US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA4360

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UNDER SECRETARY FEITH MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE

Identifier: 05BOGOTA4360
Wikileaks: View 05BOGOTA4360 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Bogota
Created: 2005-05-10 14:59:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PTER PHUM PREL MOPS ASEC SNAR CO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 004360 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PREL, MOPS, ASEC, SNAR, CO 
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY FEITH MEETS WITH PRESIDENT URIBE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) On May 3, 2005 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
Douglas Feith discussed Colombia's democratic security 
strategy and concerns about Venezuela with President Alvaro 
Uribe.  Uribe described U.S. assistance as critical to 
counterterror and counterdrug successes.  Feith assured Uribe 
that the U.S. was committed to continued support.  Uribe 
expressed concern about President Chavez's ties to Colombian 
guerrilla groups, his efforts to spread unrest in nearby 
countries, including Bolivia and Nicaragua, and close 
relationship to Fidel Castro. Uribe acknowledged he had no 
proof for a public case to denounce Chavez and that, until 
there is proof, public criticism of Chavez would lack 
credibility.  Uribe said the OAS Secretary General election 
had been swayed by Chavez and that this had to be seen as a 
defeat for us, meaning the U.S. and Colombia.  Feith agreed 
Chavez was a threat to regional stability and noted that 
Central Europeans, businessmen, journalists, and local 
opposition were the best vehicles to expose Chavez's 
violations of democratic freedoms.  End summary. 
 
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Uribe Eager to Stay the Course 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (C) On May 3, 2005, President Uribe told Under Secretary 
Feith that U.S. support was key to the progress Colombia was 
making against narcoterrorists.  He emphasized that there was 
a still a long way to go and that U.S. assistance beyond Plan 
Colombia was critical to staying the course and consolidating 
success.  Feith assured Uribe the U.S. was committed to 
supporting Colombia and was proud to be associated with 
Colombia's counterdrug and counterterror accomplishments.  He 
welcomed the opportunity to discuss objectives for the 
U.S.-Colombia relationship and for the hemisphere during the 
May 4 to 6 Bilateral Working Group in Cartagena. 
 
--------------------------- 
Venezuela a Growing Concern 
--------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Uribe expressed concern about Venezuela's threat to 
regional stability.  He said Chavez has ties to Colombian 
guerrilla groups, is interfering in neighboring countries, 
especially Bolivia and Nicaragua, to create political unrest, 
and maintains close relations with Fidel Castro, whom he 
subsidizes with inexpensive oil.  Uribe said he had just met 
with former Bolivian President Jaime Quiroga, who stated 
these concerns (Quiroga, Uribe added, plans to run against 
Evo Morales for the Presidency).  In a recent meeting with 
Uribe, Chavez swore he did not support the FARC, but admitted 
that some members of his political party are FARC supporters. 
 In response to the Ambassador's inquiry if Chavez would try 
to influence the Colombian elections, Uribe said he had heard 
rumors that Chavez is giving support to the leftist Polo 
Democratico (PDI), but had no proof.  Uribe expressed 
frustration with Chavez's use of trade for coercion. 
Colombia depends on trade with Venezuela and Chavez makes 
trade difficult or denies foreign exchange rights to 
Colombian firms whenever political relations become tense. 
Uribe said Colombia exports USD 1.7 billion to Venezuela and 
imports USD 1.2 billion. 
 
4. (C) Uribe said he had rumors and surmises of Chavez's 
destabilizing and illegal activities, and noted the GOC was 
committed to finding evidence to prove the point.  He said we 
need to make public our intelligence on Chavez's subversive 
activities and undermining of democratic institutions in 
order for our criticism to be credible. 
 
5. (C) Uribe emphasized that NGO orangizations such as the 
OAS should monitor Venezuela's democracy and pressure Chavez 
to stop suppressing democratic freedoms.  U/S Feith agreed 
that Venezuela was a threat to regional stability and to U.S. 
and Colombian interests.  He also agreed that NGOs, 
journalists, businessmen, and Venezuelan opposition figures 
could be effective vehicles to speak out against Chavez's 
violations of democracy, with Colombians, Americans, and 
others supporting them.  Central Europeans newly liberated 
from communism are the most clear-headed on this subject. 
 
6. (C) Uribe praised the efforts of Secretary Rice during the 
campaign to elect the new OAS Secretary General, but 
expressed concern that newly elected Secretary General 
Insulza would not criticize Chavez.  Uribe said Chavez 
persuaded 11 Caribbean countries to back Insulza.  The OAS 
Secretary General election was a defeat for us, meaning the 
 
SIPDIS 
U.S. and Colombia, he said.  "We can put the best face on it, 
but no amount of make-up can disguise that it was a defeat." 
 
 
7. (U) USDP Feith has reviewed and cleared this cable. 
WOOD 

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