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| Identifier: | 05OTTAWA1411 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05OTTAWA1411 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ottawa |
| Created: | 2005-05-10 20:14:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | SENV CA Devils Lake |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 001411 SIPDIS CONFIDENTIAL SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA A/S NORIEGA, WHA DAS LINDA JEWELL, WHA/CAN TERRY BREESE, OES CLAUDIA MCMURRARY, AND L/OES HIM DAS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2015 TAGS: SENV, CA, Devils Lake SUBJECT: DEVIL'S LAKE: CONTAINING THE DAMAGE REF: OTTAWA 03133 Classified By: Charge John Dickson. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary - The U.S. and Canada are clearly on a collision course over Devils Lake, one that could have been avoided in a number of ways over the past two years. We continue to believe that a reference to the International Joint Commission (IJC) would have been the most constructive approach, but Canada,s failure to accept our request for a reference in 2002 and our apparent inability to agree to one now have essentially removed that best-case option. For its part, Canada is considering a number of &unilateral actions8 to achieve its aims ) including seeking an injunction in U.S. federal court and/or bringing greater media attention to the issue. Assuming that the Department will not agree to the Canadian request for an IJC reference at this late date, we recommend that the USG start planning quickly to counter the official outcry and media assault that will undoubtedly follow in Canada. We need to prepare the best possible defense of our position, which is increasingly coincident with that of the state, and ensure that North Dakota authorities adhere rigorously to the water quality standards included in the permit for the state outlet. End Summary 2. (C) The problem we face over the outlet at Devil,s Lake now is one of reduced options, due to our failure over the past several years to agree with Canada on a reference to the IJC or to some other mutually agreed mechanism for resolving concerns about an outlet from Devils Lake. Construction of the outlet is nearly complete at significant cost to the state. There is no reason to believe that North Dakota would agree to postpone operation of the project at this late date unless forced to do so. That, of course, is still a possibility, if the Canadian or the Manitoban Government can obtain an injunction from a U.S. federal court. (Note: We understand from Canadian officials that they are considering filing such a motion with a federal court in Washington DC.) 3. (C) Canadian behavior on Devils Lake over the past several years has been unfortunately disingenuous. Their strategy shows little concern for the very real plight of their neighbors, despite a fairly long history of cooperation over flooding issues in the Red River Basin. In view of Canada,s decision not to refer an earlier Army Corps of Engineers project to the IJC in 2002 and by aggressively demanding an IJC reference on the state project now, the Canadian Government,s arguments about the integrity of the Boundary Waters Treaty have taken on the air of empty moralizing. Their actions reflect more a strategy of delay or cancellation of the project at all costs, using whatever argument seems convenient at a given moment. Furthermore, the angry rhetoric and intransigence of the provincial government in Manitoba, now escalating at the federal level in Ottawa, has served to harden the attitude in North Dakota, rather than help move toward a solution. 4. (C) The federal government in Ottawa is now seized with this issue, even though outside of Manitoba it still has not taken on as high a profile as beef or softwood lumber. A decision by the USG not to refer this issue to the IJC may well make it the third major complaint (after softwood lumber and BSE) against the U.S., especially as Canada moves toward an electoral campaign when both government and opposition will want to show -- rhetorically anyway -- how strong a stance they will take for Canadian interests against their southern neighbor. 5. (C) Discussions with contacts at Foreign Affairs reveal that Canada is still not looking for a mutually agreeable solution short of an IJC reference. They are now studying options to prevent the release of the water, including direct appeals to multiple offices at the Department and White House, enlisting members of Congressional delegations neighboring North Dakota to appeal to senior USG officials, filing for an injunction in federal court, and recruiting high profile Americans to travel to North Dakota to publicize the issue. 6. (C) If, as we expect, the Department decides not to agree to an IJC reference, we need to move quickly to limit the damage to our bilateral relationship and to counter the official and media assault that will undoubtedly follow. Once the water starts flowing through the outlet, there will be no way to put the genie back in the bottle, but we should be prepared to make the best case possible that water from the outlet has not introduced alien invasive species to the Sheyenne and Red Rivers and that the outlet has not had a significant negative impact on water quality downstream. We should be ready to respond quickly and forcefully to complaints from Manitoba, the Canadian Government and the media with our own message ) one that will depend to a large extent on North Dakota,s compliance with EPA water quality standards and the best possible research on the alleged invasive species in Devils Lake. On the latter issue, North Dakota authorities have already shared publicly some information indicating that two species of fish pathogens of concern are already present in Manitoba and/or the Red River in Minnesota. North Dakota officials have also said that the striped bass, introduced into Devils Lake many years ago, have not been seen in the lake since 1993. Canadian officials and media seem to be unaware of this information or willing to ignore/discount it because of its source. To make an impact and to be credible on this issue, we will need much more detailed information than we currently have. 7. (C) As we understand it, North Dakota has monitoring stations at several locations along the Sheyenne and Red Rivers. We need to ensure that the state has taken steps to establish a water quality baseline for the river. We should emphasize to state authorities the importance of adhering rigorously to the tolerances for phosphorus, total dissolved solids and other pollutants included in the state,s permit for the outlet. The more open, transparent and timely the state is in sharing monitoring information and reducing/stopping water flow when necessary to stay within established tolerances, the more chance we have of countering erroneous claims of pollution from the lake. Some of the state,s monitoring data is already available on a state website, but should be made more accessible and user- friendly to be effective in countering Manitoba,s allegations on water quality. We believe it would also be useful for North Dakota to invite Canadian/Manitoban water officials to participate in ongoing monitoring activities as a means of establishing transparency and credibility with our Canadian counterparts -- as well as starting to rebuild trust in this terribly strained relationship. 8. (C) This issue is a prime example of failed diplomacy, in that there have been no direct discussions between Canada and the U.S. or the two major parties (North Dakota and Manitoba) on solutions beyond referring this to the IJC. Our best course of action now lies in trying to limit damage to the relationship and to stop further escalation of the situation. We need to communicate at the highest levels our disappointment at having been unable to agree on a bilateral solution to this issue and our determination not to let this disagreement damage our long-standing efforts to cooperate on cross-border water issues. To this end, we suggest that the Secretary convey our views directly to Foreign Minister SIPDIS Pettigrew and that we make an effort to reinforce that view at all levels of the Canadian and Manitoban Governments. Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa DICKSON
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