US embassy cable - 05DHAKA2243

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LOYALTY AND ACCESS TRUMP TITTLES IN INFLUENCING PM

Identifier: 05DHAKA2243
Wikileaks: View 05DHAKA2243 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Dhaka
Created: 2005-05-11 02:16:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PGOV PREL BG
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 002243 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BG 
SUBJECT: LOYALTY AND ACCESS TRUMP TITTLES IN INFLUENCING PM 
 
REF: 03 DHAKA 3720 
 
Classified By: P/E Counselor D.C. McCullough, reasons para 1.4 d. 
 
 1. (S) Summary and Introduction.  Reftel described the BDG's 
dysfunctional decision-making process and its control by a 
handful of individuals.  Not much has changed since 2003. 
Loyalty, proximity, and length of service to PM Zia still 
count for far more than title or institutional position, but 
for Zia loyalty is a two-way street.  Many insiders have a 
close relationship with her son and heir apparent, Tariq 
Rahman.  The good news is the USG has productive 
relationships with 12 of the 17 insiders and is working to 
strengthen relationships with Falu, Syed Iskander, Khondakher 
Hussain, Mir Nasiruddin, and Motiur Nizami.  Moreover, none 
of those five, except for perhaps Jamaat Islami leader 
Nizami, could be described as fundamentally hostile to the 
USG.  The bad news is that very few of them have the ability 
or the interest to pressure Zia's basic outlook on politics 
or governance.  End Summary and Introduction. 
 
The Inner Circle 
---------------- 
 
2. (S) Zia aside, these people have the ability to influence, 
but not determine, the outcome of key issues: 
 
A) PM Zia Khaleda Zia: Maligned by critics as insulated, 
lazy, uneducated, and susceptible to the last word whispered 
in her ear, she is still clearly the lady in charge.  Her 
pedigree as General Zia's widow, backed by an effective 
public persona,  protects her from BNP dissidents, who 
believe the party -- and their political futures -- would 
unravel without her presence at the top.  Good political 
instincts and loyal to her friends.  Seems to enjoy the 
ceremonial aspects of her job the most. 
 
B) Tariq Rahman: Zia's notorious senior son and heir apparent 
(septel).  Takes credit for the BNP's successful 2001 
electoral strategy, including its alliance with Jamaat 
Islami.  Reportedly filled/sold up to one-third of the 60 
cabinet slots.  His many critics say he is ruthless, 
exceptionally corrupt, inexperienced in politics or business, 
poorly educated, and unworldly.  His admirers say he is 
dynamic, smart, and represents a new generation of forward, 
not historically backward, looking leaders.  His official BNP 
title of Senior Joint Secretary masks, ineffectively, his 
unrivaled authority, save for his mother, in the party. 
Operates a "shadow government" from his "Hahwa Bhaban" think 
tank, particularly on clearing government appointments and 
contracts.  Sometimes brutal with his business rivals.  In 
the last year, he boosted his stature with BNP workers with a 
successful nationwide "listening tour."  Emerging as an 
effective public speaker.  Key questions: Will Tariq run for 
parliament in the next election?  (Probably). When would he 
and his mother try to arrange his elevation to the top?  To 
what extent does his mother control him or concur with his 
actions? (Reports are mixed.) 
 
C) Haris Chowdhury: PM Zia's Political Secretary and a close 
Tariq ally.  His history as a BNP youth leader, rough 
demeanor, and his reputed involvement in violent actions 
against the opposition account for his thuggish reputation. 
Capable of outlandish statements, but very accessible.  While 
MFA dithered, Chowdhury got a BDG statement issued welcoming 
the Iraqi election. 
 
D) Salahuddin Qader Chowdhury is officially Zia's Adviser for 
Parliamentary and Energy Affairs, but he's an all-purpose 
player.  Scion of an important pro-Pakistan political family 
accused of "war crimes" during the 1971 war of independence, 
critics vilify him as an alleged rapist, arms smuggler, and 
killer.  Yet, Georgetown educated, he is articulate, 
personable, and direct.  May have the best understanding in 
the PMO of how Americans think and act.  His influence is 
reflected by his ability to survive three major 
embarrassments in 2004: his defeat for OIC SYG after an 
effective Awami League diplomatic campaign against him; his 
vulgar attack on Sheikh Hasina afterwards; and widespread 
speculation that he was involved with the Chittagong arms 
haul shipment.  After the latter incident, Kamal Siddiqui and 
then Foreign Secretary/now Ambassador to U.S. Shamsher 
Chowdhury predicted his exit from the PMO. 
 
E) Syed Iskander: The PM's brother and link to the military. 
As a retired army major, he exerts great influence on 
military procurement contracts and on senior military 
appointments.  Also an MP and tied by business to Tariq. 
 
F) Home Minister of State Lutfuzzaman Babar: His dynamic 
management has turned a major political liability for the BNP 
-- law and order --  into a modest asset, in part by creating 
and launching the Rapid Action Battalion, arguably Zia's most 
popular initiative this term with a crime-weary population. 
A known smuggler, an ally of Tariq, and reportedly 
pro-JI/pro-Islamist.  His influence will grow as his ministry 
becomes more active in the run-up to the next general 
election.  His health is a big question mark.  He regularly 
goes Thailand for medical treatment and is expected to visit 
American doctors this summer for unknown ailments. 
 
G) Kamaluddin Siddiqui: The PM's Principal Secretary is loyal 
to Zia but not her son, whom he views as uncouth and 
dangerous.  Sometimes shockingly candid in talking to us 
about corruption and BNP politics.  His influence stems from 
his role as Zia's gatekeeper and his bureaucratic ability to 
get things done.  However, he does not have the sway he 
enjoyed during Zia's first term, when he was a major policy 
force.  Repeatedly over-promises to us.  Projects himself as 
the USG's best friend in the PMO. 
 
H) Finance Minister Saifur Rahman: Dominates economic, 
development, and financial matters, and is influential on 
some political issues.  Broadly respected for his competence 
and experience, he has cut Bangladesh's dependence on foreign 
aid while increasing its forex.  Remains wary of FDI.  He 
seems to do nothing to control his son, a BNP MP who is, 
after Tariq, the most corrupt and abrupt of the leadership 
offspring.  An accountant, not a reformist visionary in the 
Manmohan Singh model.  Rahman apparently miscalculated or got 
out elbowed by cabinet colleagues when they refused to extend 
in office the reformist central bank governor.  Prone to 
outlandish public statements denying obvious Bangladesh 
problems, especially in the context of foreign criticism. 
Compared to his shortsighted cabinet colleagues, he can look 
at a broad range of issues in terms of national interest. 
Rahman is the one minister the Ambassador can use to get 
important bilateral points to the top. 
 
I) Health Minister Khondakher Musharraf Hussain: Another 
beneficiary of Zia's loyalty based on their long association. 
 Energy minister in Zia's first administration, corrupt, and 
involved with coal mining deals with the Chinese, he is a key 
member of her kitchen cabinet.  A geologist, and a former 
teacher of Tariq Rahman's, before winning his first election 
to Parliament in 1991, he has Zia's trust, perhaps more than 
any other minister.  Also reported to be exceptionally 
corrupt.  In 2002, he held up a USAID-financed condoms 
shipment for months looking for a payoff. 
 
Middle Circle 
------------- 
 
3. (S) The next group is important, especially in specific, 
technical areas. 
 
A) Reaz Rahman: The Foreign Policy Adviser is de facto 
foreign minister.  An old-time BNP stalwart, he is close to 
Tariq and Babar.  Capable, articulate, and direct.  Charged 
with making the SAARC summit in Dhaka a logistical and 
political success. 
 
C) Mosadek Ali "Falu": The PM's former private secretary, and 
reputed intimate companion, he is no longer in the inner 
circle since leaving the PMO to take up his seat in 
parliament he won in the controversial "festival of fraud" 
Dhaka 10 by-election in July 2004.  Owns a television 
channel, N-TV, available on cable in the U.S. and the UK, as 
well as in Bangladesh. 
 
D) NSI DG Brig Mohammed Haider: Became, in Tariq's orbit, a 
key player soon after his appointment in January as the head 
of the National Security Intelligence Service, Bangladesh's 
civilian intelligence agency.  Works on many political 
matters, and deputed to deal with important ambassadors on, 
for example, the "Tuesday Group's" proposed election 
conference in November. 
 
E) Civil Aviation State Minister Mir Nasiruddin: Enjoys the 
PM's favor, in part because he draws on his contacts as a 
former ambassador to Saudi Arabia to ensure Zia is well 
treated when she goes to Mecca.  She forced her son Tariq and 
other reluctant BNP leaders like S.Q. Chowdhury to go to 
Chittagong in a last-ditch, unsuccessful effort to boost his 
challenge to the Awami League incumbent in the May 9 mayoral 
election.  Not a dynamic campaigner or manager but wily. 
Kamal Siddiqui privately told us Nasirruddin is holding up 
the sale to Bangladesh of Boeing 777 jets because he wants a 
bribe. 
 
F) Industries Minister Motiur Rahman Nizami: Also leader of 
Jamaat Islami, Nizami has access and stature as the BNP's key 
coalition partner, but he does not exert, and does not appear 
to seek to exert, major influence on policy.  His initial 
opposition to the proposed USD 2.5 billion Tata investment, 
because in part it was Indian, was circumvented by giving the 
BDG lead to the dynamic chairman of the Board of Investment. 
Nizami now supports the project after part of it was slotted 
for his constituency.  His goal is to broaden JI's appeal and 
turn Bangladesh into a theocratic state in the next 25 years. 
 One son is a graduate of the University of Maine.  A son in 
Manchester reportedly channels local contributions via the 
NGO Muslim Aid to Bangladeshi madrassahs. 
 
Outer Circle 
------------- 
 
4. (S) These people have access but less influence than their 
title or reputation might suggest: 
 
A) Law Minister Moudud Ahmed: This politically opportunistic 
lawyer can be counted on to promote the BDG line, from 
defending extrajudicial police killings to its request for an 
umpteeneth postponement in separating the judiciary from the 
executive.  In a cabinet short on technocrats, his role in 
legal matters and drafting legislation is vital.  Accessible 
and often constructive in dealing with us.  Was the key 
player in ramming legislation through parliament last summer 
on workers' rights in the EPZ's to end the threat of lost GSP 
benefits for Bangladesh. 
 
B) Local Government Minister/BNP Secretary General Mannan 
Bhuyian: Marginalized by Tariq's ascendancy and viewed with 
suspicion by the PMO since BNP dissident MPs last year mooted 
his name as an alternative leader to Zia.  He is the BNP's 
moderate public face in dealing with the opposition and 
condemning acts of political violence.  A former pro-China 
communist, he retains close ties to the PRC; his duties 
include keeping the opposition communist and socialist 
parties at bay. 
 
C) Foreign Minister Morshed Khan: Owes his position largely 
to his business wealth and generosity to BNP coffers.  An 
unrespected leader of an unrespected ministry, he's unfairly 
blamed for Bangladesh's poor international image.  Khan, 
however, did deliver on our Article 98 agreement and getting 
cabinet support for at least eight UN counter-terrorism 
conventions.  On occasion, he has described to us the BDG's 
inner workings and plans. 
 
D) Chief of Army Staff LTG Hassan Mashhud Chowdhury: No sign 
of political ambition or independence, but any army chief in 
Bangladesh remains a potential player under the right 
circumstances.  Due to retire in June but might be extended. 
The Awami League claims he is pro-Islamist but he comes 
across as just unobtrusively pious.  Mashhud aims to 
modernize the military to ensure that Bangladesh can maintain 
its lucrative role in UN peacekeeping operations. 
THOMAS 

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