US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI2173

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ABU DHABI 002173 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARPI, AND NEA/PI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2015 
TAGS: KDEM, PGOV, ECON, KPAO, PREL, XF, KMPI, TC 
SUBJECT: UAE DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY TO SUPPORT FREEDOM 
AGENDA 
 
REF: STATE 80607 
 
Classified By: (U) Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1 
.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Although the United Arab Emirates is a 
wealthy and economically advanced country, an open political 
system and political competition do not exist.  The UAE has 
no elections, no political parties, and no trade unions.  The 
existing appointed consultative bodies that debate and adopt 
policies are non-transparent.  Nevertheless, the UAEG and its 
principal rulers enjoy a high degree of political legitimacy 
among much of the population as a result of successful 
long-term policies to distribute oil wealth and educational 
and employment opportunities to citizens.  The World Bank 
ranks the UAE higher than all other Mideast countries in 
terms of good governance, with a score of 86.1. 
 
2. (C) Summary continued:  While rapid economic development 
and redistribution of wealth have established legitimacy, 
these generous allowances are not a substitute for reform. 
They do not in and of themselves supplant the need for public 
participation, stability or social development.  The U.S. 
should encourage the ruling families to introduce 
representative government/elections, but this is not the only 
reform needed to open the political space in the UAE.  An 
open and independent operating environment for civil society, 
a free and independent media, and greater transparency and 
access to the legislative and regulatory process are possible 
within the next eighteen months.  Advancing reform in the UAE 
requires a two-fold approach:  quiet -- but frank -- 
diplomacy with the senior leadership and a bottom-up strategy 
of programming and dialogue (to include targeting of both 
youth and female groups) to increase support for reforms 
among the population at large.  End summary. 
 
Overview 
-------- 
 
3. (C) The UAE's decentralized federal political system 
generates consensus-based decision-making through the 
co-existence of traditional and modern forms of government. 
The UAE's seven emirates must agree on the passage and 
implementation of new laws.  Informal mechanisms such as the 
UAE leaders' open majlises that allow nationals to voice 
opinions and seek redress have historically provided a degree 
of government responsiveness to its citizens.  UAE citizens 
constitute a mere 15 percent of the population, with guest 
workers from South Asia and the Arab world greatly 
outnumbering Emirati nationals. 
 
4. (C) The UAEG's commitment and continued ability to use its 
sizeable wealth to satisfy the needs of its small citizenry 
constitute the "ruling bargain" and explain the absence to 
date of significant popular pressure for change.  However, as 
the UAE becomes an increasingly developed and modern society 
and its population continues to grow rapidly, these 
traditional mechanisms are becoming less effective.  The 
post-Zayed Abu Dhabi leadership has recognized the need for a 
broad range of reforms.  For example, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince 
Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) and his brother Sheikh Mansoor bin 
Zayed have told us that Abu Dhabi Emirate is developing a 
plan for elected local councils.  There has been similar 
discussion in some of the other emirates. 
 
5. (C) We expect that the senior leadership would assess the 
results of any local body elections very cautiously before 
moving toward broader emirate level or national elections. 
This reflects the leadership,s oft-stated concern that 
Islamic fundamentalists could "take advantage" of elections 
for which the population is "unprepared" ) a concern that we 
have heard voiced recently by MbZ and his younger brother, 
State Security Director Sheikh Hazza bin Zayed.  Nonetheless, 
we need to encourage the UAEG to move at a less glacial pace 
on developing its plans for representative government and 
local body/municipal elections.  (Note: We are aware that Abu 
Dhabi has already worked with private U.S. consultants on 
developing local body districting options.) 
 
6.  (C) Other reforms emanating from Abu Dhabi's ruling 
family are Minister of Information Sheikh Abdullah bin 
Zayed,s publicly-stated commitment to legislate press 
freedom in a new media law and Minister of Education Sheikh 
Nahyan,s push for reforms at the primary, secondary and 
university levels.  In addition, in the context of our 
bilateral FTA negotiations, the UAEG is moving toward 
adoption of international labor standards. From the 
bottom-up, at least two human rights organizations are 
pushing for legal recognition. 
 
Strategy for Reform 
-------------------- 
7. (C) The U.S. should encourage the leadership (Abu Dhabi's 
Al Nahyan and Dubai's Al Maktoum ruling families) to 
introduce representative government/elections and engage with 
and support the nascent civil society groups working toward 
this goal -- but these are not the only reforms needed to 
open the political space in the UAE.  We can and should back 
a range of reforms for which there is already a degree of 
support within UAE society -- and a likelihood of progress in 
2005 and 2006.   These include increased movement toward 
individual freedom, freedom of association, participation, 
equality of opportunity, rule of law, open political 
competition, institutional checks and balances, government 
accountability, responsiveness to citizens, and competent and 
effective governance.  We believe that progress on an open 
and independent operating environment for NGOs, a free and 
independent media, and greater transparency and access to 
laws and regulations is possible by the end of 2006. 
 
8. (C) Advancing reform in the UAE requires a two-fold 
approach: quiet, but frank, diplomacy with the senior 
leadership and a targeted bottom-up strategy of programming 
and dialogue to increase support for reforms among the 
population at large. For reform to succeed in this country, 
it must be seen as a home-grown phenomenon.  In some cases, 
close identification with the United States may undermine 
rather than advance reforms.  Programming targeted at youth 
and female populations may prove particularly effective. 
(Although women constitute 60-70 percent of college students 
in the UAE, they cannot participate openly in public 
discussions, since they cannot use the traditional majlis 
system of open consultations with government leaders that is 
open to the men.) 
 
Desired Outcome:  Representative Government 
------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Status:  There has been recent significant discussion 
in the media, primarily among academics, about the need to 
open the political space.  Abu Dhabi Emirate is considering 
municipal elections, we have been told privately, and has 
quietly begun developing a plan for local councils.  Sharjah 
Emirate has appointed municipal councils, noting that they 
may one day be elected.  The Federal National Council (FNC) 
is an appointed body, but the Constitution leaves it up to 
each Emirate's ruler whether to appoint or elect members. 
There has been discussion in some emirates of electing some 
members.  It is generally agreed that oil-rich Abu Dhabi 
emirate will set the scene for the other six emirates with 
regard to any announcements on representative government. 
 
10. (C) Goal:  Municipal elections in Abu Dhabi Emirate by 
the end of 2006 that enfranchise all citizens, including 
women.  Dubai and the five northern emirates also develop 
plans for local elections. 
 
11. (C) Milestones: 
 
--Abu Dhabi announces local election plans/voter registration 
by March 2006; 
 
--Dubai and the northern emirates announce local 
elections/voter registration simultaneously or soon 
thereafter in March 2006; 
 
--Abu Dhabi Emirate holds municipal elections, including 
voting privileges for all UAE citizens, by December 2006. 
 
12. (C) Tactics:  With a carefully targeted approach, the 
U.S. can and should encourage the UAE leadership to move 
forward on elections.  The ideal format would be a series of 
one-on-one meetings with senior leaders (President Khalifa, 
MbZ, Dubai Crown Prince Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum) and 
senior USG officials.  Resource considerations:  Once the UAE 
announces its intention to hold local elections, there may 
possibly be a role for U.S. NGOs (IFES, IRI, NDI) -- although 
the UAEG is also likely to want any voter 
registration/election planning to appear "homegrown" -- even 
if the districting plans are mapped out by private 
US-consultants. 
 
Desired Outcome: Civil Society Development 
------------------------------------------- 
 
13. (C) Status:  The basic elements of a democratic political 
culture -- including political space for independent groups 
and freedom of the press -- are not yet in place in the UAE. 
There are no authorized human rights groups or other truly 
independent NGOs promoting change.  The nascent civil society 
sector does not have the capacity to engage in meaningful 
public policy review or to monitor effectively the activities 
of government institutions.  Public assembly and association 
are subject to government approval and oversight. 
 
14. (C) Goal:  Operating under new labor and NGO laws, civil 
society organizations act independently of the UAEG. 
 
15. (C) Milestones: 
 
--Enactment of a labor union law that grants the 
international labor rights of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining by December 2005; 
 
--Enactment of revised labor regulations allowing workers to 
change their sponsors or employment by December 2006; 
 
--Enactment of an NGO law that allows civil society 
organizations to form independently of government sponsorship 
by December 2006; 
 
--Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs approves establishment 
of the first NGO by December 2005. 
 
16. (C) Tactics:  Encouraging civil society development will 
require both diplomatic dialogue to encourage the revision of 
the labor laws and a new NGO law.  Programming could support 
the necessary legal reforms, as well as the strengthening of 
new civil society groups.  Resources include U.S. expertise 
and support on NGO and labor laws, training civil society 
groups, and IV programs.  Programs must also target 
independent women's groups.  The Free Trade Agreement is the 
key instrument for enacting a labor union law granting 
international labor standards.  Additional diplomatic 
engagement to ensure continued attention to these targets and 
milestones remains vital for ensuring the enactment of an NGO 
law and a revised labor law that allows foreign workers to 
change employers without penalty.  Resource considerations: 
MEPI, ECA programming. 
 
Desired Outcome: Media Reform 
------------------------------ 
 
17. (C) Status:  The UAE media avoids criticism of the 
government and exercises a large degree of self-censorship. 
There are widespread examples of control of the largely 
expatriate journalist community through the veiled threat of 
revoking their work permits.  Government officials have broad 
discretionary authority to take legal action against 
journalists, including bringing criminal charges, if stories 
cross their redlines.  Nonetheless, Minister of Information 
and ruling family member Sheikh Abdullah has been a vocal 
proponent of a new media law, and has actively encouraged the 
Journalists Association to provide suggested language for a 
new law. 
 
18. (C) Goal:  A more vigorous and freer press, operating 
under a new press law that guarantees press freedom by the 
end of 2006.  Members of the press (most of whom are 
expatriates) operate without fear of government reprisal that 
could affect their freedom or visa status.  The UAE becomes a 
model for the rest of the region on media reform and freedom. 
 
19. (C) Milestones: 
 
--Journalists Association provides language for a new press 
law by September 2005; 
 
--New media law is written and enacted by May 2006; 
 
--UAE takes leadership role in promoting regional media 
reform by December 2006. 
 
20. (C) Tactics:  Resources required for media reform include 
MEPI-funded U.S. media and press law experts (particularly to 
aid Journalist Association efforts to provide the UAEG legal 
reform recommendations) and diplomatic engagement to 
encourage the UAE to take a leadership role in regional media 
reform efforts.  The Embassy's Public Diplomacy section will 
continue to target programs aimed at women journalists, such 
as the workshop planned for May 2005.  Resource 
considerations:  MEPI, ECA programming. 
 
Desired Outcome:  Transparency 
------------------------------- 
 
21. (C) Status:  Despite high marks from the World Bank for 
good governance and rule of law, UAEG decision-making is 
undeniably opaque.  Although the UAE has a comprehensive set 
of laws and regulations, many of these laws and regulations 
appear to apply selectively.  We have seen firsthand in the 
FTA process that the UAEG is unwilling/unable to share draft 
legislation and there is no period of public comment on 
legislation or regulations.  Oftentimes, the fact that a 
decision has been made at senior levels is not apparent to 
mid-level Emiratis.  Even if the decision has been made and 
is considered common practice, there is rarely any formal 
enforceable regulation.  This opacity makes it difficult to 
assess accountability or to determine which decisions are 
based on influence and which on merit.  As the society and 
economy become more complex, it is clear that today's 
informal mechanisms will work less and less well in the 
future. 
 
22. (C) Goal:  A comprehensive and fully transparent set of 
laws and regulations that is publicly accessible, in Arabic 
and English, and a formal, transparent mechanism for people 
to comment on draft legislation.  This outcome will influence 
the ability of the UAE to develop and promote enforceable 
laws and regulations that are understood by the population, 
and allow interested parties to formally participate in the 
drafting of public legislation. 
 
23. (C) Milestones: 
 
-- The UAEG will publish all of its current laws and 
regulations in a searchable forum by January 2006.  (Note: 
Currently laws are published in the official gazette, but the 
gazette itself is inaccessible to the general public, which 
makes it difficult to find laws after passage.  Furthermore, 
many local practices are governed by Ruler's Decrees that 
never make it to the gazette.  Publishing all currently 
effective laws and regulations in a searchable -- perhaps 
online forum would improve the ability of UAE citizens and 
residents to understand and comment on existing laws and 
regulations.  End Note.) 
 
-- The UAEG will begin officially translating all laws into 
English to reach the 85 percent expatriate population, many 
of whom do not speak Arabic, by July 2006; 
 
-- The UAE establishes a formal, transparent mechanism for 
citizens to comment on draft legislation (similar to the U.S. 
Federal Register process) by December 2006. 
 
24. (C) Tactics:  The USG needs to use diplomatic engagement 
to raise awareness in the UAEG, as well as to encourage a 
mechanism for public comment on draft legislation.  Ongoing 
Free Trade Agreement negotiations offer one avenue through 
the transparency chapter.  The U.S. business community is an 
ally in this goal, and we should encourage them to engage on 
this issue as well.  Training is needed to support 
development of a searchable forum for UAEG laws and 
regulations, as well training on options for a Federal 
Register type of process.  As with other targets, women 
remain a key audience for such training programs.  Resource 
considerations:  MEPI programming. 
 
Long-Term Effort:  Judicial Reform 
------------------------------------- 
 
25. (C) The Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs oversees 
the entire UAE justice system -- from prosecutors to judges 
-- in civil, criminal, and sharia courts.  There is no 
separation of power; there is no independent judiciary.  Many 
judges (the majority of whom are Egyptian or Sudanese) are 
only trained in sharia law.  Full judicial reform will 
require significant political will and will be a very long 
term effort.  The USG needs to ensure criminal and civil law 
training programs remain on track; these efforts will need to 
be sustained and ongoing far beyond the calendar year 2006 
timeframe of this strategy paper.  Resource considerations: 
DOJ OPDAT and MEPI programming. 
SISON