US embassy cable - 05ABUJA756

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000756 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, MOPS, EPET, PREL, NI 
SUBJECT: GON PRESENTATION ON NIGER DELTA 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Thomas P. Furey for Reasons 1.5 (b) an 
d (d). 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY:  President Obasanjo has given us a document 
asking for cooperation in "ensuring availability, security 
and stability of hydrocarbon resources in the Niger Delta," 
although he refers to it as about the Gulf of Guinea as a 
whole and includes some regional efforts as a figleaf that it 
is also Nigeria's neighbors' problem.  The report is not 
aimed at them, however, it is aimed at the international oil 
companies and the U.S. and UK governments, whose interests 
are more at risk.  The GON document is long on background, 
not always accurate, and very short on how the GON, foreign 
governments and international oil companies would work 
together.  The document does, however, frankly acknowledge 
that the GON is totally absent from much of the oil-rich 
Delta.  Perhaps that and the skimpy plans for future 
initiatives are at least a start, and worth our and the oil 
companies pursuing it further.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) The Ambassador with PolCouns notetaker met May 12 with 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation's Group Managing 
Director, Funsho Kupolokun, at the request of President 
Obasanjo to discuss GON plans for restoring stability to the 
Niger Delta.  Kupolokun gave us a slightly updated copy of a 
plan that Obasanjo had given to the Ambassador and a visiting 
delegation led by EUCOM DCDR Gen. Wald, NSC Africa Director 
Dr. Courville, and DASD Whalen on May 3 (reftel). 
 
3. (C) Kupolokun explained (and we have heard from other 
sources) that he has been designated to put together a GON 
strategy to restore stability to the Niger Delta, including 
security, political and development action.  The actors would 
include Nigeria's Presidency, military, police, development 
authorities and states, working with Nigerian and 
international oil companies, and foreign governments (mostly 
U.S. and UK).  Kupolokun noted that the GON seeks to increase 
oil production capacity to 4.1 million bpd (from the present 
2.5 million bpd), which will require some 34 billion USD in 
new investment over the next five years.  The GON seeks to 
expand natural gas production likewise through investment of 
some 32 billion USD.  The GON realized, he said, that it 
needed to create stability in the Delta to make such 
investment possible. 
 
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GON PLAN:  LONG ON BACKGROUND... 
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4. (C) Kupolokun walked us through the first 62 background 
pages of the 72 page document, explaining the 
economic/strategic importance of the Niger Delta, how 
previous Nigerian Governments and the oil companies have 
created the current mess, and efforts to date of the present 
authorities to improve it.  When the Ambassador noted that 
the report's list of what Nigeria's state governments have 
done and are doing to help does not reflect reality, that 
they are doing little to help and instead stealing much of 
their budgets, Kupolokun rolled his eyes and said he had had 
to put in the document what the state governors told him they 
were doing, not reality.  There was a similar exchange of 
incredulousness on the activities of the GON's Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC), also widely accused of great 
theft and little positive action. 
 
5. (C) The document was more honest and even lucid in some 
other parts of the background assessment.  Page 42 on 
violence, instability and conflict, for example, says "State 
(GON) institutions and services are completely absent in a 
substantial number of communities, and hence oil companies 
are forced to take over parts of the social welfare 
functions, thereby seemingly constituting a 'surrogate 
government.'"  Later it said, "Illegal bunkering (theft) of 
oil, illegal tapping of pipelines, and sale of the stolen 
fuel or crude oil to buy weapons, political support and fund 
militias has created a large criminal sector leading to 
disruption of oil operations, loss of revenue, and 
instability."  The report speaks of oil "shut-ins," meaning 
production losses due to theft and militias closing 
facilities as some 250,000 bpd, of which 80,000 is Shell's 
being kept out of Ogoniland.  (Note:  The resulting 160,000 
bpd figure is close to the 150,000 bpd estimate for stolen 
oil the Embassy uses, but is far above the 20,000-60,000 bpd 
figures that the Finance Minister and other GON officials 
give.  End Note.) 
 
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...AND SHORT ON ACTION 
---------------------- 
 
6. (C) The last ten pages of 72 touch briefly on "domestic 
and international initiatives" to be taken by the Nigerian 
Presidency, military and development agencies, Nigeria's 
state governments, Nigerian and international oil companies, 
and foreign governments.  The main foreign governments being 
considered are the U.S. and UK; Kupolokun said he had made 
the same briefing earlier to the British High Commissioner 
(who told us he was more impressed).  Early in this section, 
the document says baldly "The GON may not be able to sustain 
its domestic initiatives if the parallel international 
cooperative initiatives are not instituted." 
 
7. (C) The "domestic and international initiatives" are 
divided into two groups, those requiring immediate attention 
and cooperation, and "areas for further discussion and 
attention."  The GON immediates were a long list of what the 
Obasanjo administration claims it is already doing (e.g. 
defeating corruption, EITI, a campaign to confiscate/destroy 
all illegal weapons, etc.), and political work the GON wants 
to do through a "Niger Delta Peace and Security Working 
Group" that will include all "stakeholders."  Foreign 
governments and international oil companies are foreseen as 
being "stakeholders" with the GON, state governments and 
community groups, although neither Kupolokun nor Obasanjo has 
yet asked us to join.  The Working Group's tasks would be to 
develop a Peace and Security Strategy, as well as to develop 
a coalition to work toward sustainable peace in the Delta on 
the basis of that strategy. 
 
8. (C) The "Role of the International Community" was more 
detailed about "immediate" needs.  The GON wants cooperation 
on establishing coastal zone management, on tracking and 
prosecuting money launderers (which we suspect could be 
broadened to include major oil thieves), and on stopping 
unauthorized import and militia ownership of weapons. 
Nigerian "communities" would be asked to rebuild their 
traditional institutions by "restoration of traditional moral 
values."  State governments would be asked to prevent 
militias, use more of their revenue for development, and 
"desist from exciting their citizens in expectation of cheap 
and easy but unrealizable access to wealth through local 
control of natural resources."  The latter, Kupolokun 
explained, was not about getting state governors out of the 
illicit oil theft business, which many are big players in, 
but rather about stopping their political agitation for a 
bigger cut of the GON's licit revenues. 
 
9. (C) The Ambassador noted that the vaunted anti-corruption 
campaigns have not produced convictions, nor even many 
acquittals.  Kupolokun replied with the stock GON line: "We 
cannot overcome 20 years (of military rule) very quickly -- 
we are doing our best and are sending a strong message."  The 
Ambassador noted that Nigeria's state governments technically 
do not control police or military to do what the document has 
them doing, and that the GON would have a difficult time 
getting them to curb militias when the governors themselves 
controlled so many of the militias.  Kupolokun looked skyward 
for help and said: "I cannot say any of those things." 
 
10. (C) The areas for further discussion were essentially a 
wish list.  The part it seems is intended for foreign 
governments included police training and equipment (including 
an "air wing"), training and equipping a Nigerian military 
special operations force, government capacity building, 
conflict management, coastal zone management, information 
technology, infrastructure development, environmental 
remediation and restoration of biodiversity.  The part of the 
list apparently intended for international oil companies 
includes building 6 billion USD worth of electric power 
generation stations and transmission networks, and paying 
another 100 billion naira (769 million USD) to NDDC for a 
"Niger Delta Human Development Fund."  Several other NDDC 
activities were listed for funding.  Kupolokun said: "Tell me 
what can be done, and I will find a way to put it into 
official language." 
 
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COMMENT 
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11. (C) There is not much meat in the GON document, and even 
less inkling of how Kupolokun's Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) would bring together the GON military, 
political and development bureaucracies necessary to make any 
of it work.  Indeed, the document did not mention NNPC itself 
doing anything in the areas for immediate attention or the 
areas for further discussion.  For next steps it had a 
meeting "at ministerial level or equivalent" to discuss and 
clarify the GON's proposal, which seems to have precious 
little to discuss and no intention to clarify.  Kupolokun 
asked only that the PolCouns set up further meetings for him 
with the Ambassador to keep a dialogue going. 
 
12. (C) There is a huge problem in the Delta, a society 
breakdown now with political, security, environmental, and 
economic disasters seemingly headed toward further crisis. 
It certainly threatens the expansion of oil exports, as 
Kupolokun noted, and possibly threatens Nigeria's polity with 
a Columbia-like cartelization scenario.  The document frankly 
acknowledged that the GON does not control much of the Delta. 
 The oil majors recognize the threat, and agree with us that 
their and the GON's security, political and development 
paradigms must change.  The question is whether to push for 
GON involvement through this document from Obasanjo via the 
NNPC, or whether to seek an alternative approach. 
FUREY