US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV2924

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002924 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR BURNS, SATTERFIELD/DIBBLE, E. 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2010 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KWBG, IS, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS, GAZA DISENGAGEMENT 
SUBJECT: MKS TO CODEL FRIST: SKEPTICISM ABOUNDS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary: Knesset Speaker Reuven Rivlin and Chairman 
of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee Yuval Steinetz 
told Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist May 2 that PM Sharon 
would be "making a mistake" if he allows Egyptian troops to 
deploy along the Gaza-Egypt and the Israel-Egypt borders. 
Himself a disengagement opponent, Rivlin said that, although 
the majority of Israelis support Israel's withdrawal from 
Gaza and parts of the northern West Bank, there will be a 
backlash once the populace realizes that they might also have 
to give up settlements that are widely viewed by Israelis as 
intrinsically a part of Jerusalem.  Rivlin and Steinetz both 
expressed what they called the GOI's disappointment with PA 
President Mahmud Abbas's failure to disarm terrorist groups 
as well as the codification of that failure in the agreement 
reached with the factions in Cairo allowing them to keep 
their weapons.  Rivlin predicted that Abbas is too weak to 
negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians, while Steinetz 
compared Abbas to Arafat, who also allowed militant groups to 
re-arm in the mid-1990s rather than completing their 
destruction.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
Skeptical of Disengagement,... 
------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, accompanied by 
staff members Mark Esper, Nick Smith, and Col. Michael 
Barbero, met May 2 with Knesset Speaker Reuven Rivlin and 
head of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee 
Yuval Steinetz.  The Ambassador and Poloff (notetaker) also 
attended.  Rivlin opened the meeting by stating that, 
although "the vast majority" of the Israeli public support PM 
Sharon's plan to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and parts of 
the northern West Bank, he believes the population will 
ultimately view the PM's plan as a mistake -- once it sinks 
in that Israel may also have to give up Jerusalem 
neighborhoods that most Israelis think of as intrinsically 
part of Israel, rather than as "settlements" per se. 
 
3.  (C) Asked if the evacuation could actually lead to civil 
war, Rivlin replied that he was doing everything in his power 
to prevent just that.  "If we knew where we were going after 
Gaza," he said, "it would be better."  Israeli attitudes 
towards the West Bank settlements are "totally different" 
than towards those in Gaza, Rivlin said.  Steinetz said that 
he had supported the disengagement plan when it was 
unilateral.  Now, however, Israel and the PA are supposed to 
be back on the roadmap, he continued, and the Europeans are 
trying to get Israel to ignore the Palestinians' obligations 
under the first phase.  While he said he did not think the 
situation would lead to civil war, Steinetz stressed that the 
situation is very difficult for Israel.  Rivlin's preference 
is to live "along with" the Palestinians, so long as Israel 
retains its fundamental character as a Jewish state.  Many 
Israelis, however, view a Palestinian state alongside an 
Israeli state as a danger, he said.  Rivlin said he agreed, 
adding that if there is an actual border between Palestinians 
and Israelis, there would inevitably be war. 
 
-------------------- 
...Of Abu Mazen, ... 
-------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Noting that it had been hard to convince people, 
especially the Europeans, that Arafat was a terrorist and 
thus an obstacle, Rivlin opined that President Mahmud Abbas 
(Abu Mazen) is headed down the same road of compromise with 
terror as Arafat had in the past.  Rivlin said that Abbas has 
"failed to deliver the goods," and that Israel is intensely 
disappointed, doubting even that Abbas can hold his people 
together.  The fact that the militant groups agreed only to a 
period of quiet, as opposed to a cease-fire, is indicative of 
the President's weakness, Rivlin said.  Abbas is not, in 
Rivlin's view, the person who will be able to negotiate on 
the difficult final status subjects of refugees, permanent 
borders and Jerusalem.  Rivlin opined that Abbas will be able 
to keep his position as PA president "only if we (Israel) 
meet his every demand."  Otherwise his government will 
crumble. 
 
5.  (C) When asked, in light of this pessimistic assessment 
of President Abbas' chances for political survival, what 
Israel could do to help Abbas, Rivlin replied that any 
concessions from Israel while it remains engaged in the fight 
against terror have ultimately been unproductive. 
Furthermore, Israel has already made a number of concessions 
-- now it is the turn of the Palestinians, who need to take 
some concrete steps in order to build Israeli confidence in 
them.  Although he expressed confidence that most 
Palestinians want peace, Rivlin said, the national movements 
remained problematic. 
6.  (C) Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Yuval 
Steinetz agreed, adding that, until President Abbas met with 
militant leaders in Cairo, the GOI had remained hopeful. 
During his campaign, for example, Steinetz recalled that 
Abbas had repeatedly promised to dismantle terrorist 
organizations and unauthorized militias, as called for under 
the roadmap.  Since Cairo, however, things have clearly been 
going in the opposite direction, Steinetz said, with 
President Abbas having agreed that the organizations would 
not be disarmed.  Israeli intelligence, Steinetz continued, 
is reporting that the militant groups are using the time of 
quiet to recover, a development similar to what occurred with 
Yasir Arafat in the mid-1990s. 
 
7.  (C) In response to the Senator's question as to what the 
U.S. could do to help, Rivlin said unequivocally that the 
U.S. must continue to insist that there be no more terror -- 
even the idea of terror in Palestinian society had to go. 
Rivlin stressed that, as the U.S. had done with Syria, the 
U.S. must maintain a consistent refrain opposing terror. 
Steinetz concurred, adding that there are no acceptable 
compromises on this subject and no valid shortcuts to 
disarming the terror groups. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
...and Last, But By No Means Least, Skeptical of Egypt 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
8.  (C) Turning to one of his favorite themes, Steinetz said 
that Lebanese organizations as well as Iran and Syria supply 
most of the weapons to the Palestinians, but that, regardless 
of place of origin, some 90% of all weapons and explosives 
come into Palestinians hands via Egypt.  Steinetz said that 
Egypt is "doing nothing" in response.  Furthermore, the GOE 
is trying to "blackmail" Israel into accepting the deployment 
of two Egyptian battalions along the Egypt-Gaza border and 
another three armored infantry brigades along the 
Egypt-Israel border.  Some variant of this proposal is 
currently being debated in the Knesset, Steinetz said, 
calling it the "beginning of the end of demilitarization." 
Sharon, Steinetz concluded, needs convincing that this is a 
bad idea. 
 
9.  (C) Steinetz urged Senator Frist to recommend that the 
U.S. use its economic and military aid to pressure Egypt into 
backing away from what Steinetz termed its clear policy of 
allowing the Palestinians to re-arm so that they and Israel 
can "bleed together."  Pressing his point, Steinetz said that 
Egypt is doing two things.  First, the GOE allows arms to 
enter the territories through Egypt.  Egypt, Steinetz said, 
imprisons or even executes individuals who smuggle weapons 
into Egypt, yet the GOE "does nothing" against those who 
smuggle weapons out of Egypt.  Second, Steinetz maintained 
that the GOE is pressuring President Abbas into allowing the 
factions to continue to exist, adding that the GOE had reined 
in Arafat similarly in the mid-90's when the PA had cracked 
down on Hamas. 
 
10.  (C) Rivlin echoed Steinetz's skepticism regarding Egypt, 
saying that he does not believe that the Egyptians are ready 
to "get involved seriously" in Palestinian affairs.  If they 
were, Rivlin maintained, they would be encouraging Abbas to 
take on the militant groups, instead of the opposite. 
Furthermore, allowing the Egyptians to deploy along the 
Israel-Egypt border could also have implications for the 
Golan Heights: Syria could well make the same demand, in an 
area where there is only the width of the Sea of Galilee 
rather than the entire Sinai peninsula dividing the parties. 
 
11.  (U) CODEL Frist did not clear this message. 
 
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