US embassy cable - 05MADRID1809

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 001809 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, SP, Counterterrorism 
SUBJECT: FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER'S MEETING WITH ANTI-TERRORISM 
JUDGE 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Bob Manzanares; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  FBI Director Robert Mueller met May 9 with 
Juan del Olmo, the Spanish judge overseeing the investigation 
into the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings, to advocate 
improved information sharing on terrorism investigations. 
Director Mueller expressed understanding of the limits 
imposed on information sharing by the Spanish judicial 
system, but emphasized that the nature of the war on 
terrorism requires the rapid transmittal of investigative 
data to law enforcement authorities in many countries to head 
off future threats.  Judge del Olmo agreed with the Director 
on the need for quick action against terrorists and said that 
he and other Spanish authorities acted swiftly to pass 
information that might be needed by the USG or other 
countries to avert new attacks.  However, he also noted that 
where investigative data did not provide any indication of an 
imminent or future threat, it was his duty to maintain the 
primacy of Spain's legal rules of evidence, which strictly 
limit the distribution of information.  This is why he 
maintained restrictions in the Monica Soto case, where a 
Spanish police investigation revealed no threat information 
related to a computer disk that included apparent diagrams of 
New York's Grand Central Station. Del Olmo stressed Spain's 
desire to be responsive to confront this common threat and 
assured the Director he would do all that he could to be 
helpful.  The meeting with Director Mueller sensitized del 
Olmo to the USG's desire for additional investigative data, 
but it was unclear whether he understood precisely why we 
need such broad access to this information.  We could 
reinforce our message by exposing del Olmo to USG law 
enforcement and intelligence counter-terrorism programs. 
Embassy Madrid is working to craft a possible visit by Judge 
del Olmo to the U.S. for counter-terrorism briefings. 
Readouts of Director Mueller's other meetings in Spain will 
be reported septel.   End Summary. 
 
//DIRECTOR URGES IMPROVED INFORMATION SHARING// 
 
2. (C) Director Mueller thanked del Olmo for the information 
he had provided the USG regarding the investigation into the 
March 11 terrorist attacks.  He said that as a former 
prosecutor he understood the challenges involved in carrying 
out a multi-nation terrorist investigation, citing his own 
work with Scottish officials in the Lockerbie bombing and 
with French officials in the 1989 UTA aircraft bombing case. 
The September 11 and March 11 attacks created a more complex 
world and a greater need for cross-border law enforcement 
cooperation.  The Director said the FBI had changed its 
mission as a result of September 11, from incident 
investigation and prosecution to its new role in disrupting 
terrorists to prevent future attacks.  He noted that the USG 
had adapted its legal structure to meet the terrorist threat, 
dropping barriers to the flow of information to grand juries, 
the intelligence community, and foreign allies.  Director 
Mueller said he was seeking to understand the Spanish 
judicial system and its restrictions on information sharing. 
He stressed the critical nature of data such as telephone 
records and e-mail information for ongoing investigations and 
requested del Olmo's views on how the USG could facilitate 
improved information sharing. 
 
//SPANISH LEGAL LIMITS ON INFORMATION SHARING// 
 
3. (C) Del Olmo said that any discussion had to be placed in 
the context of the Spanish legal system, which immediately 
"judicialized" terrorism investigations.  Judges charged with 
oversight of investigations sorted information into two 
distinct categories: A) evidence related to a crime that had 
already taken place, and B) evidence of planning for a future 
crime.  Information in the first category had to be strictly 
controlled by a judge and, under the Spanish rules of 
evidence, restricted to only the judge, the prosecutor, and 
the police investigators.  In the case of information to 
plans for future crimes, del Olmo said he saw no impediment 
to sharing such information as soon as it emerged. 
 
4. (C) As an example, del Olmo noted that in the early stages 
of his investigation into the March 11 attacks, Spain had 
immediately shared with Italian authorities telephone numbers 
and other data that led to the arrest in Italy of extremists 
affiliated with the March 11 bombers.  He contrasted this 
with the USG's March 2004 letter rogatory requesting 
knowledge of the full scope of the investigation.  Del Olmo 
said that at that point in the investigation a U.S. citizen 
was suspected of involvement (Washington state attorney 
Brandon Mayfield who was later cleared) and del Olmo 
authorized USG access to that narrow element of the 
investigation.  According to del Olmo, there was tension 
between U.S. and Spanish officials because the rules of 
evidence restricted USG access to broader aspects of the 
investigation. 
5. (C) The next point when del Olmo determined that a 
potential threat superseded the rules of evidence was in 
December 2004 when police found what appeared to be diagrams 
of New York's Grand Central Station on a computer diskette 
seized earlier in 2004 from a suspect connected to the 
bombers.  In that case, said del Olmo, the prosecutor moved 
immediately to share the data with U.S. authorities.  Judge 
del Olmo said that his investigation into the March 11 
attacks had produced 50,000 pages of information related to 
the case.  He had lifted secrecy restrictions on 
approximately 13,000 pages and would make those available 
upon request through a letter rogatory.  Del Olmo said it was 
his understanding that there was an intense flow of 
investigative information being passed through intelligence 
channels and this reduced his concern that his implementation 
of secrecy restrictions to preserve legal evidence was 
somehow blocking USG access to important information. 
 
//MONICA SOTO CASE// 
 
6. (C) Director Mueller said the Soto case was a good example 
of why the USG sometimes felt frustrated by Spanish legal 
restrictions on information sharing.  The fact that data had 
been provided by Spanish authorities allowed USG 
investigators to locate the worrisome diagrams and trace 
ownership of the disk back to Soto.  It was the USG's 
understanding that the disk itself had been found in the 
possession of March 11 bombing suspect, so when Director 
Mueller briefed the information to President Bush it was 
understandable that the President wanted to know why Soto had 
not yet been interviewed by the FBI. 
 
7. (C) Director Mueller said the FBI decided to work through 
the Spanish authorities out of respect for Spain's lead in 
the investigation, despite the fact that Soto was in the UK 
and could have been made available by British officials.  The 
USG was subsequently frustrated by the inability to sit in on 
Soto's interview by the Spanish police or to obtain a 
detailed transcript of that interview.  While both USG and 
Spanish authorities may have felt that Soto had little to 
offer and that there was no real threat involved, the USG 
considered the threat to be substantial until proven 
otherwise.  The Director described the Soto case as an 
instance where judicial secrecy clashed with investigative 
needs and expressed his conviction that terrorism could only 
be defeated through closer international cooperation. 
 
8. (C) Del Olmo agreed on the need for closer international 
cooperation, noting that Spain had worked closely with the 
USG in the wake of the September 11 attacks in part because 
of its own 35-year fight against ETA terrorism.  He said 
Spain's difficult experience ensured that it would always 
respond swiftly to counter terrorist threats against any 
country.  In the Soto case, del Olmo thanked the Director for 
the USG's assistance in tracking her down.  He said he had 
felt reassured by the fact that he knew the USG had obtained 
the information on the disk via informal channels and assumed 
that the USG had determined that there was no indication of 
an immediate threat to the U.S.  He also noted Soto's 
complete cooperation with Spanish authorities when they 
interviewed her and said that the lack of clear threat 
information convinced him that her information was more 
valuable as evidence than as information to be passed to the 
USG.  Del Olmo said he had briefed the Embassy's Consular 
Section (which along with Legat works closely with del Olmo) 
on this determination and explained his thinking.  He assumed 
full responsibility for his decision and assured Director 
Mueller that the information had not been held back out of 
malicious intent, but simply to comply with Spanish rules of 
evidence. 
 
9. (C) More broadly, del Olmo underlined the Spanish 
government's commitment to work with the USG to combat 
terrorism and to provide as much information as possible.  He 
said that in the case of the March 11 investigation, much of 
the information concerned common criminal activity that he 
did not believe would be of particular use to USG 
authorities.  He described the March 11 bombing case as a 
"strange mix" of religious fundamentalism and narcotics 
smuggling activity, with a limited international component 
and even less information directly related to the U.S. 
 
10. (C) Director Mueller thanked del Olmo for his explanation 
of the events surrounding the Soto matter and complimented 
him for his work on the March 11 investigation.  He observed 
that Spain had gained much experience in its fight ETA and 
had developed powerful judicial mechanisms to confront the 
threat.  However, the threat posed by Islamic extremism was 
much different and the key to success in this war was greater 
international cooperation against the terrorists.  Director 
Mueller noted that investigators in one country could not 
possibly be sure whether information in their possession 
might be useful in another country unless they shared that 
data.  He said it was important to develop new mechanisms for 
information sharing, not just with the USG, but with other EU 
countries and even further afield.  Director Mueller said he 
hoped del Olmo would have an opportunity to visit the U.S. to 
further discuss these important issues. 
 
//COMMENT// 
 
11. (C) Director Mueller's meeting with Judge del Olmo was a 
very helpful boost to USG efforts convey to the Spanish 
government the importance we place on the smooth, consistent 
flow of terrorism-related information.  Still, it was clear 
by the end of the conversation that del Olmo continues to 
find it difficult to understand why the USG requests such 
broad access to information that -- in the Spanish legal 
context -- is normally barred to those not directly involved 
in the trial process.  It is important that we continue 
working with him to explain why even seemingly trivial 
information might be useful to USG terrorism analysts.  We 
believe it would be useful to expose del Olmo to U.S. 
counter-terrorism investigative techniques, perhaps through a 
visit to relevant USG agencies.  Members of the Embassy 
Counter-Terrorism Working Group are working together to craft 
an agenda for a possible visit to the U.S. by del Olmo. 
Judge del Olmo's lead in the March 11 investigation suggests 
he may be involved in future terrorism investigations, making 
him an important information resource over the long term and 
therefore a contact well worth cultivating. 
 
MANZANARES