US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA4397

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 004397 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PLS PASS USTR FOR RVARGO AND BHARMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2015 
TAGS: ETRD, ECON, EAGR, KIPR, CO 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR TELLS TRADE MINISTER COLOMBIA NEEDS TO 
STEP UP TO THE PLATE ON AGRICULTURE DISCUSSIONS IN FTA 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
(C)  1.  Summary.  In a two hour meeting May 5, the 
Ambassador told Trade Minister Botero and FTA lead negotiator 
Gomez that the GOC needed to substantially improve its 
agricultural market access offer if it hoped to close the FTA 
negotiations in the near future.  Botero responded the GOC 
would do so in new market offers for wheat, soy and soy meal, 
barley and other grains within a few days (the proposal, 
which demonstrated improvements was transmitted to USTR May 
6). Botero underscored GOC understanding it had to break the 
negative cycle in the agriculture negotiations with 
aggressive improvements, but these would be conditioned on 
similar moves by the USG. Botero told the Ambassador that he 
would meet with the new Ecuadorian Commerce Minister May 6 to 
tell him that Colombia would support Ecuador's continued 
presence at the FTA negotiations so long as the new GOE did 
not slow down the process.  Botero stated that the GOC was 
willing to meet USG requests on intellectual property on data 
protection, linkage and extension of patent terms due to 
undue administrative delays.  Botero also stated that the GOC 
was willing to accept the SPS proposal the USG provided in 
Lima, with some modifications.  Botero stressed the GOC was 
committed to finishing the FTA within two rounds and would 
demonstrate this in the coming weeks.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  On May 5, Ambassador and Econcouns met with Trade 
Minister Botero and FTA lead negotiator Gomez to discuss the 
current state of play of the FTA negotiations.  Botero led 
off the meeting by expressing the GOC's belief that almost 
all the negotiating tables were within two rounds of closing. 
 The Ambassador concurred that there had been important 
progress, but stressed that the overall lack of progress in 
agricultural market access, and specifically the GOC's slow 
progress, was jeopardizing the possibility of closing the 
negotiations by the target date of July that the President 
mentioned to Secretary Rice only a few days before. 
 
BOTERO SEEKS USG SUPPORT ON TIMING 
 
3. (C)  Minister Botero said he would travel to Quito May 6 
for meetings with Trade Minister Molestino and possibly 
President Palacio.  Botero added he had three main messages 
for the GOE: a) Colombian solidarity with Ecuador's continued 
presence in the negotiations 
if Ecuador did not slow down the process; b) Colombia's 
willingness to delay the next round for one week; c) a 
message that the GOE had to maintain prior commitments on all 
issues, especially IPR.  The Minister stated the Ecuadorian 
delay was due to internal political issues, but Colombia 
could not accept more than a week's delay.  Botero expressed 
concern a  delay of over one week would delay the July round 
because all countries needed at least four weeks between 
rounds.  He noted the USG could not field a team past the 
second week of July because of WTO commitments.  Botero asked 
for USG support for Colombia's position on timing. 
 
TROUBLE SPOTS - INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 
4.  (C)  Minister Botero commented the GOC felt only three 
tables were more than two rounds away from closing - 
intellectual property, SPS and agricultural market access. 
Botero felt delay in closing the IP table was due to 
political concerns.  Colombia was willing to accept USG 
positions on data protection, linkage and extension of patent 
terms for processing delays, but could not accept patents for 
animal and plant species, second-use patents and any other 
type of patent term extension.  Botero and Gomez both 
expressed gratitude for USG positions on biodiversity and 
technology transfer, stating the USG willingness to include 
these issues was fundamental to obtaining political support 
for the agreement in Colombia.  Botero stated the GOC could 
only make concessions on the points at the final round to 
avoid domestic political repercussions. 
 
SPS 
 
5.  (C)  Botero then turned to the problems in the Sanitary 
and Phyto-Sanitary table.  He expressed Colombia's interest 
in gaining real market access to the US and the GOC's 
conviction that strong cooperation on SPS issues was a 
prerequisite for such access.  The Ambassador stated the USG 
had tabled text in Lima that would have made such cooperation 
possible, under terms similar, but not identical, to those 
the GOC sought, but the GOC had rejected the text outright. 
Gomez denied this, stating the GOC had taken the offer under 
consideration, but added the GOC was working with Ecuador and 
Peru to send a message to the US would accept the proposal 
(which he termed Chile-plus), so long as the terms of 
reference for the technical working group were included as a 
side letter to the FTA itself, not negotiated afterwards. 
 
6.  (C)  Gomez explained he had consulted with the Chilean 
government and was concerned that after more than one year 
the terms of reference for the Chilean technical committee 
had still not been worked out and the committee had yet to 
meet.  Colombia could not afford a similar delay, stated 
Botero, as access for many of Colombia's offensive interests 
depended on SPS issues.  The Ambassador cautioned SPS issues 
are and always must remain scientifically based, and the GOC 
must not endeavor to introduce political considerations in 
the SPS process.  Gomez and Botero agreed and stated the GOC 
had no such intention. 
 
AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS 
 
7.  (C)  With respect to agricultural market access, Botero 
stated there was a negative, vicious cycle in that table 
which was forcing both sides to make very conservative offers 
and delaying progress.  Botero understood it was imperative 
to create a more positive dynamic.  The Ambassador agreed it 
was important to change the dynamic in agriculture, and 
argued the GOC was well known for its brinkmanship in 
negotiations, but they had reached the brink and were in 
great danger of falling.  The Ambassador added that the GOC's 
offers were so weak that many in the USG doubted if the GOC 
had the desire or political strength to close the deal. 
Gomez answered that the GOC had developed a series of new 
offers, which they hoped to transmit to the USG shortly, that 
would offer TRQ's on wheat, soy and soy meal, barley and 
other grains (excluding corn) and over quota tariff levels 
that would equal Mercosur's as well as more truncated 
transition periods.  These offers were transmitted on May 6 
and an initial review indicates that while they do represent 
marked improvements, they are not a breakthrough. 
 
8.  (C)  At the meeting, Gomez stated that the GOC hoped that 
the USG would respond with offers on flowers and tobacco and 
cigarettes.  Gomez earlier told ECONCOUNS that the GOC was 
willing to consider a US counteroffer in other products (such 
as fruits and vegetables) so long as the market value of the 
offers were similar, as any large imbalance in the offers 
would kill them politically. Gomez and Botero both stated 
that the GOC hoped this offer would change the dynamic of the 
negotiations and turn a vicious cycle into a virtuous one. 
They also confided they were having problems gaining private 
sector support for this offer, as the private sector hoped to 
trade off access on these products for greater protection for 
corn. Gomez and Botero are trying to break that mindset, 
stating that any exchange regarding corn would more likely be 
tied to more sensitive products for the GOC such as chicken 
leg quarters or sugar.  The offer finally submitted May 6 
asked for USG counterproposals in fruits and vegetables, 
tobacco and cigarettes and ethanol. 
 
9.  (C)  Botero affirmed that the GOC needed some type of 
price safeguard, although not necessarily a permanent one, on 
only four products -- beans, chicken leg quarters, rice and 
corn.  He stated that these products were important 
politically because they were essential in maintaining 
campesinos working on licit crops.  Botero and Gomez agreed 
that the GOC was willing to justify the need for special 
treatment on these products for counter-narcotics reasons 
that were Colombia specific, thereby making it more difficult 
to argue that such concessions on the part of the USG were 
precedent setting. The Ambassador warned against using 
political arguments in a commercial discussion as the USG was 
negotiating FTA's with several countries and each one felt 
that they had political considerations that were worthy of 
special attention.  The Ambassador stated that the agreement 
must stand on its commercial merits to gain approval by the 
US Congress and private sector.  Minister Botero replied that 
the GOC was also able to justify its request on technical 
reasons. 
 
10.  (C)  Minister Botero reaffirmed the GOC's desire to 
finish the negotiations within two rounds.  He stated that 
the President and the rest of the GOC were resolute in their 
desire to conclude an FTA with the U.S.  Minster Botero also 
requested that the Ambassador continue to meet with him to 
discuss the FTA and the Ambassador agreed to future meetings 
as needed. 
 
IS THE GOC READY TO DEAL? 
 
11.  (C)  Comment:  Botero and Gomez clearly believe that the 
lack of progress on agricultural issues is threatening the 
FTA.  They were both clear the GOC believes its newest offers 
would help break the deadlock.  At the meeting, they 
championed the extreme position that if future rounds were 
not to include agricultural meetings, then the GOC would not 
be able to field any negotiators.  It appears however, that 
they took the warnings about brinkmanship to heart, and when 
faced with a US proposal on May 9 not to include agriculture 
at the next round, but hold substantive talks in agriculture 
in Washington, they did not reject the offer and seem to be 
willing to accept it, although they would like to suggest 
Colombia as the venue for domestic political reasons.  These 
political pressures are very strong and holding meetings in 
Colombia would help the GOC's efforts to sell the FTA to the 
agricultural community.   Moreover, while the GOC's latest 
offer is not groundbreaking, it does represent a departure 
from past practice and a willingness, arguably for the first 
time, to discuss agricultural market access seriously.  The 
USG's acceptance of Colombia as  venue instead of Washington 
could be successfully played as the USG recognizing 
Colombia's forward movement, without recognizing the strings 
attached to Colombia's improved agricultural offer. 
WOOD