US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA807

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000807 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, CG 
SUBJECT: WHAT WE NEED TO GET TO ELECTIONS IN THE DRC 
 
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
1. (C)  Now that the Congolese have completed work on the 
constitution, they and we can focus on realizing the DRC's 
first democratic elections in almost 50 years.  This 
monumental undertaking -- a model not only for the Great 
Lakes region but Africa as a whole -- is an avowed policy 
priority that will require sustained commitment, both 
politically and materially.  What is needed to realize this 
objective is a realistic electoral calendar, a plan to ensure 
the security of elections, greatly enhanced logistical 
support -- and a lot of focus and a smattering of luck. 
 
2. (C) Already, however, blockages and delays posed by 
technical experts at the UNDP and elsewhere, who seem to be 
in search of a perfect election, threaten to make the 
international community one of the potential electoral 
spoilers.  It will be important for the international 
community, through the CIAT, to speak with one voice in 
pushing for progress and for all of us to ensure that the 
necessary financial and logistical resources are available. 
These first elections will not be perfect by any means, but 
the DRC will have five years before its next round of 
elections to make improvements to the process.  Our 
responsibility is to ensure that the Congolese people have 
elections which will be accepted as free and fair within the 
timeframe provided for by the Sun City Accords, i.e., by June 
30, 2006. End Summary. 
 
Getting The Calendar Right 
-------------------------- 
 
3. (C)  The Independent Electoral Commission, donor country 
Ambassadors (or their representatives), UNDP and 
international experts met twice the week of May 9, and will 
continue meeting this week, to try to establish a realistic 
electoral calendar reflecting both political realities and 
technical difficulties in a country the size of the US east 
of the Mississippi with essentially no infrastructure. 
Technical challenges include ensuring the timely arrival and 
distribution of voter registration machines, training 
sufficient Congolese staff to man the 9,000 voter 
registration centers and the 40,000 polling stations, and 
obtaining sufficient air transport to ensure timely 
distribution and collection of ballot boxes, among others. 
Daunting as these obstacles are, the real challenge lies in 
the political arena. 
 
4. (C)  The transition must officially and legally end by 
June 30, 2006 (not/not June 30, 2005 as the UDPS and some 
opposition parties claim), and national elections must be 
completed before that date. The Congolese and others 
currently envision four elections -- local (governors and 
provincial legislatures), Parliamentary (National Assembly) 
and two rounds of Presidential elections to ensure the victor 
has a clear majority.  What all this means is that, working 
backwards from the end point of June 30, 2006, we have the 
following reality (which is in a sense a worst-case scenario, 
since ideally elections would be completed before June of 
next year): 
 
June 30, 2006 - transition culminates and elections end with 
the final round of Presidential elections 
 
May 2006 -- the mandated 30-day pause between rounds in the 
Presidential elections 
 
April 2006 - the first Presidential election 
 
March 2006 -- Parliamentary elections 
 
February 2006 - local elections 
 
December 2005/January 2006 - elections campaigning 
 
November 2005 - electoral law proposed to and approved by 
Parliament, signed by the President and promulgated 
(constitutional referendum required first to be complete) 
 
October 2005 - national referendum on the constitution 
(required by the Sun City Accords and the transitional 
constitution) 
 
June - September 2005 - national voter registration (required 
before the constitutional referendum) 
 
(Note:  Technical experts recently have proposed a variation 
of their original calendar, in which time would be saved by 
combining the local, Parliamentary and first Presidential 
elections and cutting back the campaign time to one month. 
Unfortunately, this unwieldy suggestion has some fatal flaws. 
 For instance, in a country with no/no national 
communications infrastructure such as television or radio, 
parties clearly will not be able to conduct campaigns in only 
thirty days.  Likewise, trying to combine the large numbers 
of candidates involved in the three proposed elections to be 
combined would be a receipe for widescale fraud, carrying 
with it the risk of delegitimizing the elections.  We would 
be better served to search for creative ways to save time 
now, such as accelerating and compressing the voter 
registration process in order to have the referendum more 
quickly.  End Note.) 
 
5. (C)  As the above outline illustrates, there is no time to 
indulge technical qualms.  International experts (sometimes 
including our own) risk losing the possible in search of the 
perfect.  Some, particularly within the UNDP, continue 
blindly to insist on the need to adhere to, and completely 
verify, a rigid calendar of steps, beginning with voter 
registration, which, when carried to its logical conclusion, 
would not allow elections to be completed by next June. 
 
6. (C)  For instance, the experts argue that the referendum 
cannot take place before November at the earliest because a 
month to a month-and-a-half will be needed to 
double-and-triple check voter registration lists.  While of 
course desirable, doing so is one among many examples of 
spending time that simply does not exist. Such verification 
could, for instance, be completed after the referendum and 
before the elections, a suggestion which the technicians 
resist because it could pose problems for verifying voters 
for the referendum.  Ultimately, however, they fail to 
realize that it will be easier to sustain problems with the 
referendum than with the elections themselves, and that the 
priority should be getting things right for elections. 
 
7. (C) There apparently is also an attempt by some experts to 
portray the political reality as literally too expensive to 
achieve.  The UNDP experts, for instance, insist that 
realizing even a slightly accelerated schedule from the one 
currently proposed (a schedule which still would not meet the 
political realities outlined above) will require additional 
financial resources over and above those already pledged, 
possibly another $30m -- a request which the EU and others 
seem prepared to entertain, given the importance of the 
political exigencies. 
 
Securing the Elections 
---------------------- 
 
8. (C)  The necessary Congolese legislative and structural 
framework already is in place to provide for security for the 
elections. The Interior Ministry has developed a plan, 
utilizing Congolese and MONUC resources; a coordinating 
committee (including the international community) will hold 
its first meeting this week; and the President has signed the 
decree which assigns primary responsibility to the police, 
with the military in a supporting capacity. 
 
9. (C)  Monuc is preparing to present formally to the UNSC a 
request for the necessary additional resources to ensure 
secure elections, including new military elements to be 
stationed in Katanga and the two Kasai provinces (all three 
high-risk electoral flashpoints), additional civilian 
personnel to help set up and monitor elections sites, and 
logistical support, particularly aircraft which will be 
needed to deliver and collect ballot boxes for the referendum 
and the elections.  The French-supported training program for 
the Congolese police is well underway and should result in at 
least 9,000 police specifically trained for elections 
security support, although both the French and the Minister 
of Interior hope to actually have over 25,000 by the time 
they are needed, if the training continues apace. 
 
Supporting the Process -- What Can We Do? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
10. (C)  The U.S. has a vital role to play in ensuring that 
free and fair elections in the DRC actually take place. 
These elections are a costly but essential component of 
stabilizing the region and providing a role model for other 
fragile states.  We suggest three focus areas requiring 
immediate attention from Washington. 
 
-- We need to contribute significant elections funding and 
support, sooner rather than later. At present, thanks largely 
to our complete financial absence from the pre-electoral 
scene, we do not even merit a seat at the decision-making 
table.  Even non-CIAT members (such as Sweden, Japan, Germany 
and Ireland) are making substantial contributions to support 
elections, and therefore speak with more authority than we. 
 
-- Support MONUC's request for additional, elections-related 
resources.  MONUC is the logistical backbone of the elections 
and it needs to receive the necessary means to fulfill this 
responsibility. 
 
-- Ensure coordination among key international players, such 
as the UNSC and the Contact Group, echoing the strong 
coordination already present in Kinshasa through the CIAT. 
We have to ensure that messages from capitals -- and the UNSC 
-- enforce those being delivered on the ground. 
 
Can These Elections Happen?  Absolutely 
--------------------------------------- 
 
11. (C)  The National Assembly is scheduled to formally 
consider this week the request from the Independent Electoral 
Commission to approve the first six-month extension of the 
transition, based on the logistical impossibility (as shown 
above) of organizing and conducting elections before June 
2006.  The request is expected to be approved, as is the 
second request (which cannot be advanced until December). 
Working together, with a realistic calendar and the necessary 
resources, we believe that the Congolese people can have 
their first elected, democratic government since independence. 
DOUGHERTY