US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI3401

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UK NEPAL ENVOYS: MEA HARD LINE ON THE KING

Identifier: 05NEWDELHI3401
Wikileaks: View 05NEWDELHI3401 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy New Delhi
Created: 2005-05-05 12:46:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL MASS IN NP UK India
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003401 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MASS, IN, NP, UK, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: UK NEPAL ENVOYS: MEA HARD LINE ON THE KING 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 3250 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: In a May 5 discussion with PolCouns and 
Emboffs, visiting UK Special Representative for Nepal Sir 
Jeffrey James, UK Ambassador to Nepal Keith Bloomfield, and 
UK Emboffs reported from their meeting with Foreign Secretary 
Saran that MEA Nepal policy vis-a-vis the King is hardening 
following backsliding after his April 23 meeting with the 
Indian PM.  The UK suggested that increased US-UK-India 
operational cooperation may help to disrupt Maoist activity, 
and that the GOI may be ready to consider previously 
unthinkable ideas to end the turmoil in Nepal, including UN 
peacekeepers.  End Summary. 
 
Saran: Don't Go Wobbly 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (C) According to the UK visitors, who were meeting in 
Delhi with both GOI and non-governmental experts, Foreign 
Secretary Shyam Saran and Joint Secretary (North) Ranjit Rae 
 
SIPDIS 
were unyielding in their opposition to rewarding King 
Gyanendra for the lifting of the state of emergency (SOE) in 
a May 4 meeting.  The MEA believes the monarch is responding 
to the pressure of the international arms supply suspension, 
albeit slowly.  The Brits reported that the re-arrest of 
former PM Deuba indicated to the GOI that the King thought he 
had won over the Indians by saying the right things in 
Jakarta, and South Block wants to withhold any conciliatory 
gestures until the Palace takes more permanent steps to 
reverse the February 1 takeover.  Now is not the time to go 
soft and make concessions when the pressure is giving 
results, Saran reportedly said.  The MEA, which has prevailed 
over those in the Indian military who want to resume military 
supplies, sees a return to normal relations as still a long 
way off. 
 
3.  (C) The two envoys commented that the King is feeling 
more pressure from his desire for international legitimacy 
than from the military effects of the suspension of 
assistance.  The UK and GOI agreed that the RNA is not yet 
feeling any real pinch from the arms supply cutoff, and that 
RNA protestations of dire shortfalls are intended to frighten 
New Delhi into giving in before the Palace takes any major 
steps.  The British thought the focus of the GOI, HMG, and 
USG should instead be on "putting the Maoists out of 
business," rather than trying to build up the RNA.  The 
recent split in the Maoist Politburo has put them off balance 
and weakened their leadership, but the democratic forces in 
Nepal are unfortunately not in any position to take advantage 
of this, the UK envoys stated. 
 
Full Efforts Against the Maoists? 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) The British visitors suggested that the GOI could be 
more aggressive in acting against Maoist leaders and assets 
in India, but worried that New Delhi had not given strong 
orders to the Indian police and intelligence services to act 
against them.  PolCouns noted that NSA MK Narayanan had 
indicated that he was attentive to the problem of Maoists in 
India, but the UK representatives questioned whether that 
message was filtering down to operational levels. 
 
Where Is This Heading? 
---------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Asked by PolCouns whether the GOI had given any sense 
of their plans vis-a-vis the crisis, the two envoys described 
Saran as more focused than previously on the long-term view. 
His immediate concern over the risk of losing influence in 
Nepal to China or Pakistan had given way to a more strategic 
consideration of what will work in Nepal to reverse the royal 
power grab.  In this regard, they reported, he seemed 
impatient that the current GOI approach was not working and 
was even pondering previously unthinkable ideas, including an 
eventual deployment of UN peacekeepers to separate the forces 
and restore conditions for democracy.  "What we've done up to 
now isn't working" to forge a long-term solution, Saran 
reportedly commented.  (Comment: We are dubious that the GOI 
would admit to a UN role in Nepal, but note that this issue 
did figure in the recent visit of UNSYG Kofi Annan.  End 
Comment) 
 
6.  (C) Discussing the efforts to schedule a trilateral 
US-UK-India meeting during the upcoming visit of A/S Rocca, 
the UK representatives reported Saran's comment that "we're 
not ready for that yet."  They speculated that entrenched 
bureaucratic divisions within the MEA are the biggest 
obstacle to holding formal three-way consultations, adding 
that the idea was too foreign to offices accustomed to 
strictly bilateral interactions. 
Comment 
------- 
7.  (C) The MEA considers the Deuba arrest as a slap in the 
face of PM Manmohan Singh, and has dug in its heels against 
rewarding the King for partial progress towards democracy. 
As A/S Rocca prepares for her meeting with J/S Rae on May 9, 
we expect the MEA to take a tough line on Nepal and to push 
for a continuation of the suspension of all forms of military 
assistance. 
BLAKE 

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