US embassy cable - 05PARIS3053

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003053 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL, LE, FR 
SUBJECT: CHARGE CAUTIONS LEBANESE GENERAL AOUN AGAINST 
SPLITTING OPPOSITION 
 
REF: A. BASKEY-MAILHOT 5/3/05 EMAIL 
 
     B. BEIRUT 1373 
     C. PARIS 2162 
 
Classified By: Charge d'affaires Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: In a meeting with former Lebanese armed 
forces commanding General Michel Aoun in Paris May 4, three 
days before Aoun's scheduled return to Lebanon May 7, Charge 
cautioned Aoun on the need to maintain Lebanese opposition 
unity and to do nothing to delay the conduct of May 29 
elections.  Aoun took Charge's points on board and asserted 
that his only ambition in returning to Lebanon after his 15 
years in exile in France was to help restore the Lebanese 
democracy.  He nevertheless stated that his efforts to broker 
a common position with Walid Jumblatt, the Hariri family and 
the traditional Christian leadership had been ignored. 
Ascribing to these figures mercenary and self-serving motives 
in seeking power, Aoun said he could not work with such 
corrupt members of the opposition because they were not 
credible in the eyes of the Lebanese people.  By contrast, 
Hizballah enjoys "a certain popularity" and has not been 
corrupt or exploitative.  For these reasons, Aoun said he 
felt he could work with Hizballah, encouraging them to "hand 
over their weapons to the army" and become a purely political 
group.  Aoun also stated clearly that he would encourge a 
delay in the conduct of elections of "perhaps 15 days," in 
order to give Parliament time to vote a new election law, to 
replace the 2000 law which Aoun said would polarize Lebanese 
groups and favor the Syrian loyalists.  Charge underscored 
the importance of conducting elections on schedule, clearly 
stated U.S. policy on Hizballah, and warned Aoun not to allow 
himself to be used by those who want Syria to retain a 
measure of influence in Lebanese affairs.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) Charge met with Aoun, at Aoun's request, to lay down 
a clear message on the need to maintain opposition unity and 
not to allow his return to Lebanon to be exploited by those 
who wanted to see Syria retain a measure of influence in 
Lebanese affairs.  Charge emphasized the need to keep 
elections on schedule for May 29 and not to become embroiled 
in a devisive debate over the nature of the law that will 
govern the elections.  Aoun asserted that his only reason for 
returning to Lebanon was to help restore the Lebanese 
democracy.  He added, however, that initial indications for 
the success of this project were not favorable.  Aoun claimed 
to have proposed to Walid Jumblatt and others in the 
opposition a common program as early as November 2004, but 
said his proposals had been ignored.  He claimed that he 
alone among Lebanese oppositionists had been forthright in 
his support of UNSCR 1559 and that it was only after the 
assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri that others in 
the opposition spoke out forcefully in favor of a Syrian 
withdrawal.  These same figures are now trying to block 
Aoun's return to Lebanon, even lobbying against him with 
Western governments.  Jumblatt, Aoun said with some 
bitterness, had publicly attacked him. 
 
3.  (C) Ascribing to them mercenary and self-serving motives 
in seeking power, Aoun said that he saw no possibility now of 
finding common ground with Jumblatt, members of the Hariri 
family, or the traditional Christian leadership (as 
represented in the Qornet Shehwan).  The Lebanese people are 
aware of the corruption and opportunism of these members of 
the opposition, who have no credibility in their eyes, Aoun 
went on.  The Lebanese people want real change, not a 
continuation of governance by an elite political class 
seeking only to enrich themselves and enjoy the perquisites 
of power.  Moreover, Lebanon's new leadership will have to 
deal with the critical state of the economy, and cannot do 
this by continuing to loot the national treasure.  He 
recalled that his proposal for an audit of state finances had 
raised a "tempest" of protest among officials who had no 
desire to see their long years of exploiting the pubic laid 
bare. 
 
4.  (C) Aoun noted that while considering his return to 
Lebanon he had met in Paris with the envoys of Lebanese 
President Lahoud, including Lahoud's son and long-time 
political operative Pakradouni.  He claimed that he had come 
to an agreement with Lahoud's envoys to drop the legal 
charges pending against Aoun that were leveled by the 
pro-Syrian government at the time of Aoun's "war of 
liberation" against the Syrians.  Aoun said charges of 
misappropriation of state funds had been dropped in a legal 
proceeding May 4 and that charges related to his 
Congressional testimony leading to enactment of the Syrian 
Accountability Act were scheduled to be dealt with in court 
on May 5.  No matter what the outcome of this proceeding, 
Aoun said, he would return to Lebanon on May 7 and enjoyed 
sufficient popular support and credibility to "remain on the 
political scene despite all these efforts to eliminate me 
from the game."  He stated that he had no fear for his 
personal safety in returning. 
5.  (C) Given the corruption and lack of credibility of most 
of the opposition forces, Aoun said he had to "have allies 
who perhaps should not be my allies," making clear 
subsequently that he was referring to Hizballah.  Charge 
stated clearly U.S. policy on Hizballah and warned Aoun not 
to allow himself to be used by political forces in Lebanon 
that wanted to see Syria retain a measure of influence in 
Lebanon's affairs.  Aoun said he had no personal political 
ambitions in returning to Lebanon, either for a seat in 
Parliament or for the Presidency.  He repeated that his 
objective is to restore the Lebanese democracy and have that 
achievement stand as his legacy to the Lebanese people.  To 
do so, however, he needs allies and the traditional political 
elite are not a viable alternative in the eyes of the 
Lebanese public, which wants real change. 
 
6.  (C) Hizballah, by contrast, enjoys "a certain popularity" 
and is known to be honest and not to have exploited the 
Lebanese people.  For these reasons, Aoun said he could work 
with Hizballah while encouraging them to give up their 
weapons to the Lebanese army.  The time of imposition of 
change by force in Lebanon is passed, Aoun asserted.  "We 
must convince people, and put the rifle aside."  Hizballah 
should also know that its "protection against the foreign 
threat" (a reference to Israel) is not through violence, but 
through a re-made Lebanon able to speak as a nation and 
eventually be part of a wide-ranging Middle East peace 
accord.  Moreover, said Aoun, "we don't have a way to compel 
(Hizballah) militarily" to give up their arms.  Bringing 
Hizballah around will take finesse and patience, qualities 
Aoun said mark him as an "atypical" Lebanese politician. 
 
7.  (C) Reminded that he should not allow disagreement over 
the election law to become a pretext for delaying the 
elections, Aoun demurred.  He said that a short delay "of 
perhaps 15 days," would allow Parliament time to adopt a new, 
more equitable election law that would ultimately strengthen 
the opposition's chances in the elections.  Conduct of the 
elections under the 2000 election law would further polarize 
the Lebanese polity and favor pro-Syrian loyalists.  "The 
results will not be good," Aoun asserted.  Charge reiterated 
forcefully the need to maintain momentum by holding elections 
as scheduled on May 29. 
 
8.  (C) Finally, asked about his immediate plans on his 
return to Beirut May 7, Aoun said he planned first to visit 
the tomb of the unknown solider (perhaps playing to his 
supporters within the Lebanese military), then Hariri's tomb. 
 Aoun is then scheduled to attend a rally in Martyrs Square, 
where he will give an address.  Thereafter, he intends to 
hold "open house" receiving members of the oppostion and 
loyalists alike, should they wish to come. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C) Aoun clearly understood our message and took on board 
Charge's warnings on the need to maintain opposition unity 
and not allow his arrival to be exploited by pro-Syrian 
loyalists.  He, nevertheless, is convinced that he knows the 
Lebanese political scene into which he is about to reinsert 
himself and has a strategy for consolidating support around 
himself.  His dismissal of the possibility of working with 
Jumblatt and other Christian and Sunni opposition figures 
does not auger well for opposition unity, and his willingness 
to embrace Hizballah is disturbing evidence of the same kind 
of political opportunism of which he accuses Lebanon's 
political elite.  We leave to Embassy Beirut an assessment of 
how far Aoun may succeed.  Our impression of the man, 
however, was that while not lacking in courage, he may be 
overestimating the extent of his appeal to the Lebanese 
public after 15 years in exile, and (at least in our 
two-on-two setting) did not appear to possess the kind of 
energy and charisma that would be needed to command the 
loyalty of a mass following.  End comment. 
ROSENBLATT