US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK3182

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 003182 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV, INR, S/CT. HQ USPACOM FOR FPA 
HUSO. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2015 
TAGS: OVIP, PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PTER, TH, Southern Thailand 
SUBJECT: THAILAND: PACOM CMDR ADM FALLON'S ROUNDTABLE ON 
THE MUSLIM SOUTH 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce.  Reason:  1.4 (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  On May 3, PACOM Commander ADM Fallon and the 
Ambassador met with a select group of Thai academics and 
activists to discuss the separatist insurgency in Thailand's 
Muslim-majority deep South.  The Thai analysts spoke of 
tensions from Bangkok's historical efforts to integrate the 
Muslim South into the Thai nation.  However, despite some 
differences among themselves, they in various ways blamed 
poor Thaksin administration policies -- which allowed a 
deteriorating internal situation to be exploited by local 
militants -- for the current upsurge in violence.  One 
security affairs specialist emphasized that the level of 
violence in the South is unprecedented, large amounts of 
money are involved, and that the potential exists for the 
area to become a staging area for outsiders.  The others 
focused on local origins and solutions for the separatist 
conflict.  All agreed that obtaining accurate information and 
a clear picture on the South is complicated. 
 
2. (C)  The Thais were cautiously optimistic about the 
efforts of the fledgling National Reconciliation Commission 
(NRC) to find solutions, if sustained support from PM Thaksin 
and the military is forthcoming.  Asked by ADM Fallon what 
the U.S. could do to help, the Thais said that negative 
interpretations of American policies in the Middle East 
complicate the U.S. ability to help.  However, they suggested 
that human rights and peacekeeping training for the Thai 
military, and pressure on the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to 
pursue "good governance" in the South, would be useful. End 
Summary. 
 
3. (U) The Thai participants were: Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn, 
Chulalongkorn University; Dr. Mark Tamthai, Vice Chairman of 
the Non-Violence Commission, National Security Council (NSC), 
and NRC member); Dr. Gothom Arya, Director of the Peaceful 
Solution Studies and Development Center, Secretary General of 
the human rights NGO Forum Asia, and Joint Secretary, NRC; 
and Sunai Phasuk, Bangkok Director, Human Rights Watch, Asia 
Division.  PACOM Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA) Ravic Huso and 
PolCouns Clarke (notetaker) sat in on the U.S. side. 
 
SOUTHERN VIOLENCE -- PM THAKSIN'S DISMANTLING OF SECURITY 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
4. (C) In initial comments, Sunai said that the bombings and 
daily violence in the South are being carried out by "local 
rogue separatists and radical religious elements," who are 
beyond the power of southern Muslim elders to control.  The 
violence is worsening and turning to soft targets, and the 
Thai government cannot stamp out the new phenomena, he said. 
Sunai contrasted the current situation with a more stable 
period which had held for years before 
Prime Minister Thaksin took power.  In the earlier period, 
barriers between southern populations of different religions 
had broken down and, despite occasional violence, support for 
separatism largely disappeared. 
 
5. (C) Sunai blamed the policies of PM Thaksin -- undertaken 
after he had received information that the separatist 
movement in the South was contained -- for the ensuing 
tension and upsurge in violence in (primarily) the three 
southernmost Thai provinces.  Specifically, early in his 
first term, Thaksin dismantled the Southern Border Provinces 
Administrative Center (SBPAC) and the related Joint 
(civilian, military, police) Task Force 43 -- institutions 
which had contributed to a workable modus vivendi -- and gave 
primacy to the police for southern security.  The police 
engaged in abuses, including extra-judicial killings (EJK) 
and this, Sunai said, led to a reaction in the Muslim 
population and wider support for separatist and extremist 
causes and the use of violence. 
 
HISTORICAL TENSIONS 
 
6. (C) Clearly in reaction to part of Sunai's analysis, Dr. 
Gothom stated flatly that the current Southern separatist 
movement has "nothing to do with religion."  Rather, it is a 
matter of preservation of identity, especially language, 
ethnicity, and customs.  (Comment:  All of which in the Thai 
South have religious aspects.  End Comment.)  Gothom briefly 
reviewed Thailand's history of nation-state building, when 
national myths were created, and the emphasis was on 
"Thai-ness" to the detriment of competing languages and 
minority ways of life.  He said that the Thai government in 
recent decades had allowed greater religious freedom, and was 
more relaxed on language, which in the South had opened the 
way for more use of the local dialects, the establishment of 
"pondoks" (Islamic schools), and building of more mosques. 
The public schools in the South, he said, are half-empty. 
 
7. (C) Dr. Gothom added there is no monolithic Islam in the 
South, even though Islam has been used and exploited to 
magnify other conditions.  He said the government must 
convince southerners they have a future as part of Thailand. 
They must be allowed to achieve something short of a separate 
state. The Ambassador asked how much autonomy they could 
actually achieve.  Gothom said that under Article 78 of the 
Constitution, all provinces in Thailand could become as 
autonomous as Bangkok, the capital city.  Panitan noted that 
the Thai South already enjoys more "freedom" than Malaysian 
states.  He reiterated that the military needs to regain 
"lost ground" by accepting some of the changes in attitudes 
that have already taken place among southern Muslims.  ADM 
Fallon commented that in a situation like this it was the 
national leaders who had to be flexible and generous to 
achieve progress. 
UNPRECEDENTED VIOLENCE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR WIDER IMPACT 
 
8. (C) Dr. Panitan stated that, even in this small group, it 
was clear the Thais did not agree among themselves about how 
to understand the South.  He argued that the RTG faces an 
unprecedented situation in the deep South, one very 
different from the past.  The level of violence is far 
higher, going from about 30 deaths a year to about 600. 
(Note:  Most local commentators use a figure of about 500 
deaths for 2004, with perhaps 200 more so far in 2005. End 
Note.)  "Ordinary" explanations (read: separatism), Panitan 
said, are no longer applicable, implying that the situation 
had changed qualitatively as well as quantitatively.  He 
cited a claim by former Foreign Minister Dr. Surin Pitsuan 
that the level of violence in Thailand's deep South is "worse 
than Aceh." He warned that the situation should not be 
regarded as local or isolated because the five Muslim 
majority provinces have the potential to affect the whole 
region if they become a staging ground from which outsiders 
could launch terrorist acts. 
 
9. (C) Tamthai countered Panitan's picture of the potential 
of the southern situation.  Like Dr. Gotham, he too stressed 
the separatist origin of the violence, and said that there 
had been similar Bangkok-South friction in the past.  In his 
view, it was weak analysis to focus on outside factors.  He 
emphasized poor governance and abuses by the authorities as 
the key drivers behind the separatist movement. "It is one 
thing to live in the middle of abuses, and another when you 
are abused by your former enemy.  Pattani pride is elusive 
but key in this matter," he said, adding that "the good thing 
about Pattani pride is that it trumps Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)." 
 Sunai commented that younger generations of southern Muslims 
are indeed talking more about "suppression by Siam." 
 
NEW FACTORS:  INTERNET AND MONEY 
 
10. (C) ADM Fallon asked what new factors were involved. 
Panitan said that Thai separatists had ready access to 
information about terrorist techniques on the Internet and 
were influenced by "bad examples" in other countries.  This 
led to "copycat" actions.  He said that although the South is 
a poor region, an enormous amount of money has entered the 
South outside the formal banking system, over 600 million 
baht (about USD 15 million), according to Thai Anti-Money 
Laundering Organization (AMLO) estimates.  There might be 
more, Panitan asserted, given the involvement of officials 
and members of Parliament (MP) in the South in various forms 
of transnational crime across the open borders and extensive 
use of front companies.  How much of this money is intended 
for or available to militant separatists is unknown. 
However, the violence of the past year, has made politicians 
more reluctant to involve themselves with separatists with 
whom they had collaborated with in the past. 
 
THE DIFFICULTIES OF GOOD ANALYSIS 
 
11. (C) Panitan said it is very hard for the government to 
get a clear picture of the South as different agencies 
provided PM Thaksin with competing analyses.  ADM Fallon said 
he was familiar with the "stove piping" phenomenon.  Panitan 
said that, although the Prime Minister seemed satisfied with 
the intelligence he receives, he needs a more "scientific" 
approach to information gathering, something more than 
"beating information out of teenagers." 
 
12. (C) ADM Fallon asked whether there had been any 
systematic Thai effort to sit down, list all the factors, and 
decide on a course of action.  Dr. Tamthai responded that the 
problem was that everyone thinks that they know the root 
cause of the renewed violence in the South and they care 
primarily about proving their particular thesis rather than 
adjusting it to new facts. Psychologically, because the South 
is different culturally from the rest of Thailand, the effect 
seems to be that Thai analysts feel freer to take this tack. 
"And all the evidence can be interpreted to fit into all the 
different views," he said. 
 
OUTSIDE INFLUENCES 
 
13. (C) FPA Huso asked about the extent to which what is 
happening in the world influences southern violence.  Panitan 
argued that, if one looks at what some teachers are conveying 
in the pondok classrooms, outside events are influential. 
That is also evident in the way local leaders are losing 
control.  He said this happened every time there is a move 
towards greater assimilation of the South into Thailand. 
Separatist militants have a long history of somehow getting 
together, adopting a new name and adjusting to new 
conditions.  Militants from time to time are able to 
manipulate other southerners by using religious schools to 
indoctrinate students to perceive Thai and US policies as 
injustices to Muslims. 
 
14. (C) Panitan observed that this type of manipulation is 
easier to do in a time of less regulation and more openness. 
He said that, in earlier years, former Prime Minister Prem 
had contained the situation and the separatist organizations 
had collapsed.  At a later period, the Barisan Revolusi 
Nasional (BRN) had been "recruited" (i.e. bought off) by the 
military to help intervene in the electoral system.  Panitan 
said that radical Islam, however, was now proving to be an 
effective tool.  The students are more radical, and are led 
by people who received training outside Thailand, for 
example, in Afghanistan.  The Thai National Intelligence 
Agency (NIA), he said, believes that these leaders are the 
key people behind the violence and, with the abolition of 
SBPAC, it is harder to track them. 
 
PROSPECTS OF THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE (NRC); 
PRESSURE ON BUDDHISTS 
 
15. (C) ADM Fallon said that the situation still seemed quite 
manageable and asked what the U.S. could do that was 
appropriate.  He also asked about the NRC and whether it was 
empowered.  Tamthai said the Prime Minister's recent 
"softer" line was reflected in the creation of the NRC. 
Sunai said that, no matter how serious PM Thaksin is about a 
softer approach through the NRC, convincing southerners will 
be difficult.  "He decided to launch Tak Bai" (in October 
2004) and Muslims are convinced that there can be no justice 
from the government.  They were shocked when General Panlop, 
who had been in charge of the assault on Krue Se Mosque in 
April 2004, boasted on the anniversary of that incident that 
he had been promoted. 
 
16. (C) ADM Fallon asked whether the NRC was trusted in the 
South.  Three of the Thais said "yes."  Panitan replied "not 
yet" and said that the NRC represented a possible new 
beginning and fresh approach, if used properly by PM Thaksin. 
 The NRC has the potential to win the hearts and 
minds of Southerners, but does not yet have the full 
confidence of the Prime Minister.  Panitan said that the task 
facing the NRC will take months, even years.  The question 
was whether PM Thaksin merely wanted the NRC to allow him to 
talk less about the South while NRC head Anand talked more. 
Tamthai said that people want the NRC to do too many 
different things, and have various timetables and 
expectations for it.  Panitan said that the NRC needs to 
gain the support of the military Supreme Command and its 
numerous special taskforces that are working on the South. 
He claimed that Supreme Command will be able to provide 30 
thousand jobs. 
 
17. (C)  FPA Huso asked about reports that militants actions 
were designed to pressure non-Muslims to leave the South. 
Panitan said this was happening informally.  Many Buddhists 
were moving their families away.  The strategy 
seemed to be both to drive out Buddhists and to buy them out. 
 He said that his uncle had been killed after he refused to 
sell his gas station. 
 
WHAT CAN THE U.S. DO TO HELP? 
 
18. (C) Dr. Gothom returned to ADM Fallon's question about 
appropriate American assistance.  He said that, in the South, 
the U.S. is regarded as being on the wrong side of the Middle 
East conflicts, in Iraq and in the Israel-Palestine question. 
 He said the U.S. should be a better broker between Israel 
and Palestine.  After ADM Fallon defended U.S. policy in the 
Middle East, Gothom offered the idea that the U.S. could 
train the Thai military in peacekeeping, noting that a 
military officer who served in East Timor had told him he had 
gained positive lessons ("avoid firearms; be a social 
engineer") from that experience. 
 
19. (C) Sunai also said that U.S. actions are interpreted 
negatively in the South, including its activities in Thailand 
such as Cobra Gold.  But he thought there was value in U.S. 
engagement with the Thai military to train them in the 
international rules on conflict and human rights.  He added a 
plea that the U.S. strictly vet Thai military personnel 
selected for training so that soldiers who had been involved 
in human rights abuses were not selected. 
 
20. (C) Panitan agreed with the other Thais that U.S. policy 
in the Middle East created problems for the American image in 
the South.  He said that the U.S. could appropriately help 
southerners gain a real say in their own affairs and less 
"Bangkok knows best."  He said that he was a southerner, and 
knew from growing up there that the basic desire of his 
neighbors was to live their own way, not under the sway of 
"influential" people (i.e. fixers and local crime bosses) and 
in fear of MPs and police officers.   Independence, he said, 
was not the answer.  Rather, the South needs "good 
governance, within the Constitution." 
21. (C ) Panitan recalled that he had worked on draft plans 
to change the attitudes of the military towards southerners, 
and they had all failed badly.  Individuals were brought 
around, but the structure had never changed.  He said that if 
the U.S. could put pressure on the RTG to change the system, 
not individuals, the situation in the South might be 
alleviated.  ADM Fallon responded that the U.S. would 
continue to influence the Thai military through education and 
training, including peacekeeping training, and through direct 
dialogue with senior Thai leaders. 
 
BURMA AND CHINA 
 
22. (C)  Panitan briefly raised two other issues:  Burma and 
China.  He said that Burma will be a bigger regional problem 
in the future and that the Thaksin policy of engagement 
(i.e., being a "big brother") has been unsuccessful.  He 
warned against the growing influence of North Korea and 
Russia in Burma.  Sunai agreed that Burma is a growing source 
of regional instability.  He said that 
when it comes to Burma, the RTG appears to accept a principle 
of "compromise at all costs" in pursuit of its own goals. 
Panitan also expressed concern about the growing influence of 
China in the region and Thailand.  He urged the U.S. to 
engage publics more about China and the problems it poses. 
Panitan said that Chinese were moving into Thailand to the 
extent of even buying land in the South. 
 
BOYCE