US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI2183

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DPP PREVAILS IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION

Identifier: 05TAIPEI2183
Wikileaks: View 05TAIPEI2183 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Created: 2005-05-14 12:42:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PINR CH TW
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

141242Z May 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002183 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CH, TW 
SUBJECT: DPP PREVAILS IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 2066 
 
     B. TAIPEI 2114 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
surpassed expectations, securing 127 seats (43 percent) in 
the May 14 National Assembly (NA) election.  The KMT failed 
to achieve its goal of emerging as the largest party, winning 
117 seats (39 percent).  The DPP-KMT's combined 83 percent 
vote share should ensure that the package of constitutional 
reforms passed by the Legislative Yuan (LY) last summer will 
be confirmed.  The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) and People 
First Party (PFP) had hoped to win at least a quarter of the 
vote to have a shot at blocking the measures, but both 
parties fell well short of their projections.  The election 
results are expected to be particularly damaging to the PFP, 
which dropped to last place among the major parties, despite 
recent media attention over party Chairman James Soong's May 
12 meeting with PRC President Hu Jintao.  While the Pan-Blue 
has cited a record low turnout rate (23 percent) to downplay 
the significance of the election, the DPP's strong showing 
should boost President Chen Shui-bian as he seeks to defend 
his domestic and cross-Strait policies from critics on both 
sides.  End Summary. 
 
Taiwan Elections Pro-Reform National Assembly 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) The National Assembly (NA) elected on May 14 will be 
dominated by parties committed to approving constitutional 
amendments passed by the Legislative Yuan (LY) in August, 
2004 (Ref A).  Out of the 300 seats up for grabs, 249 (83 
percent) were allotted to parties, primarily the DPP and KMT, 
committed to passing the legislation.  Opponents of the 
reforms, primarily smaller parties and activist group, won 
only 51 seats (17 percent).  Failure by anti-reform parties 
to secure 25 percent of the seats make it almost impossible 
for smaller parties to use procedural mechanisms to derail 
the reform package, which will among other things create an 
election system favoring large parties.  While turnout was a 
record low 23 percent, Premier Frank Hsieh announced that the 
election results were fully valid. 
 
The DPP Beats Expectations 
-------------------------- 
 
3. (C) President Chen Shui-bian's DPP exceeded its own 
projections, securing 127 seats (43 percent) of the 300 up 
for grabs in the May 14 election.  The DPP defied fears of a 
major setback, maintaining its status as the largest party 
and increasing its percentage of the vote over the December 
2004 LY election by nearly seven percentage points.  DPP 
Chairman Su Tseng-chang, who had threatened to resign if the 
DPP did not secure the number one slot was clearly ecstatic 
at the results.  Media commentators also cited the DPP's 
strong showing as a validation for Chen's controversial last 
minute campaign attacks on various political leaders (Ref B). 
 On the eve of the election, National Security Council (NSC) 
Secretary General Chiou I-jen asserted that while Chen's 
 
SIPDIS 
recent rhetoric clearly offended many centrist and Pan-Blue 
voters, Chen had clearly succeeded in re-energizing the DPP's 
core support base.  Executive Yuan (EY) Secretary General Lee 
Ying-yuan told AIT that the DPP's victory will provide a 
major morale boost going into the December 2005 local 
election campaign.  He also asserted that the results 
demonstrated that the Pan-Blue will be unable to leverage its 
recent contacts with the Mainland into more votes at the 
polls. 
 
KMT Gains Seats, but Suffers Moral Defeat 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) In contrast to celebrations at the DPP, the mood at 
KMT headquarters was subdued.  The KMT's share of the vote 
also increased over its performance in the LY election (from 
33-39 percent), but KMT expectations that it would pass the 
DPP's vote share in the wake of Chairman Lien Chan's recent 
visit to the Mainland failed to pan-out.  Just before polls 
closed on May 14, KMT Spokesman Chang Jung-kung boasted that 
public enthusiasm over Lien's historic visit may put the 
party over 130 seats.  After the returns were announced, 
Chang's Deputy, Cheng Li-wen, blamed rain and overly 
complicated ballot procedures for the KMT's second place (117 
seats) showing.  In his formal statement, Lien asserted that 
the election did not reflect public opinion, since heavy 
rains in northern and central Taiwan suppressed turnout. 
However, Lien touted the success of parties committed to 
constitutional reforms and noted the increase in the share of 
the KMT's vote over the December LY election. 
 
TSU Moves to Number Three After PFP Collapse 
 
SIPDIS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) TSU officials put a positive spin on its showing (21 
seats), despite the fact that its support rate (7 percent) 
did not even reach the disappointing 8 percent gained in the 
December LY election.  However, TSU Chairman Su Chin-chiang 
boasted that the party has for the first time surpassed the 
PFP and moved up to become the third largest party in Taiwan 
politics.  The Taiwan media cast the election as a "double 
win" for the Pan-Green camp, even though the TSU and DPP are 
on opposite sides of the issues to be addressed by the NA. 
 
6. (C) PFP officials were apoplectic over the party's abysmal 
performance.  The PFP won only six percent of the vote, and 
18 seats, despite expectations that James Soong's election 
eve visit to Beijing would boost the party's showing.  The 
PFP's share of the vote was far worse than its poor showing 
in the recent LY election (14 percent), leading to questions 
over the party's future viability.  James Soong publicly 
blamed the PFP's election results on what he alleged were 
politically motivated tax evasion cases filed against him in 
a local administrative court (Comment: media coverage in the 
days leading up to the election was dominated by Soong's 
visit to the PRC, with almost no reporting on his tax evasion 
case.  End Comment).  PFP Legislator Daniel Hwang (Yi-jiao) 
told AIT on May 14 that it is not clear if the Chen 
government initiated the cases against Soong for electoral 
reasons, but said the fact that the government let the 
charges proceed raises serious questions about future 
relations between Soong and the President. 
 
Comment: DPP Gets a New Wind 
---------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Despite the lack of public attention to the May 14 
election, a major setback for the DPP could have added major 
pressure on President Chen from both ends of the spectrum. 
By the same token, the ruling party's unexpectedly strong 
showing should provide a major moral boost to the President 
and signal to Beijing that Chen cannot be avoided.  Chen 
should now have greater room to move ahead on inter-party 
reconciliation and cross-Strait moderation.  The election 
results may also discourage the KMT from pushing its recent 
successful contacts with the PRC too far.  While the KMT may 
discount the significance of the NA election, it will now be 
more difficult for the party to sustain claims that it holds 
a public mandate to take the lead on cross-Strait policy. 
PAAL 

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