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| Identifier: | 05QUITO1054 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05QUITO1054 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Quito |
| Created: | 2005-05-06 21:57:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | EFIN ECON EC |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 001054 SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/AND TREASURY FOR NANCY LEE AND GIANLUCCA SIGNORELLI E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2010 TAGS: EFIN, ECON, EC SUBJECT: MINISTER OF FINANCE ON FISCAL POLICY: AMBASSADOR'S COURTESY CALL REF: QUITO 900 Classified By: AMBASSADOR KRISTIE KENNEY, REASONS 1.5 (B,D) See para 5 for policy recommendation. 1. (C) Summary: In his first meeting with the Ambassador, Ecuador's new Minister of Economy and Finance Rafael Correa made clear that he intends to implement a policy far removed from the responsible fiscal management of his two most-recent predecessors. Correa said he expects the IFIs to back off of the conditionality contained in the "secret agreements" his immediate predecessor had signed with them and hoped the U.S. would support continued disbursements from the IFIs. With those disbursements, he said, the GOE could meet its financing needs. Instead, our recommendation would be for the USG to use its influence with the IFIs to maintain conditionality and withhold disbursements until Correa and the GOE commit themselves to minimally responsible policies. End Summary. Let's Spend Some Money ---------------------- 2. (U) Correa acceded to Ambassador's request for a courtesy call on May 5. Continuing the Palacio government charm offensive, Correa spent most of the twenty-minute meeting expounding on the virtues of the "people of the United States," (implicitly differentiating it from the USG) where he received his graduate education. When he came to business, Correa gave a cursory overview of the economic program he has outlined in much more detail in the press (see reftel). He said that Ecuador, with no monetary policy, given dollarization, and 12% unemployment, had no choice but to use fiscal policy to stimulate economic growth and job creation. Economic growth in the non-oil economy was weak, he said. It was thus necessary for the GOE to increase spending. Secret Agreements SIPDIS ----------------- 3. (U) Necessary budget financing would be available if the IFIs maintained their planned disbursements, Correa said. However, the conditionality the IFIs had imposed on the previous government via such "secret agreements" as the IMF's "Intensified Surveillance Program" would have to be dropped, Correa said, echoing his denunciation in the press of the previous minister for ceding Ecuadorian sovereignty in signing these "secret accords." Correa asked that the Embassy help the IFIs to understand Ecuador's circumstances and the need for flexibility. The Fiscal Situation -------------------- 4. (SBU) We are meeting with contacts in order to put together a series of cables on Ecuador's economic and fiscal situation. Though we are not ready to make definitive statements about the current situation, we can share a few insights. Previous Minister of Finance Maurico Yepez had put together the pieces for a very favorable financing situation for Ecuador in 2005. In fact, with all the disbursements due from the IFIs and assuming continuing high oil prices, the GOE would have been significantly over financed. The GOE intended to use the over financing to restructure debt, buying higher interest rate debt back. With Correa in the driver's seat there is every reason to believe that the over financing would go directly into current spending. In just one specific example, the GOE planned significant reductions in personnel in order to reduce budget outlays on salaries. Correa has announced that there will be no personnel reductions as, "with unemployment at 12%, reducing government employment would be irresponsible." The IFIs -------- 5. (C) Econcouns discussed the situation with IMF Resrep David Yuravlivker (protect) on May 6. Yuravlivker recounted that, in the meeting between he, the resreps of the IBRD and the IDB, and Correa, Correa had said, "Ecuador will continue to pay its debts to the IFIs, as long as they continue to disburse to Ecuador." Asked about the IBRD's pending $100 million disbursement (in the absence from country of the IBRD resrep), Yuravlivker said that he did not know what the intentions of the IBRD were, but, given that the conditionality on that loan was all fiscal responsibility, given that it specifically demands that the GOE continue to respect the Fiscal Responsibility Law and the oil stabilization fund (FEIREP), and given Correa's clear and public intention to eliminate the restrictions imposed by the law and the fund, he did not see how the IBRD could possibly justify disbursing. Comment ------- 6. (SBU) Though this was only intended as a courtesy call, and most of the conversation was of a personal and protocolary nature, the limited substantive comments Correa made were fully in line with the ideas expressed in his statements to the press and in his publications. (Interested readers of Spanish can obtain his short and worrying 2004 prescription for the Ecuadorian economy "La Vulnerabilidad de la Economia Ecuatoriana" from its publisher, UNDP.) We are concerned that Correa, if he continues this line of policies, will make short work of all that has been accomplished in the last five years of relatively responsible fiscal policy. Recommendation -------------- 7. (C) We understand that the IBRD is on the verge of disbursing a $100 million budget support loan. The loan has been approved by the board on the basis of confidence on the part of the IFIs in the fiscal responsibility of the prior government. Nonetheless, the Bank does have the option of holding off on disbursement in extraordinary circumstances. We do not know what current thinking is in the IBRD on disbursement of this loan. Given the danger that these funds will be squandered, we recommend that Washington consider weighing in with the IBRD to recommend that the loan be disbursed only on the demonstrated commitment of the GOE to maintain responsible policies. We also recommend that the IBRD and IDB continue to look to the IMF's view of the fiscal decision in making disbursement decisions. KENNEY
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