US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI3587

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 003587 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PK, IN, Kashmir 
SUBJECT: SRINAGAR CAR BOMB: NEW KASHMIR TERRORIST M.O.? 
 
 
Classified By: Polcouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (U) A car bomb exploded in the summer capital of J&K on 
May 11, killing two persons, injuring more than 50, and 
damaging more than one dozen vehicles and some 40 shops and 
other buildings.  J&K police sources have confirmed the 
casualty figures, and report that the blast was an improvised 
explosive device (IED) packed in a small car that went off in 
a crowded market area in Srinagar, just as the work day was 
getting underway. 
 
2.  (U) The attack appears to have been aimed at a Central 
Reserve Police Force (CRPF) unit, but all deaths and most 
injuries were of civilians.  The blast tore a 2-foot deep 
crater in the road, uprooted electic poles, and tore through 
chain fencing, affecting an area estimated at 1000 square 
yards. 
 
3.  (C) J&K Police sources tell us they are not certain who 
was behind it.  The shadowy al-Nasireen group has taken 
responsibility, but J&K police tell us Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) 
and the J&K Islamic Front also claimed credit.  Al-Nasireen 
is one of the four terrorist groups linked to 
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) that has come out strongly in 
opposition to the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus in recent months, 
and which carried out the April 6 attack on the State 
Transport Company complex on the eve of the first bus journey 
April 7.  Javed Makhdoomi, Inspector General of Police in 
Srinagar, told us May 12 that he had not seen proof that 
al-Nasireen was behind it, and speculated that HM may have 
been the culprit, as the group has claimed responsibility for 
the occasional car bomb in J&K in the past.  Makhdoomi also 
did not confirm press reports that al-Nasireen is a front for 
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
4.  (C) This was not a suicide bombing.  Car bombs in J&K 
have been very rare during the 16 year Kashmir insurgency. 
Aside from fidayeen attacks, the terrorists' preferred modus 
operandi in recent years has been to lob grenades or to 
activate remote-controlled IEDs buried along roads, not to 
pack cars with IEDs and set them off remotely, as was the 
case here.  Our research reveals some seven car bombs since 
1997. 
 
5.  (C) Should we see more cases like this, it would 
represent a serious turn for the worse in the insurgency, the 
beginning of a new kind of terrorism in J&K.  It could cast a 
shadow over vibrant street life in Srinagar and other towns 
in the Valley, where (except for continued heavy security 
force presence) the sense of normalcy has increased markedly 
during the past two years.  It could also affect the tourist 
season, which many observers expect to be the busiest in the 
Valley since before the insurgency began in 1989. 
 
6.  (C) A terrorist strategy relying more on car bombs, 
however, could also easily backfire, because Kashmiri 
civilians would likely bear the brunt of such blasts, as they 
have with the widespread terrorist use of grenades in recent 
years, which with disturbing regularity miss their intended 
targets (the security forces).  A greater use of car bombs 
would exacerbate Kashmiri yearning for an end to violence, 
which remains indiscriminate and affects civilians as much as 
(if not more than) the institutions of the Indian state which 
the terrorists purport to be targetting. 
BLAKE