US embassy cable - 05SANAA1303

S E C R E T SANAA 001303 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ 
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2015 
TAGS: AMGT, ASEC, PREL, PTER, EAC 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 05/15/2005 
 
Classified By: RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
1.  (S/NF)  Post EAC convened on May 15 at 15:00 A.M.local 
time to discuss recent threat information targeting Embassy 
facilities and personnel.  Key offices and personnel 
represented at the meeting included: AMB, DAT, FPD, MO, 
LEGATT, POLE, POLM, OMC, CCE-Y, USAID, RSO, CONS, and PD. 
 
2.  (S/NF)  The Ambassador provided a summary of a report 
recently provided by ROYG Interior Minister Alimi in 
connection with the recent arrests of several al-Houthi cell 
members in and around Sana'a.  The information provided 
indicates that members of the al-Houthi rebellion had entered 
Sana'a with the intent, as part of a broader campaign, to 
conduct attacks, including rocket or missile attacks, against 
the US Embassy and the Ambassador specifically. Reports 
suggested that the cell members were considering attacks from 
high vantage points near the Embassy compound, as well as 
exploring the possibility of targeting the Ambassador during 
two of his recent official trips outside Sana'a.  The report 
found no indication that the cell in question had any 
interaction or linkage with Al-Qaeda, but suggests that they 
seem to have adopted some of the same methods and tactics. 
The ROYG assured post that local security forces have 
arrested nearly the entire cell in question, and expect to 
detain the remaining members shortly.  Further information 
regarding this threat and the ROYG response will be provided 
in septel. 
 
3.  (S/NF)  EAC members agreed that this most recent report 
continues the now well-established pattern of groups and 
individuals in Yemen targeting the official American presence 
in-country for attack, and agreed that maintaining and 
reinforcing the strong security practices already in place is 
the best response at the moment.  The EAC also reviewed the 
Ambassador's operational security practices, and discussed 
the possibility of extending or expanding the compound 
perimeter with heightened enclosures to mitigate the 
possibility of rocket attacks. 
Krajeski