US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI3402

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GOI READY TO ASSIST IRAQ, BUT QUIETLY

Identifier: 05NEWDELHI3402
Wikileaks: View 05NEWDELHI3402 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy New Delhi
Created: 2005-05-05 12:46:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL EAID KDEM IN IZ India
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 003402 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL, EAID, KDEM, IN, IZ, India-Iraq 
SUBJECT: GOI READY TO ASSIST IRAQ, BUT QUIETLY 
 
REF: A. STATE 79107 
     B. STATE 78774 NOTAL 
 
Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Charge conveyed Ref A demarche encouraging a 
GOI statement on new Iraqi government on April 30.  In a 
follow-up May 5 meeting, Joint Secretary (Gulf) Sanjay Singh 
told PolCouns and Poloff that while the MEA was unlikely to 
issue a formal statement congratulating the new Iraqi 
Transitional Government (ITG), it was being "proactive" in 
identifying opportunities to offer training assistance to the 
new government.  The GOI is committed to strengthening the 
new government and maintaining its strong ties with Iraq, but 
for domestic political reasons prefers to keep its 
involvement inconspicuous.  The next step is an Iraqi 
government request to India.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) Responding to the ITG demarche (Ref A), delivered 
also to Joint Secretary (Americas) Jaishankar by the Charge 
on April 30, Singh recalled India's statement welcoming the 
January elections in Iraq and stated that while the GOI 
normally sends a letter congratulating new national 
governments, it was unlikely to issue any public statement of 
support at this time.  Nevertheless, India continues 
"proactively" to identify areas for training Iraqi government 
officials in technical skills.  Noting the similarities 
between India and Iraq's multi-ethnic, multi-religious 
society, Singh suggested that Indian expertise would be 
useful in drafting the Iraqi constitution, and highlighted 
two classes for foreign officials in legislative drafting and 
parliamentary procedures offered through the GOI's technical 
assistance program. 
 
3.  (C) Singh reviewed a range of courses that the GOI had 
identified as being potentially useful for Iraqi officials, 
including banking and finance, microcredit and small business 
development, agriculture, water resource management, railway 
administration, education, and WTO preparation, and noted 
that India has already informed the Iraqi Mission of a number 
of short term scholarships and long term fellowships 
designated for them to attend these programs.  The MEA is 
waiting now for the Iraqi government to respond to its offer 
for training, he stated.  In the meantime, MEA is drawing 
from USAID materials shared by the Embassy to identify 
technical assistance options that would be responsive to 
Iraqi requirements. 
 
4.  (C) After PolCouns briefed Singh generally on the 
possibility of a June conference in Brussels to support the 
ITG as proposed by the President during his February Europe 
trip (Ref B), Singh noted the GOI's interest in 
participating, and stated that both the Secretary during her 
March visit and the Indian Mission to the EU in Brussels had 
informed the MEA of that meeting.  He asked that we stay in 
contact as the Iraqi government and conference sponsors agree 
on the details, so that the MEA can seek political 
concurrence. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
5.  (C) The GOI is committed to maintaining its traditionally 
strong ties to Iraq, and believes that it has useful 
resources to offer to the new Iraqi government, but wants to 
keep its involvement low profile for now to avoid stirring up 
opposition from the left wing of Congress and the Communist 
parties who support the UPA from outside and view the Iraqi 
government as an illegitimate product of occupation.  The new 
ITG will need to encourage the Iraqi Mission in New Delhi to 
follow up on these offers of assistance, particularly as the 
constitution drafting gets underway. 
 
6.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
BLAKE 

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