US embassy cable - 05PORTAUPRINCE1275

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001275 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
WHA ALSO FOR USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KCRM, PHUM, HA, Haitian National Police 
SUBJECT: HAITI: FARRAR-CHARLES DISCUSSIONS ON APRIL 27 
SHOOTINGS AND STATE OF THE HNP 
 
REF: PAP 1241 
 
1. (C) Summary:   HNP Director General Charles told visiting 
INL PDAS Farrar that the April 27 shootings came in response 
to violence in the wake of an unauthorized pro-Lavalas 
demonstration, and he said he has ordered an investigation 
into the incident.  Charles acknowledged that the HNP lacks 
sufficient training and resources to do its job. He also 
complained about a continuing lack of cooperation from 
MINUSTAH.  The DG confirmed that ex-FADH enrollment in the 
current recruit class would be strictly limited to 200 and 
there would be no "special status" for any person or class of 
persons in future recruitment efforts.  End Summary. 
 
April 27 shooting incident 
------------------------- 
2. (C) In an April 29 meeting with visiting INL Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Jonathan Farrar and Embassy police 
advisor, DG Leon Charles recounted his version of the events 
of April 27.  Charles said the violence occurred on the 
margins of a spontaneous Lavalas demonstration that started 
from the Bel Air neighborhood, but Charles said it could not 
be determined if the assailants were part of the protest 
march.  (Note this conflicts with CIVPOL commissioner Beer's 
assertion in reftel that there was no demonstration. End 
note)  According to Charles, the unauthorized march left Bel 
Air around 11:00 a.m. and circled around the Presidential 
Palace before returning back to the Bel Air area and then 
proceeding on Delmas toward Bourdon (and the area around 
UNDP/MINUSTAH headquarters).  (Note:  Pro Lavalas supporters 
previously held several marches following a similar route. 
The government and the HNP had approved the previous activity 
but did not authorize a permit for the April 28 
demonstration. End note).  As the march neared Bourdon, 
hundreds of people crowded the streets and brought vehicular 
traffic to a standstill.  Several women reported purse and 
jewelry snatches along the demonstration route, and Charles 
described marauding street thugs attacking and robbing 
bystanders and damaging vehicles stalled in traffic.  Police, 
monitoring the demonstration, heard several shots and 
witnessed a group of ten young men running in Bourdon near 
MINUSTAH Headquarters.  The police gave chase and opened fire 
on the fleeing suspects.  Several of the suspects were 
apprehended and two were shot and killed by the pursuing HNP 
units.  Three other suspects were also shot and killed by the 
HNP, but it was not yet clear if they came from the same 
group that the police initially encountered.  One 9mm pistol 
was recovered by the HNP not far from the deceased suspects. 
MINUSTAH forces were not involved in the shooting incident. 
DG Charles said he had ordered an investigation into the 
events leading up to the shootings. 
 
HNP not trained, MINUSTAH support poor 
---------------------------------------- 
3. (C) In response to DAS Farrar's query if HNP officers were 
sufficiently trained and equipped to effectively handle such 
incidents, Charles voiced his continued frustration at what 
he termed the lack of MINUSTAH support.  He cited as an 
example poor coordination and cooperation between the HNP and 
MINUSTAH during an armed confrontation with gang members in 
Cite Soleil within the last 2 weeks.  MINUSTAH commanders 
insisted that the HNP take the lead in entering and securing 
predetermined areas within Cite Soleil, knowing the HNP did 
not possess sufficient weapons or armored vehicles to 
properly perform the task.  Charles stated that this approach 
had become "standard practice" and often resulted in the HNP 
overreacting and prematurely resorting to the use of deadly 
force.  He cited several additional examples where, though 
MINUSTAH forces were better equipped and trained, MINUSTAH 
had insisted that the HNP be the first responder and the 
first to draw fire.  He acknowledged that both CIMO (Crowd 
Control Police) and SWAT units needed more tactical training, 
better protective equipment, and access to less lethal 
weaponry. 
 
4. (C) Embassy police advisor suggested that one solution 
would be to have CIVPOL work directly with CIMO/SWAT.  Formed 
Police Unit (FPU) officers and specially trained CIVPOL 
officers would join in the planning, staging, and execution 
of high-risk incidents and potentially destabilizing 
demonstrations.  This would improve command and control 
responsibilities, accountability, training, and access to 
non-lethal weapons and armored vehicles.  The DG agreed with 
the suggestion and encouraged USG assistance in establishing 
a format for future discussions with CivPol Commissioner Beer 
(reftel reports similar positive reaction from Commissioner 
Beer to this proposal). 
 
Police recruiting 
---------------- 
5. (C) DAS Farrar cited continuing USG commitment in support 
of HNP recruiting efforts and the importance of maintaining 
high recruitment standards.  In addition to vetting all 
recruits, Farrar emphasized it was equally important to 
attract and retain capable and trustworthy young men and 
women.  The USG was concerned that inclusion of ex-FADH in 
large numbers would detract from ongoing police reform 
measures; they therefore had to be closely scrutinized. 
Based on discussions with the Embassy police advisor and 
other professionals in the field, he said that the USG would 
not support more than 200 former military being included in 
Promotion 17 (note: the next recruiting class scheduled to 
start in May).  Moreover, the practice of allowing a class of 
people to receive special quotas for class enrollment (as had 
happened with the ex-FADH) had to end.  DG Charles agreed and 
stated that the practice would end immediately.  Future 
recruitment drives would make no distinction with regard to 
the former military, but would also not discriminate against 
anyone for previous duty in the Haitian Armed Forces. 
 
U.S. Weapons License Request 
-------------------------------- 
6. (C) Charles also inquired about the status of the weapons 
licensing waiver.  He referred to a recent gun battle in Cite 
Soleil where well-armed gangs fired upon the HNP and MINUSTAH 
for 2 hours, and lamented the lack of ammunition for training 
and reserve supplies.  The gangs had more automatic weapons 
and ammunition than the HNP, he said.  The HNP could not 
train its members or defend Haiti without ammunition and 
modern tactical weapons. 
 
7. (C) DAS Farrar explained the waiver process including 
Congressional notification by the Department of State.  He 
told DG Charles that Congress was properly demanding that the 
HNP arms license, if granted, be tied to USG oversight. 
Training, strict accountability and inventory control, 
reporting requirements, vetting, and more frequent 
inspections of the weapons in the field would be required. 
Charles pledged his full cooperation with the USG in 
achieving these standards and was hopeful that the process 
would soon be completed. 
 
Comment 
---------- 
8. (C)  April 27 was the fourth occasion since February where 
the HNP used deadly force.  Despite repeated requests, we 
have yet to see any objective written reports from the HNP 
that sufficiently articulate the grounds for using deadly 
force.  Equally disturbing are HNP first-hand reports from 
the scene of these events.  These are often confusing and 
irrational and fail to meet minimum police reporting 
requirements.  The HNP continues to suffer from corruption 
among its ranks, a broken system of justice, substandard 
command and supervisory control, inadequate levels of 
training, and scant equipment  resources.  Post will follow 
up on DAS Farrar's discussions with DG Charles and 
Commissioner Beer to get CIVPOL out in the field with HNP 
officers and to have CIVPOL work directly with CIMO.  In 
Port-au-Prince, there are no joint patrols, objective 
monitoring and reporting at the scene of major incidents, 
joint training exercises, or mentoring among command level 
officials. 
 
9. (C) MINUSTAH/CIVPOL/HNP cooperation is more advanced in 
the Cap Haitien area; lessons learned from there must be 
transferred to the more difficult and dangerous environment 
of Port-au-Prince.  The HNP and MINUSTAH  are at a 
crossroads.  New training programs are underway and this is 
positive, but the training and lessons learned must be 
immediately implemented and monitored for compliance in the 
field.  Mid-term course corrections are required and must be 
supported at the highest levels within the IGOH and MINUSTAH. 
GRIFFITHS