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| Identifier: | 05TAIPEI2127 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05TAIPEI2127 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | American Institute Taiwan, Taipei |
| Created: | 2005-05-11 10:52:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV PINR CH TW Cross Strait Politics |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 111052Z May 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002127 SIPDIS STATE PASS AIT/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CH, TW, Cross Strait Politics SUBJECT: TAIWAN CONCERNED OVER PRC-JAPAN FRICTIONS REF: 2004 TAIPEI 3742 Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 1. (C) Summary: Taipei remains optimistic over current trends in Japan-Taiwan relations, but officials express concern that Beijing may demand concessions over Taiwan as a condition to reducing short-term frictions between Tokyo and Beijing. Taiwan officials note that Beijing has shifted the focus of its demands on Japan in recent weeks from history to Taiwan. Taipei fears that Tokyo may be pressured to make concessions over its position on Taiwan participation in the World Health Organization (WHO) or plans to grant permanent visa-free status to Taiwan travelers. Nevertheless, recent statements by the Japanese Foreign Minister reaffirming Taiwan's inclusion in the scope of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty have reassured Taipei that Japan will be increasingly willing to resist PRC pressure and therefore longer term trends in Japan-Taiwan relations will remain positive. Taiwan officials are accelerating efforts to enhance trilateral communications among the U.S., Taiwan, and Japan, especially on security policy. End Summary. When Elephants Fight... ----------------------- 2. (C) Officials in Taipei expect a further long-term deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations and are reviewing Taiwan's place in what they expect to be a new, and much less stable, strategic environment. Lo Fu-chuan, Chairman of the quasi-official Association for East Asian Relations (EARA) and former Representative to Tokyo, asserted that both Beijing and Tokyo are likely to continue to foster a level of tension in the Sino-Japanese relationship in order to advance both governments' respective domestic political agendas. Lo assessed that the Koizumi government is intentionally encouraging the public to see China as a threat in order to secure a number of political objectives, including expanding Japan's international role, revising Article Nine of the constitution, and upgrading Taiwan's defense capabilities. Lo noted that this trend, combined with Beijing's long term policy of encouraging anti-Japanese sentiments for domestic political consumption, has added a destabilizing new dynamic to regional security. 3. (C) National Security Council (NSC) Senior Advisor for Asian Affairs Lin Cheng-wei offered a similar assessment, but added that the two sides have realized they may have both overplayed their hands in recent weeks and are looking to cool tensions without sacrificing core domestic political interests. For Japan, he continued, it will be difficult to give Beijing concessions over the East China Sea gas exploration, Yasukuni Shrine, history, or textbooks without offending key constituencies within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In this context, Lin told AIT that Taipei is concerned that the PRC focus has shifted from history to Taiwan in its high-level interactions with Tokyo in the wake of the April anti-Japanese demonstrations, and this could encourage Tokyo to view a Taiwan concession as an easy way out. 4. (C) Lin hypothesized that Japan might be tempted to offer a change in Japan's position on Taipei's bid to participate in the World Health Organization (WHO) as a gesture to Beijing. EARA's Lo told AIT that Japanese officials did not offer any substantive response during Lo's mid-April visit to Tokyo to press for Japanese support. Lo explained that Taipei hopes that Japan will encourage other Asian nations early to support Taiwan WHO participation, noting that Japan did not make its position known last year until the eve of the World Health Assembly (WHA) meeting. Thus far, however, Tokyo has not revealed its hand. Visa-Free Travel in Question? ----------------------------- 5. (C) The NSC's Lin expressed concern that recent Japan-PRC frictions may also delay efforts to grant Taiwan visitors to Japan permanent visa-free travel privileges. Lin asserted that LDP heavyweight Nikai Toshihiro has cited tensions with Beijing to slow the process of granting permanent visa-free status to Taiwan visitors. Tokyo has granted Taiwan visitors limited visa-free travel for the period of the Aichi Expo as a first step towards fully eliminating visa restrictions for Taiwan tourists. 6. (C) EARA's Lo downplayed the PRC angle over the visa issue, instead blaming Presidential Office Secretary General Yu Shyi-kun's recent "guerrilla diplomacy" for upsetting plans for lifting visa restrictions. Lo explained that Tokyo and Taipei have an informal agreement that Taiwan will give the Japanese Foreign Ministry 10 days notice before any senior Taiwan official arrives in Tokyo without a visa. Yu and his aides, however, angered Japanese Foreign Ministry officials when Yu showed up without notification in April to meet with Japanese political leaders. Lo said the flap was the result of "arrogant and immature" Yu advisors who were seeking to prove a point by visiting without prior NSC, MOFA, or TECRO Tokyo coordination. (Comment: Yu aides confirm that the visit was arranged by former Executive Yuan (EY) Secretary General Arthur Iap. For the past several years, SIPDIS Iap has attempted to wrest control of Japan policy from NSC Secretary General Chiou I-jen, Reftel). SIPDIS Ripples in an Otherwise Positive Trend -------------------------------------- 7. (C) Concern over the immediate fallout from recent PRC-Japan tensions have not clouded the otherwise optimistic outlook in Taipei over longer-term trends in the Japan-Taiwan relationship. The NSC's Lin said that Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka's recent affirmation that the Taiwan Strait has always fallen within the boundaries of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty encouraged Taipei that Japan may be willing to resist PRC pressure over Taiwan. Taiwan officials are also encouraged by signs that Japan, even the traditionally conservative Foreign Ministry, is taking a more assertive stance with Beijing over Taiwan issues. Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chief Secretary Jan Jyh-horng told AIT that PRC Taiwan Affairs Office Deputy Director Sun Yafu recently complained to Taiwan contacts that Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Yachi Shotaro was much tougher in his February meeting with Sun over the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) than American officials were with TAO officials during January talks in Washington. Taipei Looks U.S.-Taiwan-Japan Strategic Dialogue --------------------------------------------- ---- 8. (C) Taipei is looking to leverage warming U.S.-Japan relations by enhancing trilateral "Track Two" and "One-and-a-Half" dialogue with Washington and Taipei. Former MAC Vice Chairman Alexander Huang told AIT that his think tank has been recently commissioned by the NSC to recreate a low-profile trilateral Track Two process similar to the one that existed in the late 1990s involving former Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and EAP A/S Kelly. MOFA North SIPDIS American Affairs Director General Victor Chin said that USG officials in Tokyo and Washington will be invited to participate in the closed door meetings. The Taiwan NSC also recently tasked TECRO Offices in Tokyo and Washington to increase coordination with each other on security policy and to expand contacts with USG Japan specialists and GOJ American hands, especially those with cross-Strait expertise. Comment: Slowly Perhaps Surely ------------------------------ 9. (C) Most Taiwan Japan policy officials (as distinct from their senior political leadership) understand that overt ties with Tokyo could endanger Taiwan's equities with the Mainland, especially in the current tense atmosphere between Japan and Mainland China. However, the assessment that the U.S.-Japan alliance will increasingly focus on balancing growing PRC influence is seen as a major strategic opportunity for Taipei. The challenge for Taiwan policymakers will be to avoid overplaying Taipei's hand. Missteps like the Yu visit and recent assertion by President Chen Shui-bian that Taiwan has provided Japan intelligence on PRC submarine movements may be more likely to undermine Taiwan's interests than overt bilateral pressure on Tokyo from Beijing. PAAL
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