US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI2126

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CHEN ENDORSES SOONG QINGHUA SPEECH, PREPARES FOR SOONG-HU MEETING

Identifier: 05TAIPEI2126
Wikileaks: View 05TAIPEI2126 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Created: 2005-05-11 10:43:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PINR CH TW Cross Strait Politics
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002126 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CH, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: CHEN ENDORSES SOONG QINGHUA SPEECH, PREPARES FOR 
SOONG-HU MEETING 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 1977 
 
     B. TAIPEI 2114 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: President Chen Shui-bian welcomed People 
First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong's references to Taiwan 
in Soong's May 11 speech to Beijing's Qinghua University. 
Chen used a significantly milder tone than other ruling party 
officials, who criticized Soong's assertion that independence 
is not an option for Taiwan's future.  The Presidential 
Office also issued a formal clarification over the 
government's stance on the "1992 consensus" in an effort to 
set the stage for Soong's May 12 meeting with PRC leaders.  A 
senior Chen aide confirmed that the "message" Chen asked 
Soong to pass to Hu Jintao was that Chen is willing to engage 
in dialogue with Beijing using a more flexible "1992" 
formulation.  Aides dismissed the significance of media polls 
showing a drop in Chen's support rate, noting that an 
internal Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) projection of 
likely voters showed a significant upward bounce for the DPP 
following the President's controversial May 9-10 television 
interviews.  End Summary. 
 
Better Than Lien, but Still "Too Chinese" 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) President Chen Shui-bian publicly praised PFP Chairman 
James Soong's May 11 speech at Beijing's Qinghua University 
for highlighting Taiwan's accomplishments.  Chen's mild tone 
contrasted with criticism from other DPP officials, who took 
issue with Soong's decision to reiterate his position that 
independence is not an option for Taiwan's future.  National 
Security Council (NSC) Senior Advisor, and Chen confidante, 
Lin Jin-chang told AIT that the President was pleased that 
Soong spoke positively about Taiwan, even if the general tone 
of Soong's address "was about as Chinese as Lien's." 
 
Laying Down a Quiet Marker 
-------------------------- 
 
3. (C) The Presidential Office also released a press release 
on May 11 to clarify the government's stance on the "1992 
consensus" ahead of Soong's May 12 meeting with PRC leaders. 
The press statement reiterates the Chen administration's 
position that the "four characters -- 1992 consensus (jiu er 
gong shi)" were invented by then-Mainland Affairs Council 
(MAC) Chairman Su Chi in 2000.  However, the statement goes 
on to state that the 1992 Hong Kong talks had major 
historical significance, and that "President Chen has said 
many times that he hopes the two sides can look positively on 
the achievements that resulted from the consultative 
process."  The NSC's Lin said that the statement was put out 
in order to avoid the need to respond to anything Soong says 
in public after his meeting with Hu.  "We don't want to 
contradict him if he publicly accepts the '1992 consensus,'" 
Lin remarked, "so this way we can simply refer back to the 
May 11 press release without closing the door to future 
discussions of alternate '1992' formulations." 
 
4. (C) Lin confirmed that the "message" Chen requested Soong 
to convey on April 20 to Hu Jintao concerned options for 
moving beyond the "1992" deadlock (Ref A).  Lin said that the 
President asked Soong to tell Hu that Taipei is prepared to 
find a new formulation that references exchanges between the 
two sides during and after the 1992 Hong Kong talks as a 
platform for restarting a formal political dialogue.  Lin 
added that the PFP has promised to provide the Presidential 
Office a full private briefing on the PRC reaction to the 
offer after Soong returns from Beijing.  The Presidential 
Office does not expect Soong to make reference to discussions 
on the "1992" formulation during his public remarks in 
Beijing. 
 
5. (C) Lin clarified that President Chen will not make a 
major policy address on May 20, adding that Premier Frank 
Hsieh misspoke on May 9 when he touted the purported speech 
(Ref B).  Lin said that after the May 14 National Assembly 
(NA) election, Chen will seek to engage both KMT Chairman 
Lien Chan and Soong on creating a domestic consensus in 
support of cross-Strait engagement.  If this can be achieved, 
the President then plans to reach out privately to Washington 
and, if possible, Beijing to explain Taipei's planned policy 
direction.  Only then, Lin added, would the President make a 
major public address on cross-Strait policy.  "Otherwise, it 
would just be another unilateral restatement of Chen's 
personal thinking," Lin added. 
 
NA Election: DPP on the Rebound? 
-------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Despite criticism of Chen's recent public attacks on 
Taiwan political leaders, DPP officials said an internal 
projection completed on May 11 showed a clear up-tick in the 
DPP's prospects for the May 14 NA election.  Officials claim 
that the DPP and KMT are running nearly neck-and-neck, with 
both far ahead of the TSU and, especially, the PFP. 
Long-time DPP polling guru Chen Chun-lin dismissed two 
newspaper polls published on May 11 suggesting flagging 
public support for Chen's leadership.  Chen stated that "70 
percent of those polled are not going to vote on May 14." 
Chen added, "its the DPP core supporters who will vote that 
we are worried about and that is where we have seen the 
upward spike over the past two days."  The NSC's Lin told AIT 
that Chen will give another television address on May 12, 
this time to highlight the fact that the TSU opposes the 
constitutional reforms that will be voted on by the NA.  Lin 
noted that the President's recent public speeches were 
crafted for Pan-Green supporters, and not the public at 
large, thus the President is unconcerned about criticism from 
other quarters. 
 
7. (C) Lin acknowledged that Chen's recent rhetoric has not 
contributed positively to an atmosphere of cross-Strait 
reconciliation, but said that politicians in Taiwan, 
including James Soong and Lien Chan, all understand that 
hyperbole is an essential element of election campaigns.  Lin 
said that Chen's relations with Lee Teng-hui and the TSU may 
be more difficult to repair, but added that the DPP really 
doesn't need the TSU's support anyway.  Lin said that the 
Presidential Office will attempt to move quickly after May 14 
to arrange a meeting with the two Pan-Blue leaders in order 
to break the logjam over the Special Defense Procurement 
Budget. 
 
Comment: Staying the Course 
--------------------------- 
 
8. (C) There are growing expectations in the President's 
inner circle that Soong may be able to secure a new 
formulation from Hu Jintao over "1992" that may pave the way 
for a more formalized dialogue.  The contents of the Soong-Hu 
meeting may not be immediately apparent, as Soong is not 
expected to reveal any new formulations agreed upon until his 
return to Taipei later in the week.  In this context, it is 
encouraging that the President is preparing to offer a 
low-key response to whatever public message comes out of the 
Soong-Hu meeting.  If he can keep his rhetoric over the NA 
election within bounds between now and May 14, prospects for 
a post-NA ruling-opposition summit to work towards a 
consensus on cross-Strait policy and the Special Defense 
Budget appear to remain on track. 
PAAL 

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