US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI3599

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003599 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PK, IN, Kashmir 
SUBJECT: GETTING CLOSER TO WHAT KASHMIRIS THINK 
 
 
Classified By: Polcouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Many Indian experts on J&K insist that they 
know what Kashmiris think about the major political issues of 
interest in the Valley, such as attitudes towards Pakistan, 
independence, and the like.  During our interaction with 
Kashmir watchers during the last three years, we have found 
several to have outstanding grassroots contacts, but also 
have learned that their views are often based more on 
personal ties and experiences than on rigorous empirical 
data.  The closest we have seen to scientific evidence is 
three opinion polls taken during 2002-2005, the most recent 
of which was taken in April.  For all their methodological 
weaknesses, the surveys provide a window into sentiment and 
trends in J&K, while some of the main conclusions -- little 
support for accession to Pakistan, majority favoring 
independence, weak separatist All-Parties Hurriyat Conference 
(APHC) popularity, and conflicted attitudes towards the LOC 
as a border -- largely track with our past reporting.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (C) It is notoriously difficult to obtain a fix on 
Kashmiri views about major political issues.  We have a high 
degree of confidence that alienation against India runs quite 
deep there, that there is substantial pro-independence 
sentiment, and that a smallish minority wants to accede to 
Pakistan.  It is also clear that Kashmiris are very tired of 
the insurgency, want foreign terrorists to stop infiltrating 
and to leave the Valley, and would rejoice at a return to 
normalcy.  The Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus is very, very 
popular, despite some criticism that the travel process is 
cumbersome.  Most Kashmiris want the security force footprint 
to be smaller or to disappear (but many link this to a 
cessation of terrorism), and human rights abuses by all sides 
to the conflict to stop. 
 
3.  (C) Beyond that, assessments get trickier, despite some 
Indian Kashmir watchers' firm conviction that they know 
exactly what Kashmiris think -- such as assertions by some 
that an overwhelming majority in the Valley would vote for 
independence if they ever had the choice, to cite one fairly 
widespread opinion.  Without dismissing views like this, we 
posit that sentiment is more difficult to quantify and 
subject to variables that have not been factored into the 
debate.  For example, aside from the almost complete absence 
of visible public debate in J&K on these and other issues, 
Indian experts who have dealt with J&K for many years remind 
us that Kashmiris rarely tell outsiders what they really 
think -- and if they do their views are often not well 
thought out.  Some Kashmir watchers go so far as to joke that 
they cannot be entirely certain that Kashmiris will even 
accurately give their names. 
 
Three Surveys 
------------- 
 
4.  (C) In an attempt to fill the void of empirical data on 
what Kashmiris really think, and to obtain a better read on 
popular views on some of the bigger issues at stake in the 
Valley, three attempts have been made since 2002 by private 
polling firms -- Synovate India for the "Times of India" in 
April 2005 (Srinagar and Rajouri); AC Nielsen with "Asian 
Age" in September 2002 (Srinagar, Anantnag, Jammu, and 
Udhampur); and Facts Worldwide for MORI in April 2002 
(Srinagar, Jammu, Leh, and seven rural areas).  Each survey 
was slightly different in focus, but several questions were 
similar and/or repeated, providing a sense of comparison. 
None of the polling firms followed up on their questions 
again, complicating attempts to trace trends.  Questions also 
arise concerning geographic coverage.  Nevertheless, some 
questions were sufficiently similar that they allow for 
comparisons, and provide a window into movement over time. 
The most interesting results of the April 2005 poll show: 
 
-- interest in the LOC as the International Border: 
 
TOI/2005          55 percent in favor 
AC Nielsen/2002    1 percent (Srinagar) in favor; 8 percent 
(Anantnag) 
Mori did not consider this issue 
 
-- a bit of consistency in views on independence, India and 
Pakistan: 
 
For Independence: 
 
TOI:         54 percent 
AC Nielsen:  48 percent (Srinagar); 59 percent (Anantnag) 
Mori did not consider this issue 
 
For India: 
 
TOI          36 percent 
AC Nielsen:  21 percent (Srinagar); 5 percent (Anantnag) 
Mori:        61 percent 
 
For Pakistan: 
 
TOI:        3 percent 
AC Nielsen  0 percent (Srinagar); 0 percent (Anantnag) 
Mori:       6 percent 
 
-- strong support for Indo-Pak trade: 
 
TOI:  96 percent in favor 
Mori: 70 percent in favor 
 
-- a decline in Hurriyat popularity 
 
TOI:        16 percent feels APHC represents them 
AC Nielsen: 22 percent of population would vote for APHC 
 
2005 Additional Points 
---------------------- 
 
5.  (U) The April 2005 survey brought out several additional 
noteworthy items: 
 
-- Massive support in J&K (95 percent) for expanding the 
Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus, indicating Kashmiri public opinion 
is overwhelmingly behind "soft borders;" 
 
-- Overwhelming sentiment (84 percent) that Indo-Pak talks on 
Kashmir must include representatives of the Kashmiri people; 
and 
 
-- A majority (62 percent) believes the state government 
better represents Kashmir than the Hurriyat. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (C) These surveys are by no means definitive readings of 
Kashmiri views, but are useful as the only empirical data in 
the public domain.  With the usual caveats, the polls reveal 
several items of interest -- particularly regarding interest 
in accession to Pakistan (very low), desire for independence 
(over 50 percent), and acceptance of the Hurriyat as leaders 
representative of Kashmiri aspirations (relatively low).  As 
such, the surveys confirm most of our observations derived 
from many reporting visits to J&K and extensive interaction 
with Indian Kashmir experts and a broad spectrum of Kashmiri 
leaders and ordinary Kashmiris during the last three years. 
 
7.  (C) There are at least two interpretations of the 
apparent contradiction in the April 2005 survey between a 
majority desire in the Valley for independence and acceptance 
of the LOC as the Indo-Pak border: 1) Kashmiris increasingly 
recognize that territory in J&K is unlikely to change hands 
between India and Pakistan, and that the LOC is where the 
border will eventually be; or 2) Kashmiri views remain 
confused on many issues.  We have found ordinary Kashmiris 
often very poorly informed, and given the many weaknesses in 
their leaders' thinking, such logical inconsistencies would 
not be unusual.  Voting behavior, which we have described 
exhaustively following elections in 2002 and twice in 2004, 
is another dimension not factored into this mix, but which 
demonstrates other important aspects of Kashmiri political 
opinion. 
BLAKE