US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI3367

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003367 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL, ETRD, KNNP, IN, UNSC, India-Japan 
SUBJECT: KOIZUMI VISIT: LOW-KEY CAP ON A MAJOR MONTH 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3333 
 
     B. NEW DELHI 3132 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt.  Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Japanese PM Junichiro Koizumi's low-key 
April 28-30 visit to India contrasted sharply with the 
breathlessness that followed Chinese Premier Wen's visit two 
weeks earlier.  Koizumi and PM Manmohan Singh signed an 
eight-point program for boosting bilateral relations, 
particularly in trade and investment and maritime security. 
In a notable departure from long-standing GOJ policy, the 
Embassy told us the Japanese did not press New Delhi to sign 
the NPT, either privately, or publicly.  The only reference 
to the nuclear question in the Joint Statement was a 
declaration to work as "partners against proliferation," 
hinting at a Japanese desire to emulate the US approach to 
this issue.  While China was a prominent, if unspoken, factor 
in the background of discussions, the UNSC was less so. 
Tokyo's new nuclear line with New Delhi suggests that the two 
governments are beginning to move away from past 
tentativeness.  End Summary. 
 
PM Singh: "Renew and Reinvigorate" 
---------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Koizumi's India trip came at the end of a month that 
saw the Secretary, Chinese Premier Wen, and Pakistan's 
President Musharraf visit New Delhi, all of which factor more 
prominently in India's strategic calculus than does Japan. 
While the Koizumi visit did not generate a great deal of 
public attention, the GOI treated it with characteristic 
hyperbole.  Heralding a "paradigm change in the political 
ambiance of our relations," PM Manmohan Singh announced a 
new, strategic focus in ties with Japan, while FM Natwar 
Singh, launching the Indo-Japan Parliamentary Forum, declared 
the bilateral future "bright."  Echoing a Manmohan Singh 
formulation, the two PMs unveiled their plan to construct an 
"Arc of Advantage and Prosperity" in Asia, with an 
eight-point initiative for partnership in a "New Asian Era," 
building on their five year-old "Global Partnership." 
 
3.  (SBU) Briefing the diplomatic corps on May 2, Japanese 
DCM Ryoichi Horie acknowledged that the Global Partnership 
"catchphrase" was something of a misnomer when it was hatched 
in 2000, but that the relationship has become "more 
strategic, more global, and more positive" since then.  He 
repeated the generally vague language of the statement, which 
calls for a high-level strategic dialogue, annual meetings 
between PMs, "comprehensive economic engagement," and 
cooperation on security, UN reform, science and technology, 
and "global challenges" including terrorism through a new CT 
joint working group. 
 
Some Things Do Change 
--------------------- 
 
4.  (C) In response to PolCouns' question on the nature of 
the nuclear proliferation discussions, the Japanese DCM 
informed us that Koizumi had not raised nuclear issues either 
publicly or privately, and that GOJ policy was "more 
realistic now."  Rather, he explained, Tokyo and New Delhi 
agreed to "promote commonalties instead of differences."  The 
joint statement acknowledges their diverging views, calling 
for "cooperation in a constructive manner."  This is a 
significant departure from long-standing GOJ policy, 
articulated by Japanese Ambassador Yasukuni Enoki in an 
interview just prior to Koizumi's arrival: "Japan will 
continue to call upon India to become a member of the NPT." 
A variety of senior MEA officials have indicated that New 
Delhi was pressing hard for Japan to shift away from its 
ritualistic formulation on the NPT, and will no doubt welcome 
Tokyo's new characterization of India as a "partner against 
proliferation." 
 
(Re)Comitting to Economic Ties 
------------------------------ 
 
5.  (U) Declaring their commitment to a "quantum increase" in 
trade, point two of India and Japan's eight-part initiative 
is directed at economic engagement.  The PMs agreed to 
"explore" an economic partnership agreement in addition to 
their policy dialogue between the Ministry of Commerce and 
Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). 
Highlighting Japan's ongoing role in infrastructure 
development in India, including the Delhi metro on which 
Koizumi took a ride, New Delhi and Tokyo expressed interest 
in greater Japanese investment in road and rail systems.  The 
PMs also announced cooperation on energy security through an 
oil and natural gas dialogue.  Notably, Koizumi did not 
follow the pattern of important visitors before him (Putin, 
Wen) and stop in IT center Bangalore. 
 
Maritime Security: Room to Grow 
------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Prior to the visit, the MEA emphasized to us the 
strategic significance of expanding maritime cooperation from 
only Coast Guards to include naval exercises as well. 
Although the Japanese DCM called India Japan's "most reliable 
naval power west of the Straits of Malacca," he did not 
foresee more than an exchange of views and friendship visits 
between the two navies.  Unimpressed by bilateral efforts so 
far, Commodore (ret.) Uday Bhaskar, Director of the Institute 
for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA) suggested that India 
and Japan ought to put more energy into maritime security as 
"the most viable and appropriate area wherein the India-Japan 
relationship can be given a strategic orientation." 
 
The Chinese Gorilla in the Room 
------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Following so soon after PRC PM Wen's stop in New 
Delhi, China weighed heavily in discussions of India-Japan 
relations.  Ambassador Enoki said before the visit that Japan 
needed to prepare for the "reality" of three big countries 
coexisting in Asia.  Elaborating that although his focus was 
bilateral relations, this was not limited to India and Japan. 
 The Joint Statement explicitly echoed recent comments by 
Secretary Rice in emphasizing that "a strong, prosperous and 
 
SIPDIS 
dynamic India is in the interest of Japan and vice versa," 
with China as the unspoken impetus.  Echoing the same 
sentiment in sharper terms, the Chairman of the Indo-Japan 
Chamber of Commerce told a group at FICCI on April 29 that it 
was "problematic" for Japanese businesses to concentrate 
their resources in China and that they were looking to 
diversify to India. 
 
UNSC: Unexpectedly Quiet 
------------------------ 
 
8.  (C) UNSC reform, which initially promised to figure 
prominently on the visit agenda, broke no new ground, with an 
MEA contact telling us that the two sides simply reaffirmed 
their positions.  The Japanese DCM noted that the PMs agreed 
that the G-4 should remain united and that members should 
take a decision on Security Council reform before the UNGA in 
September.  Reflecting the new public view after UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan's recent comment that new UNSC members 
were unlikely to have veto privileges (ref A), a May 2 
editorial in the "Hindu" criticized New Delhi and Tokyo's 
UNSC partnership as a "needless distraction" from other more 
important areas of cooperation, such as trade relations. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C) Tokyo's new line on the NPT and the increasing use of 
the word "strategic" in the context of bilateral ties, 
represent a subtle shift in Tokyo's perception that both 
stand to gain from adding content to their relationship 
beyond mutual endorsement for a permanent UNSC seat.  While 
this visit represents a solid step in that direction, if 
there were less tentativeness in the relationship, and 
greater economic ballast, there would be more room for New 
Delhi and Tokyo to coordinate on issues of interest to both 
governments and the USG. 
BLAKE