US embassy cable - 02AMMAN3549

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 003549 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2012 
TAGS: KISL, KPAO, PGOV, PHUM, JO 
SUBJECT: ASSABEEL: UNDERSTANDING JORDAN'S PREEMINENT 
ISLAMIST WEEKLY 
 
REF: AMMAN 2559 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM FOR REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) The Islamist publication Assabeel ("the way" or "the 
path") is Jordan's most important weekly newspaper.  Its 
circulation is small compared to that of the daily 
newspapers, but it has grown recently when other Jordanian 
weeklies have not.  Insiders aver that the paper seeks to 
convey "quality information beneficial to readers."  They 
style the paper as a critical opposition mouthpiece, 
positively directed at supporting reform in Jordan through 
conventional and democratic means.  The paper, they say, is 
both lauded and reviled because it stakes out strong, 
principled positions on issues.  Insiders at Assabeel claim 
the paper is independent.  Other members of the media scoff 
at such claims of independence, and even suggest that 
Assabeel's staff reports to Jordanian intelligence.  End 
summary. 
 
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HISTORY, CIRCULATION, AND READERSHIP 
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2. (C) Members of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) founded 
Assabeel in 1993, shortly after the advent of the MB's 
political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF).  Assabeel rose 
out of the ashes of an "official" MB newspaper, Al Ribat 
("the tether").  According to Sa'ud Abu Mahfuz, Assabeel's 
General Manager and a member of the MB, Al Ribat failed in 
its second year because the MB controlled it too tightly. 
Abu Mahfuz claims Assabeel is, by contrast, independent. 
 
3. (C) Abu Mahfuz reports that the paper's circulation has 
doubled to about 17,000 copies since September 2000.  (Note: 
A former editor ousted from Assabeel in 1996 insists it has 
merely maintained circulation at 5-7000 copies over the past 
two years, and was in steady decline before that.)  Assabeel 
employs fourteen people besides Abu Mahfuz; seven are 
journalists and the other seven work as secretaries, computer 
technicians, and office staff.  The paper meets its operating 
expenses through sales revenues. 
 
4. (C) According to Abu Mahfuz, most copies of Assabeel are 
purchased by women who take the paper home to large families. 
 In addition, copies placed in any of Jordan's more than 3000 
mosques may be read by scores of people.  For this reason, 
Assabeel uses a large multiplier to extrapolate an estimated 
readership of 170,000 from circulation figures.  Though one 
former parliamentarian surmises that Assabeel's hardcopy 
readership is confined to MB members, Assabeel insiders claim 
many party leaders, ministry officials, diplomats, doctors, 
educators, and leaders at mosques and churches read their 
paper.  (Indeed, the Political and Public Affairs sections 
receive Assabeel weekly.) 
 
5. (C) Assabeel's website reportedly has 1,000,000 hits 
monthly from expatriate Jordanians seeking an opposition 
viewpoint on issues within Jordan, government officials, and 
others in countries throughout the world.  Thousands of hits 
originate from the United States. 
 
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THE SECRET OF OUR SUCCESS: CREDIBILITY, FAMILY VALUES, 
"NATIONAL" APPEAL, AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
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6. (C) Abu Mahfuz attributes Assabeel's success to its 
credibility and authenticity as a news source.  He even 
claims the paper presents U.S. views and positions evenly, 
and promised the paper would support Bush's June 24th speech 
if it turned out to be "fair."  Abu Mahfuz said Assabeel's 
readership appreciates its "principled" opposition to the GOJ 
in instances like the sedition case of former MP Toujan 
Faisal (reftel).  Assabeel openly criticized Faisal's 
imprisonment, even though Islamists had been the object of 
Faisal's vitriol in the past.  According to Abu Mahfuz, the 
fundamental unfairness of Faisal's imprisonment made Faisal's 
prior invective superfluous. 
 
7. (C) Abu Mahfuz also claims readers are drawn to Assabeel 
because of its conservative "family" orientation.  For 
example, unlike other Jordanian weeklies, Assabeel does not 
publish photos of women passing for Arab-World correlatives 
of Britain's "page three" girls.  Assabeel bars advertising 
by establishments (e.g., banks and night clubs) promoting 
practices (e.g., usury and drinking) at odds with 
conservative Muslim ideology. 
 
8. (C) Abu Mahfuz points to Assabeel's breadth of coverage as 
another reason for its increased popularity.  A typical issue 
contains several pages of news and features treating a broad 
range of topics through the "eyes of Islam," whereas the 
content of other weeklies is more thin.  Three of nine 
columnists at Assabeel are at least nominally Christian, 
though the practical effect of this on the paper's content is 
hard to detect.  Regardless, Abu Mahfuz characterizes the 
newspaper as "national" (not merely Muslim) in its appeal. 
 
9. (C) Abu Mahfuz acknowledges that regional developments 
help account for heightened sales.  Circulation has generally 
increased throughout the Intifada -- while other weeklies 
have fizzled -- and it spikes in response to specific events 
on the West Bank.  For example, Abu Mahfuz says bloody 
photographs depicting Palestinian suffering in Jenin during 
Israel's April insurgency greatly boosted circulation.  Abu 
Mahfuz asserts that people are attracted to Assabeel's 
coverage because it is moderate and discourages violence, yet 
at the same time says some of the photographs it publishes 
incite "revolutionary" sentiment.  The paper has also given 
positive coverage to Palestinian suicide bombers. 
 
10. (C) Comment.  Assabeel also panders to popular 
anti-Israel and anti-U.S. sentiment in other subtle (and not 
so subtle) ways.  Assabeel stories, headlines, and captions 
consistently use pejorative labels for Israeli officials, 
e.g., "the criminal Peres" and "the terrorist Sharon."  It 
frequently runs lurid banner headlines (in red ink) calling 
attention to the latest Israeli "atrocity" or Bin Laden 
statement.  However, Public Affairs has obtained relatively 
fair and frequent coverage in Assabeel for U.S. speaker 
programs and Embassy activities.  End comment. 
 
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ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT: INFORMAL PRESS RESTRICTIONS, MARKET 
LIMITS, AND REPORTING QUALITY 
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11. (C) Abu Mahfuz identifies two factors "limiting" 
Assabeel.  First, like all media in Jordan, there are 
unwritten restrictions on Assabeel's freedom of expression, 
which Assabeel observes in order to avoid "problems" with the 
GOJ.  Assabeel claims to support positive change through 
conventional means, and does not publish material aimed at 
undermining the Hashemite regime, personally attacking GOJ 
officials, or exploiting societal fault-lines (e.g., 
East-Bank/West-Bank tensions and Muslim/Christian religious 
differences).  (Note: On a personal level, Abu Mahfuz 
considers the Hashemite regime "an evil blight, forced on 
Jordan by colonial powers, in an otherwise holy land.")  By 
observing limits, the paper retains the ability to criticize 
the GOJ on human rights issues and other topics. 
 
12. (C) Second, Abu Mahfuz notes that Assabeel cannot -- at 
least in hardcopy form -- expand beyond its small Jordanian 
market due to the prohibitively high transactions costs of 
selling in other countries.  (Note:  Though Abu Mahfuz did 
not mention it, political sensitivities in other countries 
would also limit hardcopy distribution.) 
 
13. (C) Sources outside Assabeel criticize its reporting. 
The former Assabeel editor describes the current crop of 
Assabeel journalists as bright, but young and inexperienced 
(because, he says, few experienced reporters belong to the 
MB).  There is also a perception that Assabeel's treatment of 
international issues is especially weak.  Assabeel uses the 
internet, releases from Hamas media offices, and 
sensationalist media outlets to cover external issues.  Given 
Assabeel's limitations as a raw news source, one contact 
explains that the paper survives only because its opinion and 
editorial pieces are marginally better than those of other 
weeklies. 
 
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THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE 
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14. (C) Assabeel's General Manager claims the paper is an 
independent publication, rather than "a bird crushed in the 
hands of the IAF or the Muslim Brotherhood."  This may be 
true in the limited sense that the IAF/MB does not own 
Assabeel and the paper operates out of separate offices. 
Moreover, the paper criticizes the IAF on occasion.  For 
example, Abu Mahfuz says Assabeel blamed the IAF for weaker 
than expected showings in student council elections held at 
some universities.  Moreover, the paper reportedly criticized 
the IAF's boycott of the 1997 parliamentary elections.  Abu 
Mahfuz promises Assabeel will cover debate over the IAF's 
participation in anticipated parliamentary elections, but 
only after the GOJ commits to a date for elections. 
 
15. (C) The former Assabeel editor agrees that Assabeel's 
content is not determined by the IAF or the MB.  However, he 
says the content is controlled by Assabeel's founders (four 
Palestinian Muslims and a Palestinian Christian), who use the 
paper to air their pro-Hamas/anti-Palestinian Authority 
viewpoint under the cover of an organ most associate only 
with the IAF/MB.  Sources note that the views expressed by 
Christian writers on Assabeel's staff do not differ 
appreciably from Islamist views, so that the paper does not 
present a distinct Christian outlook.  Members of the media 
deride claims of Assabeel's independence, suggesting that 
Assabeel's staff reports to Jordan's General Intelligence 
Directorate. 
 
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COMMENT 
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16. (C) The Islamists who run Assabeel portray themselves -- 
and may see themselves -- as uncompromising 
"uber-journalists" wrapped in a righteous cause.  They seem 
convinced that they conscientiously express their viewpoint 
in accordance with the highest professional standards, and 
appear to believe that the "truth" of their message fully 
explains Assabeel's popularity.  But in Jordan, where 
opposition views are not always easy to air, at least in the 
media, some people may gravitate towards whatever opposition 
exists whether or not they accept all that the opposition 
stands for.  Opposition dynamics -- combined with Assabeel's 
clear anti-Israel bias -- help explain why the paper is as 
popular as it now is, and also why it is not embraced more 
broadly. 
Gnehm