US embassy cable - 05CAIRO3424

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 CAIRO 003424 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, KISL, EG, Egyptian Politics 
SUBJECT: A SEASON OF UNCERTAINTY IN EGYPTIAN POLITICS 
 
REF: A. CAIRO 3239 
     B. CAIRO 3089 
     C. CAIRO 3086 
     D. CAIRO 2536 
     E. CAIRO 2506 
     F. CAIRO 2433 
     G. CAIRO 1413 
     H. 04 CAIRO 8353 
     I. 04 CAIRO 8146 
 
Classified by A/DCM Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) As Cairo's weather warms up this spring, Egyptian 
intellectuals and observers are preoccupied by a growing 
sense of anticipation and uncertainty about Egypt's political 
future.  Contacts are focused on a series of "unprecedented" 
recent developments which, in combination, are charging the 
country's political atmosphere.  These include: 
 
-- President Mubarak's constitutional reform initiative and 
the impending "competition" for the nation's highest office; 
 
-- The continuing controversy surrounding opposition figure 
Ayman Nour and his impending trial; 
 
-- Mubarak's nine-hour interview aired on prime time 
(alternatively interpreted as masterful and historic or 
desperate and pathetic); 
 
-- The "revolt" of judges demanding greater autonomy in 
supervising ballot stations; 
 
-- Protests by academics at state security's interference in 
campus affairs; 
 
-- The reemergence of domestic terrorism after a seven year 
hiatus; 
 
-- The continuation of demonstrations by the "Kifaya" 
(Enough) movement, an umbrella movement encompassing a broad 
spectrum of regime opponents; and 
 
-- An increasingly assertive Muslim Brotherhood, which is 
working to recast itself as a force for political reform. 
 
2. (C) While the GOE has dealt in the past, individually, 
with challenges of comparable magnitude, there is a sense 
that the convergence of these factors this spring poses an 
unprecedented challenge to the Mubarak regime, with the 
potential to change the prevailing political dynamic in ways 
that are still unclear.  These factors, in accumulation, will 
certainly have GOE policy circles working overtime and will 
test conjectures on the degree to which Mubarak and his inner 
circle have a master plan to shape and drive developments, 
rather than just react to them.  End summary. 
 
---------------------- 
Presidency in Flux (?) 
---------------------- 
 
3. (C) President Mubarak, by his own confession a man of 
cautious and conservative tendencies, followed up on his 
decisive cabinet shuffle in the summer of 2004 with an even 
bigger surprise in February, when he announced that he would 
support a constitutional amendment to allow for the first 
direct, competitive elections for head of state in the 5,000 
year history of the Egyptian state (ref D). 
 
4. (C) More than two months after the announcement, the 
modalities of the new presidential election system remain 
undetermined, but there is general agreement that there is no 
figure currently on the political stage capable of 
effectively challenging Mubarak.  As the implications of this 
major systemic change were debated in March, many, including 
(privately) Mubarak himself, expressed frustration at the 
lack of viable competition.  Finally, in mid-April, Khaled 
Mohieldin, president of the leftist Tagammu' Party, began 
sending clear signals that he was prepared to step into the 
race (though he indicated that no formal announcement would 
be made until parliament had finished preparing the 
amendment). 
 
5. (C) Mohieldin's apparent entry into the race was greeted 
by most of our contacts, and a number of commentators, with 
sadness.  The 84 year-old political veteran, a core member of 
the free officers' movement that deposed King Farouk in 1952, 
is respected by many Egyptian political elites.  (Note: He is 
also the paternal uncle of current Minister for Investment 
Mahmoud Mohieldin.  End note.)  Wafd Party Vice President 
Mahmoud Abaza described him to poloff as "the only one of the 
free officers truly committed to democracy."  However, the 
consensus among our contacts was that Mohieldin, in entering 
the race, was allowing himself to be used as a prop.  Some of 
our contacts claim he is barely ambulatory, hard of hearing, 
and perhaps even showing signs of senility.  One of our 
contacts quipped that Mohieldin was probably a favorite of 
the palace to challenge Mubarak because he makes the 
President (who turned 77 on May 4) look young and sprightly 
by contrast.  Prominent columnist Salama Ahmed Salama called 
Mohieldin's decision to run "hasty" in the absence of clarity 
about the modalities for the race, while another prominent 
editorialist, Magdy Mehanna, predicted that Mohieldin's 
participation in this "charade" would tarnish his reputation. 
 
 
---------------------- 
Ayman Nour Controversy 
---------------------- 
 
6. (C) Also running for president is Ayman Nour, the 
embattled leader of the opposition Ghad (Tomorrow) Party, 
even as his lawyers prepare for his criminal trial on forgery 
charges, set to begin June 28 (Ref E).  Nour continues to 
take an aggressive and defiant approach to his campaign, 
hurling scathing criticism on Mubarak and the GOE.  He 
claimed to poloff in early May that the ruling party and the 
State Security apparatus was hiring thugs to disrupt his 
campaign rallies, particularly in the Nile Delta provinces, 
pelting him and his entourage with garbage, insults, and 
threats.  (Comment: Nour's attempts to campaign outside his 
own district are groundbreaking in Egypt and bound to 
engender at least some hostility among local politicians and 
their constituents.  Nonetheless, we deem credible his claims 
of GOE/NDP involvement in hiring thugs to make his 
campaigning as unpleasant as possible.  However, to the 
extent that the GOE is behind this harassment, the GOE 
appears to be trying to put some distance between itself and 
his tormentors.  End comment.)  Nour also confirmed to poloff 
in early May reports that "private citizens" had been filing 
various complaints against him, which he described as part of 
a campaign of harassment, requesting permits to demolish his 
apartment for zoning violations, to demolish the social 
services center he funded in his parliamentary district, and 
even a motion to have him arrested for insulting the head of 
state after a journalist claimed to have witnessed him 
tearing up a picture of President Mubarak. 
 
7. (C) Nour remains confident (and probably has an 
exaggerated view) of his popularity on the Egyptian street, 
and told poloff that, in a truly open electoral campaign, the 
"real contest" would be not between his Ghad party and the 
ruling NDP but between the Ghad and the Muslim Brothers. 
Nour has many enemies, including many among regime opponents, 
who believe he is "slick" a "phoney," or a "lightweight." 
Some of our contacts are bemused by the fame and support he 
has acquired in western capitals as a champion of democracy. 
While it is difficult to quantify Nour's actual support on 
the street, his ongoing presidential campaign and 
controversial legal case are clearly additional complicating 
factors in this year's political climate. 
 
--------------------------- 
Hosni Up Close and Personal 
--------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Meanwhile, back at the presidential palace, Egypt TV 
aired on prime time, for three consecutive nights beginning 
April 23, a nine-hour interview with President Mubarak (refs 
A and C).  The teasers aired to promote the interview series, 
humbly entitled "Witness to History," claimed that Mubarak 
would be making many revelations and at least one major 
announcement.  The interview was conducted by the celebrated 
presenter (and satellite TV tycoon) Emad Eddin Adeeb and 
produced by a prominent cinematic director.  The result, it 
was generally agreed, was anti-climactic:  The interview 
dealt extensively with Mubarak's recollections of his 
military career, his observations about Egypt under Nasser 
and Sadat, and his heroic role in the war of 1973.  During 
one of the brief references to the current political 
situation and the issue of reform, the President told Adeeb 
he had "never" been told directly by any USG official that 
Egypt needed to undertake political reforms. 
 
9. (C) After the interviews, a surprisingly broad range of 
media commentators and Embassy contacts delivered a similar 
verdict:  The President dwelt too extensively on the past and 
was far too vague in discussing his vision for the future of 
the country and solutions to its various problems.  Contacts 
from reformist/civil society circles termed Mubarak's 
performance "terrible" and "pathetic" and the act of a man 
"out of ideas."  Even Mustafa Bakry, editor of the reckless 
and sensationalist tabloid al-Osboa, usually seen to be doing 
the GOE's bidding by regularly and systematically defaming 
its critics through innuendo and name calling, termed 
Mubarak's interview "a big disappointment." 
 
10. (C) Not all were critical of Mubarak's performance - 
editors of the three principal pro-government papers all 
praised Mubarak's statesman-like demeanor, maturity, and 
wisdom.  One contact told poloff that the Egyptian masses, 
rather than its skeptical intellectuals, were the targeted 
audience for the interview, and it was for their benefit that 
Mubarak postured both as a great man of history and a patron 
of stability and order.  It appeared to most observers that 
Mubarak's interview was a de facto launch of his reelection 
campaign, though an anticipated announcement of his 
intentions has yet to come, and will probably wait until 
after parliament completes the legislation on the 
constitutional amendment. 
 
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The Judicial "Intifada" 
----------------------- 
 
11. (C) We continue to hear received mixed interpretations of 
the significance of the April 15 declaration of 1000 Egyptian 
judges who met in Alexandria (out of a total of 7000 judges 
nationwide) in which they highlighted flaws in the current 
system of judicial supervision of elections and demanded 
passage of new legislation to expand guarantees of judicial 
independence and threatened to sit out the next elections if 
ignored (Ref B).  Democracy advocates in Egypt and abroad 
were stunned and elated at the judge's "unprecedented" and 
"audacious" move and predicted it would put serious pressure 
on the GOE to rethink its approach to elections, widely 
acknowledged to be tarnished by various forms of fraud and 
intimidation. 
 
12. (C) The GOE has not taken the matter sitting down.  The 
Minister of Justice told the press his ministry would act 
quickly to address the judges' concerns, while he reportedly 
called the judges' bluff by circulating a form requesting 
that they confirm their intent to fulfil their duties as 
electoral supervisors.  Assistant Minister of Justice 
Iskandar Ghattas told poloff in early May that "every judge" 
has already signed this pledge and was aggressively 
dismissive of the effort, saying the organizers of the 
"revolt" were gadflies cynically drawing on political reform 
rhetoric to advance their "Islamist" agenda.  (Comment: We 
found Ghattas' dismissal of the organizers as 
crypto-Islamists to be dubious.  His very defensive reaction 
was probably a sign of the actual significance of the judges' 
action.  End comment.)   However, as noted in ref B, even a 
decidedly liberal and reformist senior judicial contact told 
poloff that the "democratic" effort was actually a stealthy 
means of shaming the GOE into giving judges a pay raise.  A 
follow up to the April 15 meeting, tentatively set for May 
13, may provide clarity on the resolve and resonance of the 
judges' efforts. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Academics Want State Security to Move off Campus 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
13. (C) Another of the "unprecedented" recent developments 
was the April 19 demonstration, held simultaneously at public 
university campuses in Cairo, Minya, and Assiyut, in which 
dozens of university faculty members staged a one hour silent 
protest at the presence, and interference, of Egyptian State 
Security in Egyptian academic life.  State Security has long 
maintained a significant presence on Egyptian university 
campuses, particularly focused on containing and thwarting 
recruitment and organization of students by Islamist groups. 
As described in Ref I, State Security intervenes annually in 
student union elections to preempt, by heavy-handed tactics 
if necessary, the election of Islamists to student government 
positions, but is also accused of stiffling the general 
academic climate and harassing students and faculty who 
challenge orthodoxy on various issues. 
 
14. (C) During the April 19 protest, organized by a group 
known as "Professors for Change," dozens of faculty members 
on the three campuses donned black academic robes and stood 
silently in front of university administration buildings for 
an hour, carrying banners with slogans such as "No to 
security interference in universities;" "Yes to free and 
independent universities;" and "No future for Egyptian 
students without freedom."  An organizer, journalism 
professor Awatef Abdel Rahman told the press that the 
protests had been inspired by the growing calls and activism 
in the country for political reform.  Prominent intellectual 
and Shura Council member Usama Ghazaly Harb (protect) told 
poloff in late April that the faculty protests against State 
Security were "very important" because they had "shattered 
the fearful silence" of professors and openly expressed views 
widely held among Egyptian academics. 
 
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"Enough" Flexes Muscles 
----------------------- 
 
15. (C) Clearly one of the most significant developments of 
early 2005 has been the sustained emergence of the protest 
movement Kifaya ("Enough") - a loose coalition of political 
groupings and individuals united by their opposition to the 
Mubarak regime (ref G).  The group, which has captured the 
attention of the international media, as well as a growing 
number of Egyptians, has surprised observers by its ability 
to repeatedly defy bans on its demonstrations and turn out on 
the streets for a series of protests this spring.  While the 
numbers Kifaya turns out at demonstrations are modest by 
international standards (usually around 200-500), their pluck 
and resolve is undeniable and they can probably be credited 
with having made routine previously unutterable slogans such 
as "Mubarak must go," "No to a fifth term," "No to 
bequeathment of power (to son Gamal)," etc. 
16. (C) Kifaya's latest feat was staging simultaneous 
demonstrations in 11 Egyptian cities on April 27, explicitly 
unauthorized by the government, which led to 75-120 arrests, 
(most were released within several hours).  The Ministry of 
Interior has openly lost patience with the movement and its 
activities, but has so far refrained from either the arrest 
and prosecution of Kifaya's leaders or authorizing a "head 
cracking" approach by the riot police deployed to contain the 
demonstrations - no doubt mindful of the domestic and 
international fallout that would likely ensue.  The 
movement's strength - its simple, "unifying" message, will 
also limit its development as a political force.  As one 
Internet commentator, and acknowledged supporter of Kifaya 
concedes, the movement "binds together all sorts of 
contradictory groups, organizations, ideologies, and visions. 
 The only consensus is that Mubarak must go; everything else 
is up for debate." 
 
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Emboldened Brothers 
------------------- 
 
17. (C) For their part, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (MB), 
which is banned but tolerated by the GOE within certain 
parameters, and which claims to be the nation's most popular 
political movement, has also seized perceived opportunities 
in Egypt's changing political atmosphere - by adopting 
political reform as their mantra in place of their 
traditional calls for the implementation of Shari'a Law.  As 
discussed in ref H, the MB in the past year adopted its own 
"blueprint for political reform," established its own "human 
rights" organization, and adopted a generally more strident 
(though enigmatic and often contradictory) political 
discourse.  In late April, for example, MB Supreme Guide 
Mahdy Akef pledged the group's loyalty to President Mubarak 
(while continuing to demand the dissolution of the Emergency 
law), but then subsequently qualified his comments as 
"respect and support for the office of the President," while 
in a statement posted on the group's website in early May, 
Akef's deputy, Mohammed Habib, called on Egyptians to boycott 
the coming Presidential elections. 
 
18. (C) In the past two months, the MB, likely inspired by 
Kifaya's activities (in which it has conspicuously 
participated), has shown a greater willingness than at any 
time in the recent past to defy government bans on 
demonstrations:  Their March 27 demonstration (ref F), was 
successfully thwarted by the GOE, but the massive security 
deployments paralyzed central Cairo for hours and prompted 
much criticism of the GOE in the independent press.  The MB 
appeared to up the ante with demonstrations it staged on May 
4 in Cairo and six provinces, reportedly attended by 
thousands of MB cadres and sympathizers.  The GOE responded, 
according to an MOI statement with 400 arrests - the largest 
number of MB arrests in a single day that we can recall.  The 
demonstrations reportedly devolved into clashes with police 
in some spots, the worst probably being in Fayyoum, where 43 
demonstrators were injured (according to the MB), while the 
MOI claimed that an undisclosed number of police were 
injured. 
 
------------------------- 
Domestic Terror Reemerges 
------------------------- 
 
19. (C) The apparent reemergence, however tentative, of 
domestic terrorism, is an additional factor that has added to 
the mood of uncertainty and concern in Egypt this spring. 
The calm that had prevailed since the infamous Luxor massacre 
of 1997 was first shattered in October 2004, when a group of 
Egyptians, reportedly led by a disaffected Palestinian, 
detonated several explosives at several tourist sites 
frequented by Israelis on the east coast of the Sinai 
peninsula (septels).  The GOE was quick to emphasize that the 
group that conducted the attack had been identified and 
quickly captured, and that the perpetrators had no 
connections to wider terror networks.  Though the GOE's 
public analysis had some clear flaws, it was effective in 
forestalling any major impact on the country's tourist 
industry.  However, three other terrorist incidents which 
occurred in Cairo in April 2005 (septels) have undermined the 
public mood and raised fears that Egypt's victory against the 
terrorism of the 1980s and 1990s might be eroding. 
 
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Comment 
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20. (C) The GOE has considerable experience dealing, in one 
form or another, with each of the issues and areas discussed 
above.  However, contacts and observers cannot recall a time 
in which so many significant and sensitive issues have 
converged at the same time.  Usama Ghazaly Harb (protect), 
the prominent intellectual, told poloff that Egypt has 
"arrived at one of the most sensitive moments in its modern 
history" and confided that he was unable to predict with 
confidence "what will happen next month, let alone six months 
from now."  These various developments, in accumulation, will 
certainly have GOE policy circles working overtime and will 
test conjectures on the degree to which Mubarak and his inner 
circle have a master plan to shape and drive developments, 
rather than just react to them. 
 
21. (C) With so many variables in play, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that the GOE may feel compelled to crack down 
on one or more of the groups challenging its legitimacy as 
elections draw closer.  Conversely, we would not be surprised 
if additional strands of opposition emerge, or if the 
existing strands continue to seek opportunities to make 
common cause with each other in an effort to challenge the 
GOE more effectively. 
 
 
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. 
 
GRAY