US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI3494

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003494 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, MASS, PTER, IN, NP, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: MEA HOPEFUL NEPAL'S KING MAY ENGAGE PARTIES ON 
REFORM 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 3480 
 
Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: In a May 9 meeting with visiting Assistant 
Secretary for South Asia Christina Rocca, MEA Joint Secretary 
 
SIPDIS 
(North) Ranjit Rae welcomed the May 8 publication of a common 
platform by the Nepalese political parties as a potential 
"basis for talks" with King Gyanendra.  The GOI plans to 
encourage the King to not react negatively to the platform 
statement, but to engage with the parties now that they have 
taken stands on issues such as corruption that the King had 
identified as prerequisites to discussions.  India will push 
the King to take further measures to restore civil liberties 
and protect human rights, using the delivery of non-lethal 
military equipment as a "gesture of good faith."  A/S Rocca 
flagged the issue of ammunition supplies for the RNA as one 
we may face in the near future, and encouraged further 
US-India discussions in defense channels to refine our 
understanding of the military situation on the ground in 
Nepal.  End Summary. 
 
An Opening for Negotiations? 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) After noting that events had moved rapidly since A/S 
Rocca's last visit three weeks ago, J/S Rae told A/S Rocca, 
PolCouns, and Poloff that the GOI had been encouraging the 
Nepalese political parties to make a common statement of 
objectives, and was hopeful that the platform announced on 
May 8 would provide a starting point for negotiations between 
the parties and the palace.  Before departing for Jakarta, 
the King had told Indian Ambassador Mukherjee that he was 
unable to negotiate with the parties as they were disjointed 
and unwilling to address previous problems of governance and 
corruption.  As the common platform appeared to respond to 
those particular objections, the GOI planned to press the 
King now to engage the parties seriously on restoring 
democratic government. 
 
3.  (C) Noting that the King had thus far used Article 127 of 
the constitution "for all the wrong reasons," Rae pointed out 
that the party platform requests the King to use that Article 
to recall the Parliament, but with a limited agenda including 
reviving a peace process with the Maoists.  Rae suggested 
that this might be palatable to the King, as it could help 
assuage his fears that a restored Parliament would 
immediately try to infringe on his powers.  Rae argued that 
one of the biggest winners from this exercise was Congress 
leader GP Koirala, since he alone among party leaders had 
been untainted by allegations of collusion with the palace. 
 
3.  (C) Commenting that the King's greatest concern was 
retaining his position, Rae speculated that the monarch's 
initial reaction to the parties' proposal would be outright 
rejection.  However, the combination of domestic unrest 
(including party agitation and the continuing insurgency) and 
careful incentives, such as the proposed delivery of 
non-lethal military supplies and assurances of the 
continuation of a constitutional monarchy, might convince him 
to work with the political parties on a path to emerge from 
the present standoff.  Rae agreed that in order to leave room 
for negotiation, the US and India must convince the King not 
to reject the parties' statement unconditionally, since that 
outcome would play into the hands of the Maoists.  At this 
stage, he argued, questions about "constitutionality" were 
disingenuous. 
 
Resumption of Supplies and Restoration of Civil Liberties 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
4.  (C) Rae explained that the GOI's decision to resume 
non-lethal military supplies (reftel) was intended to signal 
to the King that India was pleased with the end of the 
Emergency, and was releasing assistance as a "gesture of good 
faith," but that New Delhi expected more steps to restore 
basic civil and human rights.  The supplies to be provided in 
the near term included Mahindra jeeps and night vision 
equipment, but the GOI was still debating whether to include 
mine-proof vehicles as they had been used in the past against 
civilian demonstrations.  India hoped that the King's 
response to receiving these supplies would be to make further 
progress in restoring civil liberties, the J/S noted.  He 
commented that the UK, in contrast to Washington, had 
appeared "distressed and disappointed" when notified of the 
GOI decision. 
 
5.  (C) Rae stated that his biggest concern is that "the rule 
of law is almost non-existent" in Nepal, and that Nepalese 
citizens seem to have no legal recourse to contravene 
government actions, even following the lifting of the 
Emergency.  He commented that the midnight arrest of former 
PM Deuba, the ransacking of UML party offices, and the 
reports of "vigilante" groups killing suspected Maoists 
(which India suspected may be backed by the government) added 
to the sense of fear among party leaders and other Nepalese. 
Rae added that the chairman of the National Human Rights 
Commission is reported to be either a supporter of the King's 
actions or afraid to challenge them, and that respect for 
human rights and civil liberties is something that "we must 
keep drilling home" in interactions with the RGON. 
 
Police Training and Morale 
-------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Responding to A/S Rocca's identification of police 
training as a longer-term need to provide a secure 
environment for elections, Rae noted that the GOI had begun a 
program for training up to 10,000 Nepalese police officers; 
two batches of 300-400 had completed training before the 
program was suspended after February 1.  The Nepalese police 
currently feel out of place under the unified command 
structure that groups them together with the RNA.  Rae noted 
that the RNA receives all the Palace's resources and 
attention, while the police are seen as an instrument of the 
disbanded civilian governments.  Especially in outlying 
regions, police officers feel an acute disparity of equipment 
and salaries compared to RNA soldiers, and some police in 
remote areas live across the border in India for safety, Rae 
said. 
 
Ammunition 
---------- 
 
7.  (C) A/S Rocca flagged for the Indians their earlier 
estimate that the RNA had 4-6 months' worth of ammunition 
from February 1, and requested that the USG and GOI 
coordinate in monitoring the need for ammunition in order to 
prevent the RNA from losing ground to the Maoists.  Rae 
agreed to ask the Indian Ministry of Defence to contact the 
Embassy DAO to provide its updated estimate of the RNA's 
ammunition requirements.  He reiterated the GOI view that the 
Maoists "must be convinced they can't win militarily" so 
there is time for the current, nascent political process to 
develop.  He also noted with concern reports that the RNA has 
been trying to source ammunition from China. 
 
8.  (C) Rae agreed that the first message to the King was to 
encourage him to keep open the option of using the parties' 
common platform as a point of negotiation, and that the USG 
and GOI also needed to push the parties to continue to 
negotiate together to find an agreeable roadmap out of the 
present impasse.  He commented that a US request to the King 
not to "overreact" to the parties' statement was "very 
important coming from Washington," and asked that A/S Rocca 
emphasize to the monarch that the party proposals were not 
the last word on the subject, but a place to begin 
discussions of a return to democracy. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C) The Indian decision to release some non-lethal 
military supplies to the RNA after hearing about USG steps in 
that direction demonstrates the importance the GOI places on 
maintaining a united front in our interactions with King 
Gyanendra.  Although still convinced that his steps since 
April 23 have been inadequate and superficial, the GOI hopes 
that offering positive incentives, in tandem with the US, 
will elicit more substantial actions to engage the parties, 
restore civil liberties and work toward democracy.  Despite 
its current sanguine outlook on ammunition needs, if the King 
does not make sufficient progress, the GOI may be forced 
nevertheless to resume more substantial military assistance 
in response to RNA requirements or Maoist gains.  Rae made 
clear that the GOI is unwilling to risk an RNA collapse in 
order to maintain pressure on the palace. 
 
10.  (U) A/S Rocca has cleared this message. 
BLAKE