US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI2173

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 002173 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC, KMDR, KPAO, TW, Cross Strait Politics, Domestic Politics 
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
 
1. Summary: Taiwan dailies gave extensive coverage and 
editorial reporting May 13 to the meeting between PFP 
Chairman James Soong and Chinese President Hu Jintao 
and President Chen Shui-bian's response to the meeting 
in a TV interview Thursday.  Almost all Chinese- 
language newspapers in Taiwan reported on the Soong-Hu 
meeting on their front pages.  The centrist "China 
Times" ran a banner headline that read: "Soong-Hu 
communiqu: [the statement of] `two sides of [Taiwan] 
Strait, one China' [is used to] interpret the 1992 
Consensus."  The pro-unification "United Daily News" 
also headlined in its front page: "Soong-Hu meeting: 
`two sides of [Taiwan] Strait, one China' and `no use 
of force if [there is] no [Taiwan] independence."  The 
pro-independence "Taiwan Daily" focused on Chen's 
response to the Soong-Hu meeting in its front page, 
quoting Chen as saying that "China makes zero 
concession."  A second story on the same page of the 
"Taiwan Daily" read: "The 1992 Consensus is `two sides 
of [Taiwan] Strait, one China.'"  The pro-independence 
"Liberty Times," Taiwan's biggest daily, is the only 
Chinese-language daily that did not report on the Soong- 
Hu meeting on its front page.  On its second page, 
however, the "Liberty Times" printed a banner headline 
that said: "Soong and Hu gang up and invent `two sides 
of [Taiwan] Strait, one China,'" and the sub-headline 
read: "Both men met and reached a 6-point consensus, 
hoping to use the new term to define the 1992 Consensus 
and use it as a basis for the resumption of cross- 
Strait talks." 
 
2. President Chen's criticism of the results of the 
Soong-Hu meeting was reported in the first few pages of 
most dailies.  The "Liberty Times" noted on its page 
two: "Bian: What's the use of visiting [China] if China 
does not make any concession?" A page-two story in the 
"United Daily News" headlined: "Bian: the six-point 
consensus of Soong and Hu will create new problems."  A 
page-three news story of the "China Times" also said: 
"Bian criticizes Soong for violating their 10-point 
consensus." 
 
3. In terms of editorials and commentaries, both the 
pro-independence "Liberty Times" and "Taiwan Daily" 
editorialized that Hu Jintao has joined hands with Lien 
and Soong to restrain and destroy Taiwan.  A limited- 
circulation, pro-independence English-language "Taipei 
Times" editorial also said it is hard to find any 
substantive and innovative surprises in the Soong-Hu 
talks.  A "United Daily News" editorial commented on 
Soong's China trip, saying Soong has failed to help 
build a bridge between Chen and Hu as the words "1992 
Consensus" continued to remain in the six-point 
consensus reached between Soong and Hu.  As a result, 
the editorial said, future relations between Soong and 
Chen will surely face more complicated tests.  A "China 
Times" news analysis, however, gave a positive 
assessment of the Soong-Hu talks, saying Beijing has 
demonstrated some flexibility and the room for cross- 
Strait reconciliation has thus increased.  A separate 
"United Daily News" news analysis said traces of 
Washington's manipulation efforts are evident in the 
structure of interactions between the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait.  End summary. 
 
A) "Hu, Lien, Soong Join Forces to Constrain Taiwan; 
Even the Shadow of the Republic of China Disappears" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 
800,000] editorialized (5/13): 
 
". Whether it is the Lien-Hu press communiqu or the 
Soong-Hu conference communiqu, both blur Taiwan's 
sovereignty and further play the trick of promoting 
unification by economic interests.  The bridge built by 
y 
them leads to surrender. . 
 
". James Soong's `cooperation-with-the-communists' tour 
is approaching the end.  With the two united-front 
helpers of Lien Chan and Soong, China's ability to 
destroy Taiwan by the united-front tactic will 
definitely be strengthened.  This will be a major trial 
for Taiwan moving toward a normalized nation. 
[Judging] from the implicit mutual understanding that 
Lien Chan and James Soong have with Hu Jintao, their 
common denominators with Hu are much larger than those 
with the people of Taiwan.  If President Chen still 
wants to insist on Taiwan's sovereignty and security, 
he can no longer fantasize about using the Republic of 
China, which Lien and Soong dared not to mention [in 
the mainland], as the common denominator to seek 
reconciliation and co-existence with Lien and Soong, 
who are joining forces with the communists to constrain 
Taiwan.  It is because Lien and Soong not only did not 
find a route favorable for Taiwan, but also paved the 
way for China to have a hand in Taiwan.  Will Lien and 
Soong succeed in working with the communists against 
Taiwan or even selling out Taiwan?  Will China succeed 
in using the Trojan Horse strategy to win unification 
by economic benefits?  Will Taiwan's national 
identification be torn down and tilted toward China? 
Everyone is waiting to see what President Chen will do 
facing this historically crucial time.  Whether he will 
fight against the fad of cooperating with the 
communists and the China fever or succumb to this 
adverse current and make preparations for a Bian-Hu 
meeting, all this involves the survival of the 23 
million people in Taiwan and the protection of 
sovereignty." 
 
B) "`Two Sides of the Strait, One China' Is Extension 
of `One-China Roof,' Soong Ignores Taiwan's Sovereign 
Status.  Without Sovereignty How Can One Talk About 
Cross-Strait Equal-footing Negotiations?  Lien, Soong 
Failed to Oppose 1992 Consensus During China Visits and 
Lost Taiwan People's Dignity'" 
 
The pro-independence "Taiwan Daily" [circulation: 
150,000] commented in an editorial (5/13): 
 
". James Soong said to resume negotiations on an equal 
footing based on the `Two Side of the Strait, One 
China' principle is an extension of his past proposal 
of the `one-China Roof' theory.  There is nothing new 
about this.  Under the `one-China' framework, it equals 
losing Taiwan's sovereignty and [gaining] a status not 
different from Hong Kong's.  The so-called `Two Sides 
of the Strait, One China' is plainly a reproduction of 
`one country, two systems.' How can there be any equal 
sovereign footing or `resumption of negotiations on an 
equal basis' between the two sides across the Strait? 
James Soong's statement is self-deception.  How can it 
be accepted by the majority of the Taiwan people? ." 
 
C) "Soong-Hu Meeting an Anti-Climax" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" 
[circulation: 30,000] editorialized (5/13): 
 
"The supposed climax of People First Party (PFP) 
Chairman James Soong's trip to China took place 
yesterday, when he finally met with Chinese President 
Hu Jintao.  Although many observers had assigned 
slightly more significance to Soong's meeting with Hu 
than the prior meeting between Hu and Chinese 
Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan as a result 
of the 10-point consensus Soong had reached with 
President Chen Shui-bian, it is hard to find any 
substantive and innovative surprises in the Soong-Hu 
talks. . 
 
"As for conducting substantive talks with Chinese 
officials, nothing they said had not been uttered 
before.  At the core of all their speeches is still the 
`one China' principle and the so-called `1992 
consensus' under which this principle is supposedly 
recognized.  In other words, the fundamental roadblock 
preventing any progress in the cross-strait 
relationship remains. . 
 
"Ironically, in repudiating Taiwan independence as an 
option, Soong went on to say that independence would 
only bring disaster and war.  The problem is that these 
disasters and war could be averted if only China could 
learn to respect Taiwan's democracy and its right to 
self-determination.  So, at the end of the day, Taiwan 
independence is not an option to some people only 
because Beijing had made it to." 
 
D) "James Soong Fails to Build a Bridge between Chen 
Shui-bian and Hu Jintao" 
 
The pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 
600,000] editorialized (5/13): 
 
"Hu Jintao has revealed his last card. The discourse on 
the positions of the two sides of the Strait agreed on 
between him and James Soong equals the answer he gives 
President Chen Shui-bian via this `envoy.' . 
 
"There are two points about the position of the two 
sides of the Strait in the `meeting communiqu' 
released after the Soong-Hu meeting: `1992 Consensus' 
and `anti-Taiwan independence.' . 
 
"The formation process of the `1992 Consensus' concept 
was quite circuitous, and now it has been summarized 
into the four words of `Yi Chung Ke Piao' (one China 
with each side giving its own interpretation), and it 
is generally recognized as the bottom line for 
interpretation. The `conference communiqu' this time 
preserves the four words of `Chiu Erh Kung Shih' (1992 
Consensus), and it is already against Chen Shui-bian's 
expectations. ... 
 
"...The Mainland Affairs Council has already declared 
that the so-called `two sides of the Strait, one China' 
is just another form of the packaging of the `one China 
principle syllogism' (there is only one China in the 
world, Mainland and Taiwan belong to the same China, 
and China's sovereignty and complete territory cannot 
be allowed to be split). This kind of response is not 
something James Soong expected. 
 
". Hu Jintao's definition of the `1992 Consensus' was 
sealed in his welcoming remarks, and that is `insisting 
on realizing the 1992 Consensus, which is the one China 
principle.'  This also limits the interpretation space 
for the `meeting communiqu.' Whether Chen Shui-bian 
n 
will accept such an interpretation of `the contents of 
the 1992 meeting' will be a struggle. 
 
"Now talking about `anti-Taiwan independence:'  In the 
`press communiqu' issued between Lien and Hu, only the 
four words of `Fan Dui Tai Du' (opposition to Taiwan 
independence) was seen; but in the `conference 
communiqu' between Soong and Hu, about 130 words were 
used to handle this issue, and `name rectification,' 
`referendum,' and `the making of a new Constitution' 
were all defined as [movements of ] `Taiwan 
independence.'  A statement attracting more attention 
is that `as long as Taiwan does not show any 
possibility of proceeding toward independence, it will 
be effective to avoid cross-Strait military conflicts.' 
This is generally recognized as `no independence, no 
war,' but the opposition meaning to this is `if Taiwan 
wants to become independent, then there would be a 
war.'  On this point, James Soong seems to be trying to 
find an interpretation beneficial to cross-Strait peace 
e 
in Chinese Communist Party's `Anti-Secession Law.'" 
 
"The block of words President Chen pays most attention 
to should be `[we] hope the Taiwan leader carries out 
tangibly the promise of `five noes.' This block of 
words is very likely to cause controversies in the 
country, as the deep-green supporters will think that 
James Soong asked Hu Jintao to endorse the `10-point 
consensus between Bian and Soong.'" Although James 
Soong has written the Feb 24 `10-point consensus 
between Bian and Soong' into history, this move is very 
likely to prevent the `Bian-Soong framework' from being 
sustained. 
 
"[We can see] from observing conclusions from the Soong- 
Hu meeting, Hu is still adopting the strategy of `when 
hard being harder, when soft being softer.' The `10- 
point consensus between Bian and Soong' did not bring 
about prominent benefits, the four words of `Chiu Erh 
Kung Shih' still exists, and the relationship between 
Bian and Soong is certain to face more complicated 
tests. . 
 
"For James Soong, the last possibility for him to turn 
around is his return to the country today, and if he 
keeps to the same direction then he is really walking 
down the road of no return; for Chen Shui-bian, if he 
keeps holding to James Soong, he would make the 
situation more difficult to be solved; now he has to 
turn around and find remedies inside the green camp, 
and if he cannot smooth over the internal conflicts 
inside the green camp, the cross-Strait policies will 
still be at a standstill. 
 
"After all, before attempting to deal with cross-Strait 
relations, [Chen] has to handle and have good control 
of the cross-party and faction relations, and he 
especially has to lead the green camp to 
transformation." 
 
E) "Beijing Demonstrates Flexibility; Room for [Cross- 
Strait] Reconciliation Increases" 
 
Journalist Wang Chuo-chung noted in a news analysis of 
the centrist, pro-status quo "China Times" 
[circulation: 600,000] (5/13): 
 
"Have the words `two sides of the [Taiwan] Strait, one 
China' broken the long-term political standstill across 
the Taiwan Strait?  This is a question many people feel 
like asking following the meeting between [PFP 
Chairman] James Soong and Chinese President Hu Jintao. 
In fact, the reason why Beijing showed interest in 
holding summits with Taiwan's opposition leaders is 
mainly because it wanted to mitigate the tensions 
across the Taiwan Strait triggered by China's passage 
of the Anti-Secession Law.  Cross-Strait tensions were 
indeed alleviated following [KMT Chairman] Lien Chan's 
and Soong's China trips, but the political deadlock 
still remains, as evidenced by the DPP's unanimous 
attacks against the consensus reached between Lien, 
Soong and Hu. . 
 
"Even though Taiwan's Pan-Blue camp's understanding of 
the contents of the `1992 Consensus' differs from that 
of Beijing's, the statement of `two sides of the 
Strait, one China' cited in the Soong-Hu meeting 
indicated that to a certain extent, Beijing shares a 
tacit agreement with the Pan-Blue camp about `one 
China, different interpretations.'  For Beijing, the 
focus now remains whether or not the ruling DPP is 
willing to agree to `one China under the Constitution.' 
In fact, anytime in the future if the DPP is willing to 
talk about `one China,' that will mean it has provided 
a staircase for Beijing to step down, and Beijing will 
immediately agree to resume talks with Taiwan, which 
have been cut off for a long time. 
 
"Some experts in Taiwan affairs analyzed that Hu's new 
policy goal toward Taiwan has shifted from anti- 
independence and push for unification to maintaining 
the status quo, and in terms of political definition 
for both sides of the Taiwan Strait, Hu tends to 
silently acknowledge the `one China, different 
interpretations' advocated by the Pan-Blue camp.  In 
the meantime, the experts believe that Hu has started 
to see President Chen Shui-bian as a rival that he can 
talk with rather than a target that he must attack.  As 
a result, given the fact that Beijing is willing to 
tacitly consent to the existence of the Republic of 
China, the room for seeking reconciliation with Chen in 
the future has thus increased." 
 
F) "The 10-Point Consensus [Announced by] Bian and 
Soong Emerges in the Conference Communiqu [between 
Soong and Hu]" 
 
Journalists Yang Yu-wen and Lin Hsin-hui noted in a 
news analysis of the pro-unification "United Daily 
News" [circulation: 600,000] (5/13): 
 
". It is noteworthy that traces of Washington's 
manipulation efforts are evident in the structure of 
[cross-Strait] interactions between the `two sides of 
[Taiwan] Strait, one China' and `no use of force if 
[there is] no independence.'  Under the China-U.S. 
interaction framework, one China was [a concept] 
acknowledged by each side separately; namely, Beijing 
talks about the one China principle whereas Washington 
said it is a one China policy, and both sides have 
their own space to maneuver.  Beijing sought to discuss 
the commitment of no Taiwan independence stated in the 
10-point consensus announced by President Chen Shui- 
bian and Soong after having built the precondition 
[with the PFP] regarding `two sides of [Taiwan] Strait, 
one China.'  Then it used the communiqu issued by the 
PFP and Chinese Communist Party, in which both urge the 
Taiwan leaders to adhere to his [five no] pledge, as a 
condition and broach [the proposal of] `no use of force 
if [there is] no independence.'  Such a move meets 
Washington's policy direction and interests exactly and 
has predetermined [the possibility of] future dialogue 
between the authorities of both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait." 
 
PAAL