US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO888

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000888 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, EAID, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, Political Parties, Tsunami 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  PROPOSED JOINT MECHANISM NOW POLITICAL 
HOT POTATO 
 
REF: COLOMBO 0834 
 
Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) Hopes that the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) would sign a joint 
mechanism on tsunami aid before the May 16-17 Development 
Forum are fading.  The proposal has become a political hot 
potato for President Chandrika Kumaratunga, with her 
opponents--including her Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) 
coalition partners--using it to attack her and the LTTE 
pointing to her delay in signing the agreement as proof of 
her insincerity.  The President's failure to vet the proposal 
adequately with other parties and influential players, 
including India, may be partially responsible for her current 
dilemma.  Although some critics believe that the President 
never intended to sign the agreement--and can now 
conveniently blame the JVP and others for scuttling it--she 
has told donors she plans to keep trying--and only needs a 
few weeks more to bring the JVP on board.  Whatever her true 
intentions, the ugly, very public battle over the mechanism 
highlights ever more glaringly the difficulty of securing a 
southern political consensus on this important issue.  End 
summary. 
 
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MECHANISM MOOTED; 
NO TAKERS 
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2.  (SBU)  Although informal discussion of a possible "joint 
mechanism" between the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on tsunami aid has 
been kicking around Colombo for several months, President 
Chandrika Kumaratunga waited until the end of April to begin 
publicly promoting the proposal.  She chose her inaugural 
remarks at a development project in Colombo District on April 
29 to first broach the controversial topic, telling the crowd 
that she was sure her Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) 
coalition partners would not oppose the agreement.  The 
President followed up this initial salvo with an appeal for 
the support of religious leaders, telling religious committee 
members of the National Advisory Council for Peace and 
Reconciliation on May 3 that she would press for the joint 
mechanism even if her government falls and she loses the 
presidency (Reftel).  Stressing that the LTTE had climbed 
down from an initial demand for a separate state to "a much 
more democratic mechanism to distribute tsunami relief," she 
asserted that at least 60 percent of the nation--including 
all of her own Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and most of the 
opposition United National Party (UNP)--support the proposal. 
 
 
3.  (C)  According to one Embassy source, the President then 
asked the religious leaders present at the meeting to sign a 
statement endorsing the proposal.  The participants demurred, 
asking first to see a copy of the draft agreement.  The 
President reportedly told the clerics that she was unable to 
comply with their request, and the meeting ended 
inconclusively.  The President met May 4 with bipartisan 
members of the Muslim Peace Secretariat, who, according to 
Secretary General Javid Yusuf, pressed for greater Muslim 
 
SIPDIS 
representation at the regional level.  (Note:  According to 
several interlocutors, the joint mechanism will operate at 
three levels:  national, regional and district.  The LTTE, 
GSL and Muslims will have one representative each at the 
national level; five, two and three respectively at the 
regional level; and only GSL representatives at the district 
level.  End note.)  Since the meeting, Sri Lanka Muslim 
Congress (SLMC) Leader Rauff Hakeem has made repeated public 
statements against the mechanism, complaining that the Muslim 
community was not adequately consulted during the drafting 
stage.  The President also waited until May 4 to brief her 
increasingly out-of-the-loop Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse 
and the Cabinet on the draft--but once again did not, 
apparently, give anyone in the Cabinet a copy of the 
document.  According to one source in the Cabinet, two 
Ministers representing small parties in the alliance--Urban 
Development Minister Dinesh Gunawardena of the Mahajana 
Eksath Peramuna and Housing Minister Ferial Ashraff of the 
New Unity Alliance, a Muslim representing the eastern 
district of Ampara--objected to the proposal.  (Note:  JVP 
ministers had already walked out of the Cabinet meeting in 
protest over a separate matter--the proposed restructuring of 
the Ceylon Electricity Board--and thus did not participate in 
that briefing.  End note.) 
 
4.  (SBU)  On May 6 the President brought the proposal before 
her JVP partners, who promptly and very publicly shot it 
down.  Local press reports quoted JVP MP Wimal Weerawansa as 
saying signing the mechanism was tantamount to recognizing 
the LTTE's claim for a separate state.  At a May 10 rally to 
protest the mechanism, JVP Leader Somawansa Amarasinghe 
blamed the international community for pressuring the GSL to 
sign the agreement, lauding the example of Cuban President 
Castro, who "stands upright in the face of opposition and 
pressure from America."  He asserted that India was also 
opposed to the mechanism and the potential threat it could 
pose to regional security.  (Note:  Another protest by the 
JVP-backed National Bhikku (monk) Front, is planned to be 
held in Colombo on May 15 in opposition both to the joint 
mechanism and the May 16-17 Development Forum in Kandy.  When 
asked why the bhikkus did not elect to hold their protest in 
Kandy, a representative told us that the Buddhist leadership 
in Kandy forbade it.  End note.)  The President suffered a 
second rebuff on May 6 as the UNP flatly turned down her 
invitation to Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe to meet 
to discuss the draft agreement.  In a letter released to the 
press, the UNP put the onus for pursuing the mechanism 
squarely on the President, indicating the party's support 
"once the government reaches a final agreement with the 
LTTE."  When DCM told Bradman Weerakoon, a long-time UNP 
advisor that he believed the party had erred in not agreeing 
even to hear the President out, Weerakoon lamely responded 
that the President's invitation had been turned because it 
had not been sent through proper channels. 
 
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TAMPING DOWN DONOR EXPECTATIONS 
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5.  (C) While meeting near-universal opposition on the 
domestic political front (from foes and purported allies 
alike), the President has also begun to brief members of the 
diplomatic community, in separate tranches, on the 
initiative.  (Note:  The DCM--who was Charge at the time--was 
initially invited to meet the President on May 10.  The 
appointment was subsequently shifted to May 11 and then to 
May 13.  As of COB May 13, the meeting had not taken place. 
End note.)  According to a read-out from participants at the 
first such briefing on May 10 (which included the EU, 
Australia and Canada), the President said that she needed a 
few more weeks--i.e., well after the May 16-17 Development 
Forum in Kandy--to bring the JVP on board.  Some participants 
believe that once the impending Forum is safely behind her, 
the pressure will be off the President to sign--and her 
two-week full-court press on the mechanism will fade away. 
 
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INDIAN VIEWS 
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6.  (C) Many political analysts, perhaps picking up on the 
JVP's allusion to Indian objections, believe that the 
President did not properly vet the proposed mechanism with 
her Indian neighbors, who, resentful at not having been 
adequately consulted, are thus trying to scuttle it.  (The 
Indians had been part of a SAARC Missions-only briefing on 
the topic with the President earlier in the week.)  The 
President's still-unconfirmed plans to visit India this 
weekend are an attempt to smooth things out, several Sri 
Lankan contacts have suggested.  Indian DCM Mohan Kumar 
dismissed such speculation in a May 12 conversation with DCM, 
however.  The Indians will not try to stand in the way of an 
agreement or "scuttle" it ("as if we could") if all Sri 
Lankan parties agree to it, he asserted.  That said, Kumar 
cited two Indian concerns about the mechanism.  First, 
allocating the only slots reserved for Tamils at the national 
and regional level to the LTTE reinforces the Tigers' claim 
to be the sole representative of the Tamil people.  Second, 
New Delhi is "shocked" that the mechanism would apply in 
government-controlled areas in the north and east as 
well--thereby giving the LTTE some degree of legitimacy in 
GSL-controlled areas.  Instead, the Indian government 
believes the mechanism should have been drafted to apply 
exclusively to LTTE-controlled areas--a point, he said, his 
senior GSL interlocutors concede but view as too late to 
change. 
 
7.  (C)  According to Kumar, in her meeting with SAARC 
envoys, the President said she was "strongly inclined" to go 
ahead with the mechanism--a significantly toned-down message 
from her May 3 speech before the religious leaders--and did 
not mention the two-to-three week delay cited in her meeting 
with other Chiefs of Mission.  Kumar said he believes the 
President will ultimately sign the mechanism to earn some 
points from the international community for political 
courage.  New Delhi's concern, however, is that after signing 
the mechanism nothing will be done to implement it, he 
concluded. 
 
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COLOMBO CHATTERING CLASS GENERALLY SKEPTICAL 
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8.  (C)  A survey of contacts in the NGO community, academia, 
media and the opposition political arena reveals widespread 
skepticism that the mechanism will ever be signed.  One 
cynical (but widely cited) assessment holds that the 
President never actually intended to sign it.  According to 
this theory, President Kumaratunga went along with pursuing 
the agreement to curry international favor and to appear 
willing to risk political capital in the interests of 
peace/humanitarian aid--while knowing all along she could 
count on JVP opposition to keep the proposal from going too 
far.  (An interesting variation on this theme sees the LTTE 
adopting more or less the same tactic--claiming support for 
the mechanism while relying on divisive Southern politics to 
prevent its adoption.  The LTTE would thus be left free to 
reiterate its oft-repeated claim that the South is not 
serious about the peace process.)  A significantly smaller 
group believes she genuinely supports the mechanism but will 
end up unable to overcome JVP opposition and thus not sign. 
Others, like the Indians, predict she will sign the agreement 
(perhaps accommodating JVP objections to the restructuring of 
the Ceylon Electricity Board in exchange for an assurance 
that the partner will not bolt from the government should she 
go through with the mechanism) but then fall down (whether 
because of JVP obstructionism or her own inattention) on 
implementation.  In general, the bottom line among most 
non-GSL Sri Lankans we have talked to--even those who are 
convinced of her sincerity--is strong doubt that the document 
will ever be signed. 
 
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LTTE ALREADY FIXING BLAME 
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9.  (SBU) If our contacts' prediction proves true and the 
President, for whatever reason, does not sign, the LTTE can 
be expected to try to capitalize on the situation.  The May 
12 edition of Sudar Oli, a pro-LTTE Tamil vernacular daily, 
carried an interview with Tiger political wing leader 
Thamilchelvan, who accused the GSL of "dragging this matter 
out while at the same time allowing opposing forces to get 
strengthened."  While the Norwegian facilitators remain 
optimistic of securing an agreement, Thamilchelvan said, "the 
actions of the Sri Lankan government and the crisis among the 
alliance partners make us doubtful.  Mrs. Kumaratunga is just 
issuing statements without doing anything constructive . . . 
as a strategy to convince the donors (so that she can) 
receive the aid."  The GSL had squandered the opportunity 
presented by the tsunami to rebuild confidence by working 
with the LTTE, he charged, and the President had strengthened 
the JVP by making them partners in her government.  Instead 
of working to find a permanent solution to the ethnic 
conflict, she had stopped humanitarian aid from reaching 
tsunami-affected people in LTTE-controlled areas, he alleged. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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10.  (C)  That the President waited so late in the day before 
seeking support for the proposed joint mechanism does not 
necessarily mean she is not sincere in wanting its passage; 
her well-known penchant for lateness is so pervasive that it 
influences her approach to many matters--even those important 
to her.  That said, she is no political neophyte, and is too 
savvy a strategist to be surprised by the JVP's, the Muslims' 
and the UNP's response.  The UNP, in particular, is unlikely 
to play any role in saving the President from her 
uncooperative alliance partner, and she knows it.  Thus her 
claims, carried prominently in the local press, of "surprise 
and regret" at the UNP's lack of support seem a bit 
disingenuous. 
 
11.  (C)  Comment (cont.):  We believe that the President is 
sincere in principle about wanting some kind of rapprochement 
with the Tigers, whether through a joint mechanism or other 
vehicle, but may be unwilling to risk the political capital 
needed to muster multipartisan support for it. (Since risking 
political capital should be easier for a last-term president 
than one contemplating re-election, her reluctance to take 
such a gamble indicates she may still want to keep her 
options open.)  Faced with vociferous opposition to the 
mechanism on multiple fronts, she may just decide it is 
easier to let it go--especially once the Development Forum is 
behind her.  Whatever she decides, the battle has been ugly 
enough and public enough to jeopardize the one benefit that 
signing the mechanism could have brought her--increased 
confidence from Tamils, LTTE and non-LTTE alike, in her 
ability to bring the South together to clinch a lasting 
settlement to the conflict. 
 
 
 
LUNSTEAD