed counterdrug strategy, guerrilla attacks in southern Colombia, the AUC peace process, and recent arrests of U.S. military personnel with SOUTHCOM Commander General Bantz Craddock. Uribe expressed concern that if the GOC did not significantly reduce drug production this year, public opinion would turn against aerial eradication and extradition. Craddock agreed that it was important to win both the military and political battle in support of couterdrug policies and assured Uribe that the U.S. Congress was pleased with his administration's progress. Uribe emphasized that the security forces were attacking all paramilitary groups that did not respect the cease-fire and that record numbers were being killed or captured. He said he trusted the U.S. to fully prosecute detained U.S. military personnel found guilty of trafficking arms or drugs, but urged the USG to keep him fully informed so he could reassure the Colombian public there would be no impunity. General Craddock pledged to keep Uribe as informed as possible. End summary. ----------------------------------------- Eager for Better Counternarcotics Results ----------------------------------------- 2. (C) Uribe expressed frustration that, despite ongoing counternarcotics operations, the price of drugs had not increased and the Counter Narcotics Center (CNC) had reported that the coca crop stayed stable in 2004. He warned that public opinion and his political opponents would question aerial eradication and extradition if the GOC failed to significantly decrease drug production in 2005. He said former minister and presidential hopeful Alvaro Leyva was already trying to form alliances with the FARC and the ELN on an anti-extradition platform. Uribe reiterated his committment to extradition and said he would not change this policy to gain support for his re-election. He urged Craddock to review Colombian counterdrug policies to make them more effective. 3. (C) General Craddock said he was surprised by CNC's crop estimate. He speculated that perhaps the quality of the coca crop had decreased or that the profit margins of drug trafficking were so high that the traffickers did not have to increase the price even though supply had gone down. He assured Uribe that the U.S. Congress was impressed with the high volume of eradication and interdiction operations Colombia was conducting with U.S. support, and that support would continue. -------------------------------- Operations Continue in the South -------------------------------- 4. (C) Uribe said U.S. helicopters had been crucial in transporting troops to combat recent guerrilla attacks against security forces and civilians in Cauca and Narino Departments. In response to the Ambassador's inquiry if the GOC would divert resources away from Plan Patriota to focus on Cauca and Narino, Defense Minister Jorge Uribe said they had no plans to do so, but would consider it if necessary. General Craddock noted that Cauca and Narino could be considered a subset of the Plan Patriota area of operations and encouraged the security forces to adapt to changing guerrilla tactics. He said minor setbacks were to be expected and that the attacks in Cauca and Narino were a clear indication that the FARC was feeling pressure in the Plan Patriota area. 5. (C) Minster Uribe noted that killing or capturing high value targets continued to be a top priority. Armed Forces Commander General Ospina had moved Plan Patriota troops to the south of the area of operations to target the FARC leadership. MILGRP Commander Colonel Trombitas said the Embassy was impressed with Special Forces Commander Colonel Mejia's skill and determination to go after high value targets. President Uribe emphasized that he wanted to follow U.S. advice on how to best combat narcoterrorists. ----------- AUC Process ----------- 6. (C) In reaction to UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour's statements about AUC cease-fire violations, the Minister of Defense reported on military successes against the paramilitaries: during Uribe's term, 9,804 paramilitaries had been captured and 1,125 killed; in the last 12 months, 4,231 had been captured and 449 killed; and in the first four months of 2005, 1,060 had been captured and 132 killed. Uribe underscored that any illegal armed group not respecting a cease-fire would be pursued militarily. The Ambassador agreed that security forces were tough on the AUC, but noted that the imperfectly observed cease-fire, the weakening of the demobilization law, and the inefficiencies in the military justice system, including the lack of a conclusion in case of the murder of trade unionists in Arauca Department, had created confusion about the GOC's position on paramilitaries. 7. (C) With respect to the demobilization law, President Uribe explained that, from the time he began campaigning for the presidency, he had disagreed with different treatment for guerrilla or paramilitary group members. Ideally, he noted that membership in any illegal armed group should simply be terrorism. He said the GOC would work to create the best legislation possible for demobilization. 8. (C) Uribe defended the Arauca trade unionists case and said the suspects would remain detained until a decision had been made. Minister Uribe reminded Craddock that the case was moving at a much faster pace than was typical for the military justice system. The Ambassador agreed that the case was going well, but said a conclusion would be help ease concerns about military justice. ---------------------------------- Arrests of U.S. Military Personnel ---------------------------------- 9. (C) Uribe said he trusted the U.S. justice system to fully prosecute all U.S. military personnel found guilty of trafficking drugs or arms in Colombia. It was important to demonstrate to the Colombian public that immunity for U.S. personnel in Colombia did not mean impunity. Otherwise, the incidents would threaten support for a strong extradition policy. He urged General Craddock and the Ambassador to keep him informed on the cases so he could show the U.S. was holding the guilty parties accountable. General Craddock expressed dismay at these incidents and assured Uribe that the U.S., in close collaboration with Colombian authorities, were investigating the cases carefully. He pledged to keep Colombia informed of developments and said he hoped to arrange some sort of observer status for Colombia at public sessions. WOOD
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