US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI3646

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003646 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, KDEM, MASS, IN, NP, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: INDIA SEEKS DIALOGUE ON NEPAL END-GAME 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 3494 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: PolCouns and Poloff met with MEA Joint 
Secretary (North) Ranjit Rae on May 13 to review A/S Rocca's 
 
SIPDIS 
and Indian Ambassador Shiv Mukherjee's recent audiences with 
Nepal's King Gyanendra.  Rae emphasized that the King had not 
relented on his opposition to a dialogue with the parties, 
which required continued US and Indian pressure on the 
palace.  The GOI is still debating what supplies it will 
provide to the RNA, but Rae suggested it may be time for the 
US and India to begin looking beyond issues of military 
supplies to political solutions.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Sharing the text of public remarks in Kathmandu, 
PolCouns relayed A/S Rocca's strong message emphasizing the 
need for progress on the three R's (release of detainees, 
restoration of civil liberties, and reaching out to the 
political parties) and improvements on human rights as a 
prerequisite for additional assistance.  Rae sought 
clarification of A/S Rocca's call for "substantial progress," 
noting that he needed to emphasize that aspect of the USG 
position within the Indian government, and then provided a 
read-out of Mukherjee's May 9 meeting with King Gyanendra. 
 
Gyanendra's Message to Ambassador Mukherjee 
------------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Rae said the King told Ambassador Mukherjee that the 
parties must take a clear stand on terrorism and corruption 
for him to deal with them, and reviewed the progress he had 
made on his "assurances" to PM Manmohan Singh in Jakarta, 
such as ending the Emergency.  The monarch also promised to 
do more in the next month to lift the remaining restrictions, 
reportedly stressing, "I am committed to democracy." 
 
4.  (C) Mukherjee pressed the King to take the parties' 
position seriously.  The monarch responded that he would ask 
his Ministers to engage the parties, but reiterated his view 
that restoration of the previous Parliament would be 
impossible because it was unconstitutional.  The parties 
consider the Ministers illegitimate and will not accept 
discussions with them, Rae observed, but if the King were 
serious about restoring Parliament, he could find a way to do 
so that meets his constitutional concerns.  Rae had no sense 
that the King intended to work with the parties, adding "I 
feel he is restoring the panchayat regime" by appointing 
loyalists throughout the government in advance of any 
proposed elections. 
 
Keep Pressure on the King 
------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Rae worried that if the King does not agree to a 
rapprochement with the parties, then the parties' positions 
will harden, leading to further radicalization and alignment 
with the Maoists.  The news that the Maoists have "welcomed" 
the parties' joint statement is an indication of the coming 
polarization, he warned, which is "fraught with serious 
implications."  Therefore, the USG and GOI needed to use the 
parties' statement as a point to start negotiations, keeping 
pressure on the King with "whatever leverages we have," he 
stated. 
 
6.  (C) Rae agreed with PolCouns that it was not the place of 
the USG or the GOI to lay out a roadmap for a political 
solution to the impasse, but argued that it was time to start 
looking past the short-term question of how much military 
assistance to provide, and to consider what a final political 
outcome to the King-party standoff and the Maoist insurgency 
would look like.  Since the Maoists supported the parties' 
platform (and possibly influenced it through back-channel 
contacts), it could serve as a starting point for peace 
negotiations, if the King agrees to accept it as such.  India 
and the US should try to bring everyone together for a 
comprehensive peace process, he suggested. 
 
Military Assistance Still Debated 
--------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Although the GOI decided on May 6 to release 
non-lethal military supplies that were "in the pipeline," Rae 
said the government was still debating internally what 
constitutes the pipeline.  The MEA was supporting the view 
that the term encompasses vehicles, jackets and thermal 
imagers that were at the border waiting for shipment on 
February 1, while the MoD was pushing for a broader 
definition that covers all supplies that the RNA had 
requested before the royal takeover (to include ammunition). 
For now, nothing is planned for delivery beyond the small 
amount at the border, but the GOI would meet later in the day 
to continue discussions on what to send to the RNA, Rae 
stated. 
 
8.  (C) Rae again agreed (reftel) that a discussion between 
the US DAO and Indian military on RNA ammunition needs would 
help to determine the correct level of assistance to provide 
to Nepal. 
 
9.  (C) Although the Indian Communist parties have protested 
even the resumption of this non-lethal aid, the Congress 
party leadership had smoothed over the dispute by telling 
them "it's only some vehicles," Rae said.  As a result, the 
anticipated Parliamentary debate on the decision to resume 
supplies did not occur prior to the end of the current 
session. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.  (C) The Indian media has characterized the internal GOI 
debate over how much assistance to provide to Nepal as policy 
"U-turns," complicating efforts by the GOI to use military 
assistance as a lever on King Gyanendra as leaks to the press 
undermine the "message" sent to the monarch and cause 
objections from both ends of the domestic political spectrum 
to the perceived shift.  Nevertheless, the MEA appears 
confident that the suspension of aid has thus far prodded the 
King to make some positive moves, releasing some detainees 
and taking small steps in restoring civil liberties, and 
believes that the right combination of pressure from the US, 
India, and UK could motivate him to work on the third R: 
reaching out to the political parties.  Even when pressed, 
Rae did not indicate any clear GOI preference for a way 
forward, but he did signal strongly the Indian desire to 
deepen our bilateral consultations on long-term end game 
issues. 
BLAKE