US embassy cable - 05QUITO1100

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ECUADOR: DEMOCRATIC DOCTOR IN THE HOUSE?

Identifier: 05QUITO1100
Wikileaks: View 05QUITO1100 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Quito
Created: 2005-05-13 13:54:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL PINR EC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 001100 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, EC 
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: DEMOCRATIC DOCTOR IN THE HOUSE? 
 
REF: QUITO 1058 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i., Arnold A. Chacon, for reasons 1. 
4 (b&d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  The political scene is coming alive with 
voices, new and old, providing different prescriptions for 
Ecuador's democratic ills.  Congress on May 11 ejected four 
more of its members, tossing due process to the wind in the 
face of threatened protests on May 12.  As the first test of 
popular sentiment and activism since ex-president Gutierrez 
was summarily dismissed by Congress on April 20 the May 12 
protest proved underwhelming, with media reporting only 1,000 
taking to the streets.  By all accounts these protesters 
comprise an extremist subset of those who demanded Gutierrez' 
ouster.  Their demands are anti-democratic and 
hyper-nationalistic:  Congress should be dissolved; an FTA 
with the US rejected, US use of an air base in Manta denied, 
and any involvement with Plan Colombia scrapped.  The GOE, 
though intimidated and weak, is unlikely to crumble in the 
face of this opening protest salvo.  Without further progress 
toward political reform, however, the protests could grow.  A 
continuing OAS role could help keep reforms on track.  End 
Summary. 
 
Congress Intimidated by Protests 
-------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) In the face of new protests threatened for the 
evening of May 12 (SepTel), Congress has taken several recent 
actions to convey a new sense of purpose.  On May 11, it 
voted to expel four of its members accused of participating 
in a late-night binge/orgy while in Lima for trade talks 
(RefTel).  In doing so, it ignored procedural rules, citing 
national urgency.  The four deputies will be replaced by 
their alternates.  Congress also announced a new process to 
dismiss 10 other deputies on various ethics charges (all of 
whom collaborated with pro-Gutierrez forces).  On May 11 and 
12, Congress debated but did not vote on President Palacio's 
partial veto of the Supreme Court bill.  PSC deputy Luis 
Fernando Torres proposed that Congress vote separately on the 
issue of reducing the size of the court from 31 to 16 
magistrates, signaling a possible override effort on that 
point alone.  Torres told PolOffs on May 10 he thought the 
veto would ultimately be approved.  On other pending 
congressional issues, he said TIP and money-laundering 
legislation would continue to move through Congress.  He also 
speculated that the Palacio government would never be strong 
enough to sign an FTA with the U.S. 
 
Conspiracy Theories Validated 
----------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Torres told PolOffs that party leader Leon Febres 
Cordero had been plotting ex-president Gutierrez' downfall 
ever since his failed impeachment attempt in November. 
Torres disagreed that Gutierrez was brought down in a 
legislative coup, claiming that Congress' decision to dismiss 
Gutierrez came after the military high command decided to 
withdraw its support from Gutierrez' government.  That 
decision was taken early on April 20, he claimed.  According 
to Torres, members of the rightist National Democratic 
Alliance (ADN) met with Congressional leaders including 
Torres on April 19, urging Gutierrez' dismissal.  The ADN is 
an ad-hoc pressure group which then included Government 
Minister Gandara and Energy Minister Cordovez.  It was 
created to bring together various groups which sought the 
removal of Gutierrez after Quito Mayor Paco Moncayo had 
rejected their tactics and expelled them from the Assembly of 
Quito.  Moncayo colorfully defended his action to us, 
labeling the ADN group as "Fascist coup-plotters" 
("golpistas"). 
 
4.  (C) In addition to meeting with Congress, according to 
Torres, the ADN had extensive contact with then-Vice 
President Palacio, who rewarded several of their leaders with 
Cabinet positions after taking office.  Most prominent were 
the appointments of Government Minister Mauricio Gandara and 
Energy Minister Fausto Cordovez. 
 
5.  (C) In a public address on May 11, former president 
Oswaldo Hurtado agreed that conspiracy was one of several 
factors contributing to the collapse of the Gutierrez 
government, including: 
 
-- Congressional disrespect for the constitution; 
-- the decision of the military high command, at the request 
of opposition political leaders, to withdraw their support 
for the government ("the dagger that ended the bullfight"); 
-- the circle around Vice President Palacio conspiring to 
take power; 
-- Gutierrez' own combative and unconstitutional actions; and, 
-- Latent racism against Gutierrez' humble mestizo roots. 
Presidential Prescriptions Vary 
------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) In addition to positions in his government, President 
Palacio has offered other palliatives to demanding "forajido" 
critics.  On May 10, Palacio assigned Vice President Serrano 
to organize national roundtable discussions intended to 
generate ideas for possible inclusion in a future national 
referendum, in collaboration with civil society leaders from 
the forajido movement.  In doing so, he reportedly agreed to 
discuss possible inclusion in such a referendum of a call for 
a constituent assembly (which would automatically dissolve 
congress and his government). 
 
7.  (U) Former president Hurtado, for his part, lamented the 
damage done to Ecuador's international reputation and 
expressed concern about the populist tone of the Palacio 
government's economic policies.  He expressed hope that 
Ecuadorians would strengthen Ecuador's democratic 
institutions, rather than seek undemocratic alternatives. 
Election reforms should strengthen larger parties by reducing 
proportional representation.  Political parties must be 
purged from their absolute control over the Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal.  (On May 5, Congress swore in a new Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal, shifting the political balance there by 
replacing Gutierrez' Patriotic Society Party representative 
with one from Pachakutik, and naming the PSC representative 
as president.)  Hurtado also expressed hope that "new 
political blood" represented by Quito's more "virtuous" 
protest leaders, would enter electoral politics to pursue 
their reform agenda. 
 
8.  (C) Quito Mayor and presidential aspirant Paco Moncayo 
seemed downbeat in a meeting on May 9.  Moncayo, who has kept 
a low public profile since publicly calling on the police and 
military to support anti-Gutierrez protests, referred to the 
"tiresome" grind of politics, and only perked up when 
defending his own virtues (not corrupt, not beholden, etc.). 
Moncayo blamed Gutierrez for being a victim of 
"self-inflicted wounds."  Were it not for Gutierrez' flagrant 
violations of the constitution, there was "no way he should 
have fallen," having survived past the halfway mark.  Moncayo 
also blamed Gutierrez for politicizing the military, at heavy 
cost.  "It will take the military 20 years to recover the 
prestige it enjoyed when I left it," he said.  About his own 
role in Gutierrez' downfall, Moncayo chose to emphasize his 
efforts to restrain radical elements in the Quito Assembly. 
He claimed not to be tarnished by his actions; as of last 
week, private polls showed no dip in his popularity (which 
remained at 80%, he claimed). 
 
9.  (C) Like Hurtado, Moncayo expressed hope that the Palacio 
government would focus on what is necessary to strengthen 
democracy during its abbreviated term.  A constituent 
assembly would be uncontrollable and silly, especially if 
politicians were barred, as some would have it.  A new 
constitution would not be the answer.  Instead, political 
reforms are desperately needed to make parties more 
accountable and constrain the influence of powerful elites. 
Those reforms should include strengthening judicial 
independence (he favors the presidential veto), electoral law 
and political party reforms to increase transparency, and 
decentralization.  Moncayo said he was in touch with Palacio 
and would meet with MinGov Gandara shortly, to emphasize 
these points. 
 
11.  (C) Vinicio Baquero, president of the 
government-supported National Higher Education Council 
(CONESUP), rejected the media's characterization of the ADN 
as a political group, saying the membership is diverse (in 
addition to CONESUP it includes the major labor union 
federation, and several citizens groups).  ADN provides a 
forum to join forces to press the government for overdue 
reforms.  With Gutierrez now gone, the ADN and other 
like-minded "forajidos" seek to maintain popular pressure on 
the government to implement political reforms.  These reforms 
could include a change in the executive/legislative branch 
relationship through the creation of a prime ministership 
responsible to Congress.  Baquero said the May 12 protests 
outside Congress, would "take the pulse" of citizen pressure 
for more structural change.  Other academic leaders of the 
anti-Gutierrez protest movement have told us they will not 
support any protests seeking to dissolve Congress. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
12.  (C) With the new government in place but struggling for 
focus, political speculation and debate is noticeably 
shifting from who comprises the new government toward what 
kind of democratic reform is necessary.  As always, there is 
no shortage of prescriptions.  Only the most extreme are 
calling for a new constitution and early elections.  To 
protect itself, the GOE is offering a national dialogue and 
referendum to put priority issues to the people.  Acutely 
sensing its own vulnerability, Congress is likely to 
facilitate the referendum process.  A positive outcome would 
include reforms which support stability by increasing 
government accountability.  A worst-case scenario for USG 
interests would be a GOE sell-out to populist and nationalist 
impulses.  An ongoing OAS role could help tip the balance in 
favor of responsible reform by providing political cover for 
the Palacio government to do the right thing. 
CHACON 

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