US embassy cable - 05PARIS3234

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003234 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PARM, IR, FR 
SUBJECT: IRAN: EU-3 LETTER WARNS TEHRAN AGAINST CHANGES TO 
VOLUNTARY SUSPENSION 
 
 
Classified By: CDA: Alejandro D. Wolff for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY: MFA Political Director Laboulaye discussed 
with Charge May 11 the EU-3 letter to Rohani warning against 
resumption of uranium conversion.  Laboulaye said that it may 
be necessary to convene an extraordinary meeting of the IAEA 
board and stressed the need to build international consensus, 
particularly with Russia and China, in dealing with the 
Iranian threat.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (S) In a May 11 meeting with Charge, MFA Political 
Director Stanislas de Laboulaye shared the letter from EU-3 
Foreign Ministers and High Representative Solana to Iranian 
Supreme National Security Council Secretary Hassan Rohani 
(text in para 9).  Laboulaye said that the letter had been 
delivered in Tehran May 11.  Laboulaye added that EU-3 
Ambassadors had met with El Baradei in Vienna who had 
generally approved of the letter, but had been critical of 
the threatening tone, saying that it should have offered some 
carrots.  Laboulaye said that the Iranians had missed an 
opportunity to take advantage of EU-3 offers for cooperation, 
e.g. on civilian nuclear programs, but had chosen instead to 
block such offers.  He said "we have proof" that Iranian 
enrichment had nothing to do with civilian programs. 
 
3. (S) Laboulaye said that El Baradei had been useful during 
the NPT conference in New York, meeting with the Iranians on 
the margins.  Other countries, with the notable exception of 
Venezuela, had also ensured that the Iranians knew that 
international pressure was strong.  Laboulaye continued that 
Russia had been helpful, sharing the view of the danger posed 
by Iranian nuclear programs.  He said that Deputy Foreign 
Minister Kislyak was intending to travel to Tehran to urge 
the Iranians not to do anything "stupid."  Laboulaye noted, 
however that Moscow saw Iran as their client, and preferred 
not to have the EU-3 at the center of Iran's foreign policy. 
The Russians, he said, constantly wanted to know what the 
EU-3 was saying to Tehran. 
 
4. (S) Laboulaye expected that the Iranians would send a 
letter to the IAEA, possibly inviting representatives to 
visit Tehran or Isfahan to witness the breaking of the seals. 
 Laboulaye was unsure whether Iran intended to resume 
conversion immediately, but noted this could happen as early 
as May 14 which would create a difficult moment.  Laboulaye 
said that if conversion did not resume immediately, the 
strategy should be to work with El Baradei to gain time.  The 
EU-3, he said, was pressing for a meeting with Rohani in two 
weeks, probably in Brussels on May 23, and hoped that Iran 
would not take action before then. 
 
5. (S) Laboulaye said that the EU-3 would seek an 
extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, either 
when the Iranians sent their letter or when the seals were 
broken.  The purpose of that meeting, he said, would be to 
tell the Iranians to get back in compliance with the November 
2004 Paris agreement "or else."  Laboulaye acknowledged that 
it was the "or else" which would be difficult to draft.  The 
next step, would be a second meeting of the IAEA, currently 
scheduled for June 13 (just prior to the June 17 Iranian 
election) which would take the decision to refer the matter 
to the UNSC. 
 
6. (S) Laboulaye stressed that for the process to work 
through the UNSC, it would be essential to develop an 
international consensus, something which was only possible if 
it could be shown that the EU-3 had been straightforward and 
strong, and had tried everything reasonable to prevent Iran's 
resumption of enrichment-related activities.  He said that 
there were two weeks to build such a consensus and that it 
was particularly important to get Russia on board, as 
Russia's position was central to the Chinese position. 
 
7. (S) Laboulaye speculated that Tehran might not go beyond 
conversion activities, which in itself was a "gray area." 
Elaborating, he said that conversion had not been covered in 
the 2003 IAEA definition of enrichment activity, and it was 
only after the EU-3/Iran meetings in Brussels and Paris in 
February and November 2004 that the EU-3 had succeeded in 
enlarging the definition to include conversion.  However, he 
cautioned, some could consider that conversion did not amount 
to enrichment, and the Iranians were fully aware of this gray 
area.  It was for this reason, Laboulaye said, that the EU-3 
letter referred to the Paris agreement. 
 
8. (S) Laboulaye said that the EU-3 had not decided whether 
an Iranian letter of intent, or the actual breaking of the 
seals would be the trigger for the exceptional IAEA meeting. 
The GoF would need to weigh the pros and cons.  Expressing a 
personal view, Laboulaye said that waiting for the seals to 
be lifted would probably be too late, but there would have to 
consensus among the international community in Vienna. 
 
9. (S) TEXT OF EU3 LETTER TO ROHANI (PROVIDED TO CHARGE BY 
LABOULAYE) 
 
Following the recent discussions between our negotiating 
teams in London, and contacts in New York, we are writing to 
underline the importance the governments of France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom, with the support of the High 
Representative of the European Union, attach to continuing 
negotiations within the framework agreed to in Paris in 
November 2004. 
 
We welcome Iran's continued voluntary suspension of all 
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and emphasize 
that sustaining that suspension, while negotiations on a 
long-term agreement are under way, is essential for the 
continuation of the overall process agreed in Paris, and 
necessary to respect the IAEA Board resolution of 28 November 
2004. 
 
We recall that since our common declaration issued in Tehran 
on 21 October 2003, the Europeans have kept the question of 
the Iranian program in the IAEA. 
 
In the light of this, we were concerned by the statements 
made by a number of senior Iranian officials suggesting that 
some activities covered by the voluntary suspension might 
soon be re-started.  Iran should be in no doubt that any such 
change to the suspension would be a clear breach of the Paris 
Agreement and of the IAEA resolutions.  It would bring the 
negotiating process to an end.  The consequences beyond could 
only be negative for Iran. 
 
We do not believe that Iran needs to take such a step. Though 
we understand and share your desire for progress and the 
earliest possible resolution, these hopes need to be placed 
in the context of the complexity of the issues in question. 
Given the starting positions of the two sides, they will 
inevitably take time to complete. 
 
The dialogue has already brought benefits.  This is progress 
that we should build on.  We believe that we can use the 
negotiations not only to resolve the nuclear issue, but also 
to improve the future relationship between Iran and Europe. 
To this end our strong preference would be to continue 
discussions in good faith to find mutually acceptable 
objective guarantees on the nuclear question, and to provide 
firm guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic 
cooperation and firm commitments on security issues.  In 
particular, we are ready for further discussions in the field 
of nuclear supply for Iran's power generation program.  We 
are also ready to discuss further a political and security 
frame work. 
 
More broadly, the EU's negotiations with Iran on a Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement and a Political Dialogue Agreement 
continue and we hope that we will make further progress at 
the next round of discussions in Brussels on 17 May.  We are 
also looking forward to giving continuing European support to 
Iran's entry into the world Trade Organization.  This sort of 
progress will be jeopardized if Iran now moves away from the 
Paris Agreement. 
 
In order to pursue our discussions, it may be useful if we 
were to meet you in the next fortnight.  We suggest that 
until then no steps are taken that could undermine the 
process.  END TEXT. 
WOLFF