US embassy cable - 05MADRID1693

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

SPAIN: ISAF CAVEATS

Identifier: 05MADRID1693
Wikileaks: View 05MADRID1693 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Madrid
Created: 2005-05-04 07:52:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL MARR AF SP NATO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


 
C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001693 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/WE AND EUR/RPM 
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISP (P. GRAFF) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, AF, SP, NATO 
SUBJECT: SPAIN: ISAF CAVEATS 
 
REF: STATE 60862 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick, 
reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Senior Spanish Defense and Foreign Ministry 
officials said they will reevaluate the caveats placed on 
their forces in Afghanistan in light of Spain's new missions 
there: leading a PRT and an FSB in western Afghanistan. 
Current caveats on Spanish operations in Afghanistan will 
become obsolete as Spain takes on new missions in the western 
part of the country.  If Spain maintains any caveats on their 
forces in the west, they will likely be will be as limited as 
possible and will not interfere with Spain's new missions, 
according to these officials.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) Polcouns and poloff discussed reftel demarche to 
Arturo Laclaustra, the Foreign Ministry's director general 
for terrorism, international and multilateral affairs, and 
the UN.  We also raised the issue with Admiral Francisco 
Torrente, secretary general for defense policy at the 
Ministry of Defense.  Both officials said the caveats the 
demarche dealt with are outmoded as a result of Spain's 
decision to move its forces to western Afghanistan to lead a 
provincial reconstruction team (PRT) and a forward support 
base (FSB). 
 
3.  (C) Laclaustra and Torrente each said the Spanish 
government would soon reevaluate the caveats to determine 
what, if any, would be appropriate for the new missions. 
They understood our point that caveats sometimes limited the 
local commander's flexibility in dealing with expected and 
unexpected contingencies.  Torrente noted that some of the 
Spanish caveats are required for domestic political reasons 
and others, such as those relating to the type missions for 
which the troops have been trained and equipped, are not 
really caveats, but rather clarifications of their troops, 
training and capabilities. 
 
4.  (C) Laclaustra assured us that in any event, Spain "is 
fully committed to its missions in Afghanistan," and "will do 
what is needed to lead the PRT and FSB successfully." 
Torrente emphasized that Spain will ensure that no caveats 
interfere with Spain's ability to work effectively with other 
nations' forces or otherwise to lead the PRT or FSB. 
 
5.  (C) Torrente also noted that he thought it was unusual 
that ISAF command had never expressed concern about caveats 
to the Spanish, and that the U.S. was instead raising the 
issue.  He thought it more appropriate for the matter to be 
dealt with via NATO channels. 
 
6. (C) Comment:  We think it unlikely that Spain will deploy 
to western Afghanistan with no caveats.  The current 
political landscape in Spain will probably require the 
Spanish government to insert its national military 
authorities somewhere in the wiring diagram, at least for 
some of the troops' activities. 
MANZANARES 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04