US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO844

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000844 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, EAID, PGOV, CE, NO, Tsunami, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: COLOMBO CO-CHAIR REPS MULL OVER ISSUING STATEMENT 
IN SUPPORT OF JOINT RELIEF MECHANISM 
 
REF: (A) COLOMBO 834 (B) COLOMBO 741 (C) 04 COLOMBO 
 
     1997 
 
Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle 
for reason 1.4 (d). 
 
 1.  (C) Summary.  After May 5 discussion of 
whether to issue a statement in support of the 
joint mechanism for tsunami relief in the North 
and East, Colombo co-chair representatives agreed 
that such a statement would be most useful after 
the joint mechanism is agreed upon (assuming that 
happens within the next week).  All agreed that 
the potential pitfalls of issuing a statement 
before the deal is done outweighed the potential 
benefits.  Charge' said it was imperative that 
nothing be done that would inadvertently weaken 
the President's apparent determination to move 
ahead on the mechanism.  Charge' agreed to prepare 
and circulate a draft "after signing" statement to 
the other co-chair representatives over the next 
few days.  In separate conversations, GSL peace 
secretariat head Dhanapala told Charge' a co-chair 
 
SIPDIS 
statement now would be extremely unhelpful. 
Presidential spokesman Peiris said a statement 
might be useful but the timing and wording would 
be crucial.  CBK appears determined to move ahead 
on the joint mechanism.  End Summary 
 
Better to Wait 
-------------- 
 
2.  (C) Colombo representatives of the Tokyo co- 
chairs (Japanese Ambassador Suda, Norwegian 
Ambassador Brattskar, Dutch Ambassador Blankhart, 
EU Charge' Wilton and Charge') met at Ambassador 
Suda's residence May 5 to discuss whether to issue 
a co-chairs' statement commending President 
Kumaratunga's (CBK) recent public statements in 
support of concluding with the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and with the Muslim 
community a joint mechanism on tsunami relief in 
the North and East.  (In discussion with Norwegian 
envoy Eric Solheim April 19, co-chair reps had 
agreed to consider at a later date whether to 
issue a co-chair statement on the joint 
mechanism.)  Suda opened by noting that he had 
previously been in favor of a co-chair statement 
as soon as possible to support CBK's strong public 
statements and apparent determination to move 
ahead on the joint mechanism, come what may. 
After discussions with CBK confidants that made 
clear that CBK will be in delicate discussions 
between now and early next week, Suda said he had 
changed his view and now felt it best to wait to 
put out a supportive, laudatory co-chair statement 
after the joint mechanism is a done deal. 
 
3.  (C) Charge' concurred with Suda, noting that 
it was crucial that nothing, however well- 
intentioned, be said or done by the co-chairs that 
might give ammunition to the argument that the 
joint mechanism is being imposed by donors rather 
an indigenous Sri Lankan effort.  After additional 
discussion, all present agreed that the co-chairs 
should work to have a "post signing" statement 
ready to go the moment that CBK and the LTTE 
closed the joint mechanism deal.  Charge' agreed 
to prepare and circulate a draft to other Colombo 
co-chair reps in the next few days.  Blankhart 
cautioned that if, a week from now, it looks like 
the joint mechanism will not be concluded before 
the May 17-18 Kandy Development Forum, then 
perhaps the co-chairs should reconsider the issue 
of statement timing.  The other co-chair 
representatives agreed. 
 
4.  (C) Brattskar advised the other co-chair reps 
that, once CBK is on board, he will seek to have a 
joint signing ceremony or will travel back and 
forth between Colombo and Kilinochchi in order to 
have a "same day" signing.  The Norwegian said he 
is "quite certain" that the LTTE remains firm in 
its willingness to sign on to the joint mechanism 
once CBK is ready, although the Tigers will not so 
signal in advance for fear of having the rug 
pulled out from under them. 
 
Views of Two CBK Confidants: No/Maybe 
------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Earlier on May 5, Charge' held separate 
conversations with GSL Peace Secretariat chief 
Jayantha Dhanapala and President spokesman Harim 
Peiris to gauge their views on whether a co-chairs 
statement on the joint mechanism before both sides 
agreed to the mechanism would be helpful or 
harmful to CBK's efforts.  Dhanapala 
was adamant that a statement would be very 
counterproductive at this point in the process. 
He feared it would sustain the (erroneous) public 
and editorial page view that the joint mechanism 
is something being imposed by donors rather than 
the result of negotiations between Sri Lankans. 
"The President has had some success in rebutting 
that view.  We can't undercut her now," Dhanapala 
said.  He also commented that CBK held lengthy 
discussions with Muslim politicians Ferial Ashraff 
and Rauff Hakeem May 4 and will go behind 
closed doors with coalition partner Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) on the mechanism May 6. 
Dhanapala said he was optimistic that CBK, as 
illustrated by the personal capital and energy she 
is devoting to selling the joint mechanism, will 
sign the mechanism but "things are very delicate 
right now." 
 
6.  (C) Peiris took a slightly different view in 
Charge's discussion with him.  He said a co- 
chairs' statement now would be "fine in principle, 
maybe even advantageous for the President."  Such 
a co-chairs' statement might also provide a "safety 
net" for "reluctant stakeholders" like the Muslims 
and some in the political opposition, Peiris 
commented.  But, Peiris stressed, the timing and 
the exact wording of such a statement would be 
crucial.  On the wording, Peiris said that, in his 
view, any co-chairs statement should avoid any 
implied or explicit reference to a link between 
agreement on the mechanism and future development 
or tsunami aid.  "That would cement the view that 
we are kowtowing to foreigners in exchange for 
money."  In the same vein, Peiris opined, there 
should be no reference to the upcoming Development 
Forum in Kandy in a "pre-signing" statement. 
 
7.  (C) On timing, Peiris said he hoped no co- 
chair statement would appear before early next 
week.  This would give CBK time to continue her 
rounds of quiet consultations.  Moreover, not 
coming out with a statement until early next week 
would avoid having the Sunday editorial pages 
"rant about more foreign interference, which would 
be very unhelpful to our efforts," Peiris 
concluded.  (Peiris called Charge' back later on 
May 5 to advise that CBK would be holding a joint 
mechanism "strategy session" over the weekend at 
which he would raise with CBK the utility of a co- 
chair statement.  He noted that after the first 
conversation with the Charge' he had bounced the 
idea of a co-chair statement off of several other 
CBK insiders.  All agreed a statement "on day two 
after the mechanism is signed on day one" would be 
extremely useful; opinions varied on whether a 
statement beforehand would be helpful.) 
 
8.  (C) Turning to the JVP, Peiris confided that a 
"mole" privy to the inner discussions of the party 
had told him that the JVP strategy, in the event 
CBK goes ahead with the joint mechanism, will be 
to "oppose us on the street" but not to leave the 
coalition.  Peiris said CBK's view is that she can 
withstand anything the JVP has to do to maintain 
its domestic political base short of a collapse of 
the coalition.  "We can ride it out," Peiris 
concluded.  He also commented that a co-chairs' 
statement might also help with the JVP, although 
the leftist party would never admit to being 
"influenced by foreigners."  In Peiris' view, the 
JVP in fact does care about international opinion 
and does not want to be perceived as a "pariah." 
He attributed much of this JVP sensitivity to the 
joint U.S./EU/Japan statement in December 2004 
(Ref C) which had condemned the party for its role 
in stirring up public sentiments against the 
Norwegian facilitators.  "That made an impact on 
them." 
 
9.  (C) Comment.  We earlier had indications that 
Japan and the EU strongly favored a joint 
statement and we had been prepared to argue 
against the idea.  Fortunately, that wasn't 
necessary.  It appears that CBK is in for a long 
weekend of consultation and negotiation (there is 
a rumor she may call in the co-chairs as part of 
that; we just received a diplomatic note asking 
Charge' to come in the evening of May 9 for a 
"briefing" on the joint mechanism by CBK).  All 
indications remain, however, that she is 
determined to move forward on the joint mechanism. 
End Comment 
ENTWISTLE