US embassy cable - 05CARACAS1498

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 001498 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, MARR, VE 
SUBJECT: KELLER POLL:  VENEZUELANS SUPPORT CHAVEZ AND THE 
MILITARY BLINDLY 
 
Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR CAROLINA HIDEA FOR 1.4 (D) 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C)  Respected political analyst and pollster Alfredo 
Keller met with poloff May 10 to discuss his and the public's 
views on the GOV and the Venezuelan military.  According to 
Keller's most recent (February 2005) survey, Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez, the GOV, and the armed forces all 
received high marks.  Nonetheless, respondents gave these 
institutions much lower marks when asked about their 
performance on specific issues.  Keller complained that the 
opposition was not exploiting this phenomenon, which he 
described as a gap between "emotional" and "rational" support 
for Chavez.  Turning to his personal analysis of the 
military, Keller said he considered the military and not the 
MVR to be the real center of power in Chavez's 
administration.  Keller considered Chavez's new reserve 
recruitment drive an attempt to lower unemployment.  An 
perceptive researcher, Keller is right to note that the 
opposition could benefit from highlighting Chavez's failures 
to improve the country's worst problems, but most opposition 
groups are unlikely to change their strategies.  End summary. 
 
 
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Poll and Methodology 
-------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  Pollster and political analyst Alfredo Keller met 
with poloff May 10 to share analysis on the GOV and the 
Venezuelan military.  Keller, a Swiss citizen, heads the 
consulting firm Keller and Associates, which publishes a 
survey of Venezuelan public opinion three times a year. 
According to the methodology page of his latest briefing, 
Keller's February 2005 poll had a sample size of 1,200 
people, whose addresses were selected randomly from the 
electoral registry in 67 cities.  The survey was conducted in 
homes and included respondents from all socioeconomic strata. 
 It screened out those lacking identity cards or otherwise 
appeared unlikely to vote, and it controlled for the 
variables of sex and age.  The poll claims to have a margin 
of error of 2.89 percent. 
 
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Popular View of the Armed Forces 
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3.  (C)  Keller's poll indicates that 74 percent of 
respondents had a "favorable" opinion of the Venezuelan Armed 
Forces, a return to the high public opinion levels of the 
past after a drop over the past year or two.  The military 
received higher marks than foreign investors, the church, the 
electoral watchdog NGO Sumate, and both GOV and private 
television channels.  Venezuelan oil company PDVSA edged the 
military, although the difference between the two 
institutions' ratings was within the margin of error. 
 
4.  (C)  Despite the military's high ratings, only a slight 
majority (52 percent) of those polled approved of the large 
number of soldiers serving in civilian government positions. 
According to Keller, this statistic was part of a larger 
trend showing that the public supported the administration of 
President Hugo Chavez for "emotional" rather than "rational" 
reasons.  For example, he noted that 69 percent and 78 
percent of the country had a positive perception of Chavez 
and his government, respectively.  Yet, when the questions 
turned to whether the GOV had resolved specific problems, the 
ratings plummeted.  In fact, Keller said an average gap of 
more than 50 percentage points existed between general 
perceptions of the GOV and perceptions of its performance on 
the issues most important to the electorate, such as the 
standard and cost of living, unemployment, poverty, and 
crime.  According to Keller's research, this gap has grown 
throughout the Chavez administration--even as Chavez's 
approval rating has increased over the last year and a half. 
 
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Keller's Analysis of his Results 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
5.  (C)  Keller attributed the "rational-emotional gap" to 
the electorate's naivete.  Keller said much of the electorate 
supported Chavez without seeing standard of living 
improvements because it fell for propaganda blaming powerful 
scapegoats such as the US and foreign investment.  Having 
just returned from an international conference, Keller said 
he had learned from some of his polling peers that this 
phenomenon also occurred elsewhere in Latin America. 
 
6.  (C)  An opponent of Chavez, Keller faulted the Venezuelan 
opposition for not trying to capitalize on these trends, 
which he viewed as a great opportunity.  He said he did not 
bother talking to the traditional political parties because 
he knew they would not change their strategies.  Rather, 
Keller said he focused on instructing young politicians and a 
few old ones with new ideas.  He singled out Primero 
Justicia--with the exception of its president, Julio 
Borges--as an open-minded political party. 
 
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Personal Views on the Military 
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7.  (C)  Keller said the military--rather than the ruling 
Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) party--was the true center of 
power within the Chavez administration.  As an example, 
Keller asserted that about three years ago, Chavez threatened 
to disband the MVR and replace it with the small military 
group MBR-200, which had helped Chavez plot his coup attempt 
in 1992.  According to Keller, the most powerful government 
officials were active or former military officers, with the 
exception of Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel.  Keller 
cited Miranda Governor and former army lieutenant Diosdado 
Cabello as the GOV figure closest to Chavez and most likely 
to follow in his presidential footsteps. 
 
8.  (C)  Keller viewed Chavez's call to create more than two 
million reserves as an effort to generate employment. 
Chavez, he said, recognizes unemployment is a major problem 
but has few practical ideas on how to solve it.  According to 
Keller, the President, who has had an inflated view of the 
military's power throughout his career, now relies on the 
institution--coupled with billions of dollars of oil 
revenue--as a panacea. 
 
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Comment 
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9.  (C)  Keller is a thoughtful analyst not given to the 
usual hysterics and exaggerations of the Venezuelan 
opposition.  He is certainly correct to note that the MVR is 
ancillary to Chavez's power base, which is composed of 
current and former military officers.  He is also correct to 
recognize that the opposition could get mileage out of the 
tried-and-true US campaign challenge to voters, "ask yourself 
if you're better off," but as he says, most opposition 
members are unlikely to adapt their campaigns to trends in 
voter opinion.  GOV officials probably are already posturing 
to be the presidential candidate in 2012--MVR deputy Luis 
Tascon was suspended from the party May 10 partly for 
suggesting as much.  Diosdado Cabello is certainly a powerful 
figure, but whether he is next in line is an academic 
question, as Chavez has vowed to remain in power until 2021. 
McFarland 
 
 
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      2005CARACA01498 - CONFIDENTIAL