US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI2066

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PRIMER ON MAY 14 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION

Identifier: 05TAIPEI2066
Wikileaks: View 05TAIPEI2066 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Created: 2005-05-09 00:47:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL TW
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

090047Z May 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002066 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TW 
SUBJECT: PRIMER ON MAY 14 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION 
 
REF: 2004 TAIPEI 02662 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The Taiwan public and media remain largely 
disengaged over the upcoming National Assembly (NA) election 
despite the fact that there are only eight days left, in part 
because Taiwan's political parties have ran a very low-key 
campaign.  This, the final NA, is being elected to vote on a 
set of constitutional reforms passed by the Legislative Yuan 
(LY) last August.  Political analysts expect a poor turnout, 
perhaps as low as 30 percent, which would particularly hurt 
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).  DPP officials worry 
that recent media focus on the Mainland China visits of 
Pan-Blue leaders Lien Chan and James Soong, and internal 
Pan-Green discontent over the government's "weak" response, 
will damage the ruling party.  Both the People First Party 
(PFP) and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) have declared their 
opposition to the five reforms that will be considered by the 
NA and are hoping to gain enough seats to prevent passage of 
the package, which would create a single-member-per-district 
legislative system that would marginalize small parties and 
benefit the two large parties, DPP and KMT.  Despite the 
active efforts of the two smaller parties, however, DPP and 
KMT officials remain confident that the reform package will 
pass in June.  End Summary. 
 
Election, What Election? 
------------------------ 
 
2. (C) Public opinion surveys continue to show a low level of 
interest in the May 14 election for the National Assembly 
(NA), even though there is just over a week before the 
election.  According to the Green-leaning Taiwan Advocates 
survey released April 13, more than 50 percent of the people 
surveyed had no idea that a NA election would be held on May 
14 and 80 percent were confused about the political parties' 
stance on the constitutional amendments to be debated by the 
NA.  Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Survey Center 
Director Wu Hsiang-jung confirmed these statistics at a May 4 
DPP briefing to the diplomatic community on the NA election. 
He noted, for example, that 34 percent of the public 
erroneously thinks the KMT opposes the constitutional reforms 
while only 20 percent realizes the KMT actually supports the 
reforms.  Wu predicted an election turnout rate of under 30 
percent, attributing the low public interest to the fact that 
in this election voters will vote for political parties 
rather than individual candidates.  KMT Organizational 
Development Director Liao Fung-te predicted a slightly higher 
turnout rate of 35-40 percent.  In an attempt to boost the 
turnout rate, the Central Election Commission (CEC) 
commissioned a popular actor to promote the election and 
plans to hold a "lucky draw" among May 14 voters for a grand 
prize of NT one million dollars (USD 300,000). 
 
3. (C) The combination of an expected low turnout rate and 
public focus on visits by Pan-Blue leaders to the Mainland 
has made DPP officials increasingly nervous.  DPP Legislator 
Bi-khim Hsiao said the DPP is worried about this election 
because people's attention has been distracted away from the 
election by the focus on the PRC visits of the two opposition 
party chairmen.  National Security Council (NSC) Deputy 
Secretary General Henry Ke told AIT that the government 
 
SIPDIS 
suspects Beijing's decision to move up the timetable for the 
Pan-Blue visits may have been timed to hurt the DPP in the NA 
election.  A poor DPP showing, he explained, could further 
erode Chen's domestic base. 
 
4. (C) KMT officials insist they are confident their party 
will do well, despite the fact that the KMT largely ignored 
the election until the past several days.  KMT Legislator 
Shyu Jong-Shyong told KMT that low election turnout rates 
always favor the well-organized KMT.  DPP's Wu Hsiang-jung 
separately agreed with Shyu's assessment and predicted that 
all 148 KMT nominees will win seats.  KMT Chairman Lien Chan 
told the Director on May 6, however, that he thought both the 
KMT and DPP would perform well on May 14, since the two 
parties both support the politically popular reform package. 
Although they are not cooperating on the NA, TSU and PFP 
officials are hoping to win at least one quarter of the seats 
in hopes of then being able to derail the reform package. 
While TSU officials tell AIT that President Chen's shift to 
the political center should boost the TSU's share of the 
Pan-Green vote, PFP Public Affairs Deputy Director Liao 
Wen-chang told AIT that he did not expect the PFP to do well. 
 
5. (C) Pessimistic over its election prospects, the PFP has 
tried to use procedural mechanisms to block the NA from being 
able to convene.  The party used the virtual "veto" from its 
pivotal position in the LY to block revisions to the draft NA 
procedural rules.  PFP Policy Chief Vincent Chang told AIT 
that if the LY fails to act in the current LY session that 
ends at the end of May, under Article 34 of the Constitution, 
the NA will not be able to convene.  DPP and KMT legislators 
reject this interpretation and argue that once elected, the 
NA can establish its own procedural rules, if necessary.  DPP 
Legislator Hong Chi-chang stated that the LY cannot invoke 
Article 34 to block the NA from convening, since this would 
acknowledge that the LY had failed its constitutional 
responsibilities to establish procedural rules for the NA. 
(Note:  Article 34 states "The organization of the National 
Assembly, the election and recall of delegates to the 
National Assembly, and the procedure whereby the National 
Assembly is to carry out its functions, shall be prescribed 
by law."  End Note.) 
 
6. (SBU) The issue of draft rules for the NA lie at the heart 
of political calculations by the TSU and the PFP.  The rules 
will need to specify whether the NA assembly will require a 
simple majority vote or a three-quarters majority vote, 
either of those present or of all elected members, in order 
to approve the proposed constitutional amendments.  The last 
round of constitutional amendments (promulgated in 2000) 
eliminated the three-quarters NA majority previously mandated 
to confirm revisions passed by the LY (Article 127, Item 1), 
mandating that only changes to the national boundaries 
require a three-quarters NA majority.  Article 1 of the 
Additional Articles, which replaced previous rules governing 
the NA, does not specify the bar needed for NA confirmation 
of constitutional amendments on other subjects.  If the final 
rules require a three-quarter majority and the TSU and PFP 
between them control more than a quarter of the seats in the 
NA, then they will have the capacity to scuttle the reduction 
in size of the LY, which they fear will drastically reduce 
the future influence of their two parties.  Some analysts 
expect that the success of the TSU and PFP on May 14 will be 
the driving force in whether to require a three quarter 
majority NA vote.  If the two parties together win more than 
one-quarter of the seats they may well insist on NA rules 
that require a three-quarters vote.  If they fail to reach 
that number, the LY or NA will likely agree to a simple 
majority vote for passage of the proposed constitutional 
amendments. 
 
Mandate of the National Assembly 
-------------------------------- 
 
7. (U) Under the rules established by the most recent 
revisions to the "Republic of China (ROC)" constitution, the 
300 NA seats will be allocated to political parties according 
to the proportion of votes each registered group garners in 
the May 14 election.  The ad hoc NA elected on May 14 will 
convene for the sole purpose of debating and voting on the 
draft constitutional amendment package proposed by the LY on 
August 23, 2004 (Reftel).  Following the election, the NA 
must convene within ten days and then must complete its task 
of adopting or rejecting the constitutional amendment package 
within 30 days.  With one of the provisions of the packing 
being the elimination of the NA itself, this may be the final 
meeting of the body. 
 
Five Issues at Stake 
-------------------- 
 
8. (U) The provision calling for the dissolution of the NA is 
one of five provisions of the constitutional amendment 
package to be considered by the NA.  In addition, the NA's 
power to impeach president and vice president would be 
transferred to the LY and, ultimately, to the Council of 
Grand Justices (Note: a body appointed by the President.  End 
Note).  A second provision proposes that a national 
referendum will approve future constitutional amendments 
submitted by the LY, replacing the current NA ratification 
process. 
 
9. (U) The remaining three provisions in the constitutional 
amendment package relate to LY reforms.  The reforms would 
downsize the LY from its current 225 to 113 members, of which 
73 will be directly elected in single seat constituencies 
while six constituency seats would be reserved for 
aborigines, and 34 chosen by a second vote based on 
proportional voting for political parties.  In the single 
seat constituency system, there is no provision to reserve LY 
seats for women.  Another provision would change the voting 
system from the current "single non-transferable vote" for 
multiple representation in large districts to a "first past 
the post" system with single representatives for smaller 
sized constituencies.  The final provision would provide for 
each voter to cast two ballots, one for a candidate in the 
single-member constituencies, and another for a party to 
determine the allocation of proportional seats. 
 
The "Candidates" and Platforms 
------------------------------ 
 
10. (U) Twelve political parties and associations have 
registered with the CEC for the May 14 election, with 687 
candidates designated by these groups to compete for the 300 
seats.  Among the major political parties, the DPP has 
nominated 150 candidates, KMT 148, TSU 50, PFP 83, and New 
Party (NP) 26.  In addition to the major political parties, 
the Democracy Action Alliance, which organized the September 
25, 2004 anti-arms procurement rally, has nominated 150 
candidates, 76 of whom are university professors.  This will 
be the first election in living memory in which the ballot 
will not feature individual candidate names and photographs. 
Rather, the ballot will list only the name of the party or 
group and whether it supports or opposes the constitutional 
amendment package.  Given this format, the fate of the 
constitutional amendments would be essentially apparent as 
soon as the election result is announced. 
 
Comment: Sleeper Election 
------------------------- 
 
11. (C) The amendments passed by the LY last August (Reftel) 
could have important long-term implications for Taiwan's 
democratic system.  The creation of single-member districts 
should help moderate Taiwan's political discourse by forcing 
parties to play to the political center and marginalizing 
smaller, often more radical, political parties.  Passage of 
this package of constitutional reforms may, for example, 
obviate calls from Pan-Green fundamentalists for more 
sweeping constitutional revisions.  However, few political 
observers are focused on the substance of the election. 
Rather, the (limited) attention on  May 14 is focusing on the 
election's implications for short-term political positioning. 
 Given the recent polarization of opinion over cross-Strait 
relations, and plummeting DPP morale over President Chen's 
changing stances on Pan-Blue contacts with the PRC, the DPP 
is justifiably concerned over its prospects. 
PAAL 

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