US embassy cable - 05MANILA2042

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 002042 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/PMBS, INR/EAP, USIP - SOLOMON 
NSC FOR GREEN 
SEOUL FOR ERIC JOHN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2015 
TAGS: PTER, EFIN, PREL, SA, RP, XC, XF 
SUBJECT: DEPORTATION OF SAUDI TERROR SUSPECT AT BEHEST OF 
SAUDI AMBASSADOR 
 
REF: A. MANILA 1961 
     B. TD-314/20397-05 
     C. TD-314/17381-05 
     D. MANILA 2016 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Joseph Saus 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (S/NF) Summary.  A new case of Saudi diplomatic 
interference, protection, and deportation of a suspected 
terrorist financier underscores the ambiguous role of 
official and unofficial Saudi nationals here in the 
Philippines.  While the most recent case could serve as an 
opportunity for cooperation (should the judicial and law 
enforcement process be allowed to run their natural course) 
we see a disturbing trend involving the Saudi envoy and 
senior Philippine police and immigration officials.  Saudi 
public pronouncements against terrorism are contradicted by a 
developing pattern of effective Saudi Embassy influence on 
GRP officials to release suspected financiers.  The large 
number of Filipino workers in the Kingdom and the hundreds of 
millions of dollars they annually remit gives the Saudis 
tremendous leverage over the GRP.  The Saudi Ambassador has 
professed to us a commitment to work with the US in providing 
development assistance to poor Muslim areas in Mindanao, and 
to countering extremist thought in Muslim communities.  End 
Summary. 
 
Behind-The-Scenes 
----------------- 
 
2.  (S/NF) According to Lt. Col. Winnie Quidato, a Philippine 
National Police (PNP) officer seconded to the Philippine 
Bureau of Immigration (BI), PNP officials recently arrested a 
Saudi national named Talhi, who was on a watchlist of 
immigration violators.  Quidato claimed that, after a dinner 
meeting with Saudi Ambassador Mohammed Ameen Wali on May 2, 
PNP Chief Lomibao ordered the PNP to turn Talhi over to the 
BI and that Wali then convinced BI Commissioner Alipio 
Fernandez to sign the deportation order handing over custody 
to the Saudi Embassy.  Quidato further claimed that Talhi had 
admitted to giving $8,000 to Cotabato Mayor Sema (whose 
meetings with suspected terrorist financiers caused us to 
suspend a USAID road project -- ref a).  Quidato also noted 
that Ambassador Wali "typically" uses the presence of about 
one million Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) in the KSA as 
leverage in dealing with the GRP.  (Comment:  RMAS reports 
indicate Tahli may have terrorist finance links and is 
associated with Mayor Sema -- ref B.  Talhi will likely be 
deported soon, given that he is now fully out of the 
Philippine judicial process.  End Comment.) 
 
3.  (S/NF) There are precedents for such Saudi diplomatic 
interference in terrorist cases in 2005.  After the arrest in 
Zamboanga on January 17 of Al Sughayir, a known financier of 
al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Ambassador Wali 
successfully pressured the GRP to deport him on January 18, 
according to press reports as well as intelligence.  In 
another case, GRP officials arrested Abdullah Nasir Al-Arifi 
in March 2005 upon arrival in Manila from Saudi Arabia 
following identification of his name on an Interpol list of 
suspected terrorists, again according to press reports and 
intelligence.  Wali similarly interceded to take direct 
custody of Al-Arifi, who was then deported back to Saudi 
Arabia (ref C). 
 
4.  (S) Comment:  Septel in other appropriate channel will 
report on Wali's comments on these cases, his promises of 
enhanced cooperation with the USG in counterterrorism in the 
Philippines, and his assurances that his government has 
instructed him to share information with us here.  He clearly 
has powerful access and influence with senior GRP law 
enforcement officials, undoubtedly stemming from the 
important role the remittances of OFWs in Saudi Arabia play 
in keeping the weak Philippine economy afloat.  With Saudi 
cooperation, we significantly impede the ability of 
Saudi-based financiers to provide financial assistance to 
terrorists operating in Mindanao.  On the other hand, we 
cannot yet dismiss the possibility that the Saudi 
Ambassador's priority objective is to safeguard and protect 
at least certainly possibly well-connected Saudi citizens -- 
regardless of their possible links also to terrorist groups. 
Ricciardone