US embassy cable - 05RANGOON573

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BOMBINGS: REGIME REACTION SURREAL BUT PREDICTABLE

Identifier: 05RANGOON573
Wikileaks: View 05RANGOON573 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2005-05-12 11:57:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER ASEC CASC ECON BM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000573 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, ASEC, CASC, ECON, BM 
SUBJECT: BOMBINGS: REGIME REACTION SURREAL BUT PREDICTABLE 
 
REF: RANGOON 550 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The Burmese regime is treating the shocking 
May 7 triple bombings as a non-event; there are few signs of 
enhanced security and control of information has been 
heavy-handed.  Over 90 wounded victims remain hospitalized 
and the death toll has reportedly approached 30 persons, 
although the GOB has not altered its official figure of only 
11 dead.  Authorities have not offered evidence to bolster 
immediate accusations of responsibility and a post-bombing 
inquiry appears to be more political than investigatory.  The 
GOB's predictable, though surreal, response to the terrorism 
has fueled the leading local theory that the regime itself 
was involved.  We expect that an eventual staged "press 
conference," replete with evidence and culprits, will break 
the silence, but the GOB will have difficulty convincing the 
populace that such findings approximate the truth.  End 
Summary. 
 
WHAT BOMBINGS? 
 
2. (U) Burma's military regime is treating the shocking May 7 
triple bombings as a non-event.  The GOB, subsequent to 
immediate reports on May 7 and 8, has ignored the entire 
crisis.  Several vague official editorials throughout the 
week have alerted the citizenry to be cautious for similar 
acts of "destructive elements."  However, the print and 
broadcast media have focused almost exclusively on 
traditional coverage of bridge building, diatribes against 
ethnic insurgents, and negative developments in the Iraq war. 
 
3. (SBU) Although security forces are reportedly on 
high-alert, there are no visible signs that the GOB has 
changed its overall security posture.  Key government offices 
and military installations, including Rangoon's international 
airport, have not increased security beyond a routine, mostly 
symbolic presence and i.d. checking; and access procedures at 
most public locations are minimal or nonexistent, except at 
many private businesses and some shopping venues where bag 
checks have been introduced. 
 
CIRCLE THE WAGONS 
 
4. (SBU) The GOB's control on information has been typically 
heavy-handed.  Authorities have maintained a very tight seal 
at hospitals and have reportedly refused to release bodies to 
families, prohibited transfer of patients to private clinics, 
and detained visitors who ask too many questions or 
individuals (including hospital staff and monks at monastic 
crematories) who offer information to journalists or 
families.  According to sources, over 90 seriously wounded 
victims remain hospitalized and the total death toll has 
approached 30 persons, although the GOB has refused to alter 
its official figure of only 11 dead. 
 
5. (U) The long-term economic repercussions of the triple 
bombings are uncertain, but the immediate impact is 
significant: hotel room and event bookings are evaporating; a 
jittery local population is avoiding major shopping centers 
and grocery stores (a boon to local, family-owned shops); and 
market traffic, already affected by an April bombing in 
Mandalay, is in decline.  Nonetheless, major business 
operators report that border trade has been mostly unaffected 
and the black market value of the Burmese kyat has remained 
stable throughout the week. 
 
THE USUAL SUSPECTS 
 
6. (C) The GOB has not publicly offered a shred of evidence 
to bolster its immediate accusation that ethnic insurgent and 
exile activists were responsible.  A post-bombing inquiry 
appears to be focused on the political dimensions of the 
event and by all accounts does not involve crime-scene 
investigations or forensics.  Authorities quickly undertook a 
cleanup operation at the bombing sites, although co-located 
businesses remain shuttered. 
 
7. (C) Special Branch (SB) police officers have in recent 
days rounded up a number of local ethnic Karen residents for 
intense questioning and on May 8 the Police Director General 
convoked and questioned eight recently released democracy 
activists (including 1988 student leaders Min Ko Naing and Ko 
Ko Gyi).  The activists denied any involvement and reportedly 
criticized the GOB for providing full security to top regime 
leaders while leaving vulnerable the general population. 
 
KEYSTONE COPS 
 
8. (C) A senior MFA official, who characterized the bombings 
as "a true act of terrorism," asked Emboff on May 10 if the 
USG had any information on the bombings; however, the 
official said the GOB has not requested assistance from any 
foreign source and "does not plan to do so."  The same 
official stated, without offering any evidence, that the 
likely perpetrators were individuals or groups residing in 
the Thai border areas, "specifically 'God's Army,' the All 
Burma Student Democratic Front (ABSDF), and the National 
Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) headed by 
(cousin of ASSK) Sein Win." 
 
9. (C) The GOB has been thoroughly unresponsive to the 
diplomatic community.  Although at least five foreigners were 
among the injured, an MFA Director General told the dean of 
the diplomatic corps (Philippines Ambassador) that "there 
were no foreign casualties."  One Ambassador was told that 
foreigners are not the MFA's responsibility, but that of the 
Home Affairs Ministry.  However, the MFA DG advised the dean 
not to contact Home Affairs, "because they may not be able to 
answer diplomats and, besides, there is a language problem." 
This Keystone Cops routine takes on a further dimension given 
that the Minister of Home Affairs told the COM in the wake of 
the December tsunami that all diplomats must direct 
crisis-related inquiries to the GOB via the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
 
COMMENT: SILENCE UNTENABLE, BUT STAGED EVENT PREDICTABLE 
 
10. (C) The GOB's predictable, though surreal, response to 
the country's worse act of terrorism in modern history--a 
nearly complete news blackout and apparent disregard for the 
considerable human suffering of the victims and the general 
population--has simply fueled the most popular local theory 
that the regime itself was directly involved.  Although the 
bombings could conceivably remain a complete mystery, we 
don't expect the silence to persist too much longer.  In 
keeping with past practice, the regime is likely in the near 
future to stage a "press conference" replete with "evidence" 
and culprits.  However, they'll have a difficult time 
convincing a highly skeptical populace that such findings 
approximate the truth.  End Comment. 
Martinez 

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