US embassy cable - 05ROME1506

S E C R E T  ROME 001506 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
BAGHDAD PLEASE PASS TO BG VANGJEL; 
JUSTICE FOR ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, KJUS, IT, IZ, IRAQI FREEDOM 
SUBJECT: IRAQ/ITALY: BERLUSCONI TRYING TO PUT CALIPARI 
INCIDENT BEHIND US - ITALIAN REPORT FINDS NO INDIVIDUAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Mel Sembler, reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
1. (S) Summary and Recommendation: Just prior to the May 2 
release of the Italian report on the March 4 killing of 
intelligence officer Nicola Calipari at a U.S. checkpoint in 
Baghdad, Ambassador, DCM and PolMilCouns were called to PM 
Berlusconi's office to receive an advance copy of the report 
and to hear from senior GOI officials their view of the way 
forward.  The Italians stressed that the GOI wanted to put 
the incident behind us, that it would not damage our strong 
friendship and alliance, and that it would not affect the 
Italian commitment in Iraq.  The Italians said that while 
U.S. cooperation with Italy in the joint investigation had 
been total and thoroughly professional, Italy had to stand by 
the Italian reconstruction of the March 4 incident.  The 
Italian report, they said, concluded that the shooting was 
not intentional and that no individual responsibility could 
be assigned for the shooting, thus making the magistrate's 
criminal investigation less likely to develop into a full 
criminal case. 
 
2. (S) Recommendation (see also Para 9):  While the Italian 
report quibbles with many findings and much of the 
methodology of the US AR 15-6 report on the incident, we will 
be best served by resisting the temptation to attack the 
Italian version point-by-point, and should instead continue 
to let our report speak for itself.  While our instinct at 
Post is to defend the U.S. report and criticize the Italian 
one, we realize the consequences of doing so could be 
asymmetrical: while the criticism in the Italian report is 
unlikely to have serious negative consequences for the USG, 
if the GOI appears to be disloyal to its public servants - or 
to be rolling over to please the USG in this matter, the 
consequences for Berlusconi's government and Italy's 
commitment in Iraq could be severe.  Therefore, we strongly 
recommend all USG spokespeople stand by the 15-6 report while 
refraining from detailed criticism of the Italian draft.  End 
Summary and Recommendation. 
 
3. (S)  Ambassador, DCM and PolMilCouns were called to the 
PM's office late May 2 to receive an advance copy of the 
Italian report on the March 4 Calipari incident, based on the 
joint investigation carried out with the U.S., and to hear 
from senior GOI officials their views on the matter.  Present 
on the Italian side were FM Fini, U/S Letta, PM Dip Advisor 
(NSA equivalent and Ambassador-designate to the US) 
Castellaneta, SISMI Chief Pollari, a few of their senior 
aides, and the two Italian investigators BG Campregher and 
MFA official Ragaglini.  (Berlusconi himself was not at the 
meeting and, we believe, was out of Rome until the next 
morning.) 
 
4. (S) The Italians made the following main points: 
 
-- The intent of Italian Government is that this incident 
should have no negative effect on our excellent bilateral 
relations. 
 
-- Specifically, there should be no effect on the Italian 
commitment in Iraq. 
 
-- The Italian government wants to put the incident behind us 
and hopes this report will contribute to that end (see below 
for explanation as to how it will serve that purpose). 
 
-- An unclassified version of report would be posted on a GOI 
web site May 2, with classified sections redacted.  The full, 
classified report would be given only to PM Berlusconi, but 
the USG could have a copy on request after Berlusconi sees it. 
 
-- Berlusconi would discuss the report in Parliament on 
Thursday, May 5. 
 
-- It would be useful for President Bush to call Berlusconi 
Wednesday, so that he could say before Parliament the next 
day that he had spoken with the President about the matter. 
 
5. (S) As to the report itself, the Italians generally 
described it as supporting the "tragic accident" thesis, and 
highlighted the following: 
 
-- The report says it is impossible to attribute individual 
responsibility for the killing. 
 
-- It also says Italian investigators found no evidence that 
killing was intentional. 
 
-- This last point was designed specifically to discourage 
further investigation by the prosecuting magistrates, since 
under Italian law they apparently can investigate cases of 
intentional homicide against Italian citizens outside of 
Italy, but not cases of unintentional homicide. (NOTE: Our 
contacts warn that Italian magistrates are infamous for 
bending such laws to suit their purposes, so it remains to be 
seen whether the GOI tactic will work in this regard.)  Also, 
Castellaneta told us later that the GOI was hoping the 
prosecutors would find that, because the killing was 
unintentional, there would not be grounds for a case of 
"excessive legitimate defense." 
 
-- The Italian report was written with prosecuting 
magistrates in mind.  The Italians stressed that USA 15-6 
regulations permitted some things to be covered in the joint 
investigation but not others, while Italian magistrates had 
broader scope that had to be satisfied. 
 
-- The government will block attempts by parliamentary 
committees to open their own investigations (there are 
already several calls for this from the opposition), on the 
grounds that this report answers questions sufficiently. 
 
-- The report stands behind the accounts given by Sgrena, the 
driver, and SISMI's Baghdad Station Chief; i.e., the "Italian 
reconstruction" of the incident. 
 
6. (S) The copy of 67-page Italian report that they handed to 
us was a draft that was still being proofread in another room 
(in fact, they said it was the only hard copy in existence, 
and they swapped out a couple pages during the meeting as 
typos were corrected).  We have translated and e-mailed to 
State EUR/WE high points (see para 10) and faxed the complete 
text in Italian to State EUR/WE.  Our quick scan indicates 
that there are several pages in which the Italian 
investigators take issue with specific facts and findings in 
the USA 15-6 report, generally on the grounds that the 
accounts of the Italian witnesses differed significantly from 
those of the American soldiers.  There is also an extensive 
critique of the inadequacy of SOPs for Traffic control Points 
and Blocking Positions.  It argues that more complete 
notification to US authorities would not have changed the 
outcome.  In a subsequent meeting with the DCM, Castellaneta 
said the main difference in the reports was that the US 
report focused on communications while the Italian report 
focused on preparation of the soldiers and the stress under 
which they were operating.  The final conclusions, though, 
are as stated by the Italians in our meeting:  no individual 
responsibility, no deliberate intent. 
 
7. (S) Ambassador Sembler told the Italians that the USG 
shared the Italian desire to put this incident behind us and 
not let it affect overall bilateral relations.  In that 
regard, it was important for the Italian government not to 
point accusing fingers at the U.S. or complain about lack of 
cooperation, and we would endeavor to continue doing so 
ourselves .  Fini said Italy could not complain about 
cooperation from U.S.; the Italian report clarified that the 
Italian investigators had full access and he would ask 
Berlusconi to stress that fact in parliament on May 5. 
Ragaglini and BG Campregher were effusive about the "total 
and complete" cooperation they received from the USA 
investigators, including access to all evidence.  The one 
caveat was that for five days before they arrived in Baghdad 
BG Vangjel had been conducting interviews within the USA 
chain of command re communications and U.S. knowledge of the 
rescue operation.  The Italians, however, were given copies 
of everything done prior to their arrival. 
 
8. (S) The Italians were clearly not happy about the 
classified portions of the USA 15-6 posted on the web being 
"unredacted" so easily and asked the Ambassador for an 
 
explanation.  They did not push the issue after he explained 
it was solely a technical mistake.  The Italians said they 
had pulled from Baghdad the SISMI Station Chief whose name 
was revealed in the "unredacted" version of the 15-6; he will 
not go back. 
 
9. (S) Embassy recommendations for immediate next steps: 
 
-- The NSC should try to schedule a POTUS-Berlusconi call on 
Wednesday. 
 
-- The USG public reaction for now should be limited to 
"We've just received Italian report and are studying it." 
(Italian press will be furiously nit-picking, and it will not 
serve a useful purpose for us to get into point-by-point 
refutation at this stage, although we might want to do 
backgrounders later in Baghdad, Washington, or Rome.) 
 
-- The Department should consider a SecState-Fini call in the 
next few days to confirm that we share Italy's desire to put 
incident behind us. 
 
10. (U) Informal Embassy Translation of Italian Report's 
Conclusions: 
 
"The Italian representatives - based on the evidence they 
were able to obtain - did not find elements that would allege 
that the facts indicate deliberate murder. 
 
It is realistic that tension felt by the soldiers and some 
inexperience and stress may have made them react 
instinctively and with little control. 
 
The lack of formal references to clear rules that should have 
been observed makes it problematic to assign specific 
individual responsibilities. 
 
The facts asserted by Ms. Sgrena, the car's driver and the 
SISMI Chief of Station in Baghdad can be considered 
realistic.  Based on the overall analysis, their 
reconstruction is coherent and plausible." 
 
End Informal Embassy Translation of Conclusions. 
 
11. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2005ROME01506 - Classification: SECRET