US embassy cable - 05YEREVAN846

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000846 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DS/CR/VF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2015 
TAGS: KFRD, PGOV, ASEC, TU, AM, RU 
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON ARMENIAN BORDER 
SECURITY 
 
Classified By: DCM A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
 1. (C) A Russian Border Guard (RBG) official posted in 
Armenia contends that the border with Turkey is porous and 
that locals easily cross at will.  On the margins of a 
routine meeting to discuss consular fraud prevention, he told 
us he was concerned about the possibility of corruption at 
the airport and emerging fraud trends among Iranian 
travelers.  End Summary. 
 
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POROUS BORDER WITH TURKEY 
------------------------- 
 
2. (C) The RBG monitors Armenia,s 268 km land border with 
Turkey as well as Armenia's international border with Iran. 
On the Turkish border, RBG and Armenian Border Security 
personnel jointly occupy guard towers that are located 
approximately every 2 kilometers along the border.  As of 
mid-March 2005, RBG Major Vitali Borodkin (please protect) 
asserted that, despite RBG efforts, the Armenian/Turkish 
border was porous and that ethnic Kurdish farmers were able 
to transport livestock back and forth across the border.  He 
believes that while it is probable that RBG personnel are 
being bribed to allow passage, he thinks that it is also 
possible to cross the Armenian/Turkish border undetected. 
 
3. (S) Borodkin stated that in the early 1990s, he heard 
rumors that the Kongra Gel (KGK) had sent people across the 
Armenian/Turkish border.  He stated that while he had no 
specific information that this was still continuing, he 
believed that KGK personnel may still covertly cross the 
border to seek temporary refuge from Turkish authorities. 
 
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CORRUPTION AT THE AIRPORT 
------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Borodkin stated that travelers offer RBG personnel 
bribes daily at Zvartnots Armenian National Airport to 
overlook photo-substituted or fraudulently issued travel 
documents.  He stated that one common service for petty 
bribery is to backdate entry stamps for travelers who have 
overstayed on U.S. visas and were returning to Yerevan. 
Borodkin candidly admitted that while he does his best to 
monitor and prevent passport control personnel from taking 
bribes, it was most likely a common practice.  (Comment:  The 
number of backdated stamps among visa applicants at CONS 
Yerevan has dropped since 2002.  We continue, however, to 
identify this fraud on a routine basis.  End Comment.) 
 
5. (SBU) Borodkin said that the flight from Yerevan to Moscow 
to Los Angeles is notorious for Armenian nationals offering 
bribes to RBG personnel.  According to Borodkin, travelers 
believe that if they can successfully board this flight, even 
if US immigration officials eventually stopped them, they 
could still apply for asylum and enter the US. 
 
6. (SBU) Borodkin stated that the RBG arrested approximately 
100 individuals who used fake, stolen or borrowed travel 
documents in 2004.  The majority of the individuals were 
arrested at the Zvartnots Airport.  He could only speculate 
how many evaded arrest by using legitimate "borrowed" travel 
documents, fraudulent documents, or by bribing RBG personnel. 
 
 
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IRANIAN CONNECTION 
------------------ 
 
7. (C) Borodkin suspects that Iranian nationals may be using 
photo-substituted U.S. and European travel documents as a way 
to travel to the U.S. and/or Europe.  He believes that one 
common technique would be for the U.S.-based Iranian Diaspora 
to send legitimate asylum documents to Armenia.  Travelers in 
Armenia either photo-substitute these documents or use 
unaltered versions while traveling as imposters.  Borodkin 
added that members of the Iranian Diaspora in Germany might 
be active in sending legitimate travel documents to Armenia 
for Iranians to travel and/or immigrate to Germany. 
 
8. (C) Borodkin noted that at the Armenian town of Meghri, 
the major point of entry on the Armenian/Iranian border, RBG 
personnel have noticed many suspicious travel documents used 
by Iranian nationals to enter into Armenia.  While he had no 
specifics, Borodkin observed that many of these documents 
appear to be issued in the same office, or printed by using 
similar techniques. 
 
9. (C) Borodkin stated that he has reliable contacts within 
the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).  He stated that 
the FSB notifies the RBG in Armenia about madrases or 
equivalent religious schools in the region, and, when 
students graduate, their travel destinations.  While Borodkin 
was not worried about Muslim radicals traveling to Armenia, 
he is concerned about the possibility of Armenia becoming a 
corridor to the North Caucasus or Europe in the future. 
 
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Comment 
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10. (C) Borodkin,s comments are likely exaggerated in order 
to convince us that Armenia would not be able to manage its 
border without the RBG.  However, his insights show that the 
RBG is aware of Armenia,s problematic border control issues 
and their implications for the region.  While some of our 
security assistance programs preclude participation by 
Russian officials, we see cooperation with the RBG on fraud 
prevention as very much in the USG's interest and will 
continue our practice of including them in appropriate events. 
EVANS