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| Identifier: | 05BRUSSELS1727 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05BRUSSELS1727 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Brussels |
| Created: | 2005-05-03 14:41:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | PREL MARR MOPS EAID SU ET NATO USEU BRUSSELS |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001727 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, PM. LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, EAID, SU, ET, NATO, USEU BRUSSELS SUBJECT: NATO AND EU MEET TO DISCUSS SUPPORT TO DARFUR REF: ADDIS ABABA 01481 1. (SBU) Summary. On 29 April 2005, NATO International Staff (IS) and International Military Staff (IMS) led by Assistant Secretary General Kobieracki, met with EU General Secretariat SIPDIS and EU Military Staff (EUMS) members led by Director General for ESDP, Pieter Feith in the EU's Kortenberg Building. Among the 20 plus in attendance were EUMS Director General Perruche, Anders Hendrikson from the European Commission and Canadian General Fenton (?) from the IMS. Note: USEU represented the only other bilateral partner of the AU at this meeting at the direct invitation of ESDP DG Feith. End summary 2. (SBU) Pieter Feith opened the meeting with an overview saying "We are willing to inform you" on our planning so far within a wider context of what is going on in Darfur and offering the NATO side an in-depth fact sheet. Feith focused on the results of the Joint Assessment Mission of 22 March noting this was an AU-led effort of bilateral partners working as an integrated team. He highlighted the phased approach recommended in the report: Phase I is to strengthen the current weakness in the AU structure in order to bring the current AMIS mission to full operational capacity (FOC); Phase II would expand the mission to approximately 7,600 military and police; while envisioning a Phase III, if necessary, to expand the force to over 12,000. Stating that his best sense is to carry out Phase I perhaps in parallel to building up to Phase II, Feith said we should increase the AU's effectiveness from the current 25% up to 80% before going on to Phase II. 3. (SBU) Feith then began to catalogue the weakness and shortfalls of the current mission. Command and control at all levels down to El Fasher and further to the sub-regional headquarters is the main problem. In addition, intelligence information of any kind is lacking. Citing the need for all participants to "sing off the same song sheet" Feith noted the need to enhance reporting mechanisms. Summarizing his list of shortfalls, Feith again stressed his view that we, the international community, not jump to Phase II without increasing the AU's capacity. Here he emphasized his belief that if NATO is asked for lift, NATO should keep in mind the overall approach, which is the need to finish Phase I. 4. (SBU) On logistics support, Feith noted that all AU partners provided a wide range of assistance including communications and transportation, noting in particular the inclusion of PA&E, which he said was slow at the start resulting in a gap that was covered by some EU Member States. Feith stated that if NATO wants to contribute logistics support it would be most welcome by the AU cautioning that such support should remain in consonance with ongoing efforts in order to go in the same direction. 5. (SBU) Feith then turned to the African Peace Facility (APF) funding mechanism introducing the POC, Anders Hendrikson from the European Commission, and noting that such funding for the AU was characterized by conditionality. Here in noted matter-of-factly that no funding under the APF would be available for NATO actions. 6. (SBU) In closing his introductory remarks, Pieter Feith made the following points: a. NATO and the EU should coordinate their public diplomacy (to which he added that the two organizations could relax on competitiveness in this area) b. It is possible that an EU member state may propose an ESDP operation to formalize ongoing EU actions in an inclusive effort, which would include aerial surveillance and reconnaissance, but such a mission had not yet been proposed c. Solana will make the same points to Mbeki in South Africa during his visit (that day) d. The EU will undertake a mission to Addis from 1-4 May for further discussions with the African Union and its bilateral partners. 7. (SBU) Responding on behalf of the NATO side, ASG Kobieracki noted with humor Feith's comment about EU APF funding for NATO and then turning to the AU's Konar's letter to NATO, he said he wanted to be clear on where NATO is at the moment. Identifying this effort as the first round of discussions Kobieracki said he was authorized to coordinate, to conduct staff-staff discussions, first with the African Union, and that the NATO effort would be complementary to ongoing efforts and would not duplicate the work of others stressing "we should work with you." The first step is to understand what the EU has done, what the EU is doing, and what the EU will do in order to be complementary. Accepting the need to coordinate public diplomacy, Kobieracki said NATO was at the exploratory stage and there had been no advance thinking on what NATO is considering. He said his role is to clarify the situation so nations can decide in this context, he stressed, that NATO knows what it has and is aware of its limits. 8. (SBU) For the NATO IMS, Canadian General Fenton(?) asked the EU about AU command and control "at all levels" noting that harmony with the EU and support of the AU is the NATO goal. Saying that C2 is a red-line barrier in NATO, he asked the EU side to go into more detail about the operation's C2 problems and to evaluate quantifiably the quality of the present effort. Responding for the EUMS, Lt Gen Perruche said that although advisors and planners had been sent by all partners to build the chain-of-command, it hasn't been successful as the AU is very careful to keep the leadership positions at all levels. General Perruche added that even providing all the necessary assets at the strategic, operational and tactical levels didn't help as the African culture doesn't match the western system. In the African system, according to General Perruche, the credibility of the local leadership is the key. General Perruche clearly pointed out that fixing the C2 system first is the highest priority and that this priority was communicated clearly to the AU by its bilateral partners. 9. (SBU) On a positive note, Perruche said that where they are deployed, they are having a positive affect "globally we can say so - it works, but there is no collective impact, only local." Perruche continued saying "We have good ideas, but the AU must accept them first and even if the AU leaders agree there is no guarantee that others will implement the decisions." One UK member of the EUMS with experience on the ground specified the shortfalls saying that there are no terms of reference and no standard operating procedures in the command and control system, no delineation of tasks among the participants and no strategic and operational direction of the mission. While agreeing that there are some bright officers involved, he said that clearly there are also some incompetents. An additional frustration is that deputies do not give direction in the absence of their principals. 10. (SBU) Peter Stamps of the European Commission, who was formerly the EU Council Secretariat liaison in Addis while on active service with the British Army, added that the AU lacks the numbers of personnel needed to execute the mission. On top of that, there are those in the region who "count the number of white faces going in and out" as a negative metric. In defense of the AU, Stamps added that intense political pressure had forced the AU to execute the mission before it was properly planned. The EUMS J-3, Brigadier General Brauss concurred but noted that "the plan is a piece of paper, they have to want to implement it." 11. (SBU) Matthew Reece for the Council Secretariat agreed with all the EU speakers and added his view that it's about capacity and ownership, the latter requiring a lot of the AU's attention while there is a need to expand the mission with limited capacity. He added that his is why there is a push to move operational planning to Khartoum while leaving strategic direction in Addis while endeavoring to improve both simultaneously. Finally, he added that in the AU there is a reluctance to delegate, which creates bottlenecks within an already limited capacity for action. Here Pieter Feith interjected that NATO might be useful in supporting the split of strategic and operational planning between Addis and Khartoum because of the great distance involved. 12. (SBU) Turning to the civilian aspects, Pieter Feith called on Casper Klynge of the Directorate for Civilian Aspects of ESDP to comment on the police component. Klynge described an even greater shortfall in police than in military. Currently, the requirement is for 815 officers of which only 230 are in-country. The urgent police needs are force generation, communications equipment, vehicles and guidance. In Phase II, the police requirement goes up to 1560 as there will be a greater need post-stabilization for policing as IDPs return. He is doubtful they will ever do it as force generation, logistics and communications will still be lacking. 13. (SBU) Anders Hendrikson of the Commission spoke next. He stressed that the EU has two strategic objectives. First, the EU identified the AU as a strategic partner in Africa. Most of the work so far in this relationship has been in the field of defense and security (AMIS I and AMIS II). The second objective is reigning in the chaos of Darfur. There is tension between these two objectives, according to Hendrikson; between the need to build AU capacity over time and the need to do some urgently in Darfur. He noted that this tension almost split the AU as it was forced to take a big risk in launching AMIS. Because the AU will do other operations and Africa over the coming years, we need the AU there. Because of the importance of our common strategic interest in the success of the AU, his advice to NATO was, therefore, to focus on the March AU-led Joint Assessment Report, to be sensitive to the tension described above, and to keep the quality concerns in mind. Finally, Hendrikson pointed out a valid concern of the AU: lack of coordination in the international community. Here he expressed his appreciation for the NATO effort while asking everyone to be cognizant of the AU's concern. 14. (SBU) Next, the NATO side asked if the EU had been welcomed by the AU. Pieter Feith responded that the AU officially accepted the UN Security Council resolutions but that the reality may be different in the field where there are instances of non-cooperation. 15. (SBU) In responding to an IMS question on the EU's view about the short-term and long-term requirements for NATO assistance, Feith suggested reading the documents currently in use by the bilateral partners, copies of which the EU passed to NATO at the meeting. Feith followed-up saying that it is a fast-moving situation as this week the AU PSC approved expansion of the mission to Phase II. Here he noted that the EU expects a letter from the AU officially informing them of this decision. In this context, Feith again stressed the need to "follow the party line" meaning that both organizations should work to remedy the existing shortfalls, which are listed in the documents, as it makes no sense, said Feith, to pump more troops in (a effort he attributed to Pronk's staff at UN) while acknowledging that "media wise" more troops makes sense. Summarizing this point, Feith said that more troops "will not improve the overall effectiveness as troops without support adds to the negative image of the international community." 16. (SBU) Turning to the expansion of the mission, General Perruche said he still didn't know where the AU will get the troops as they need to both augment current levels and to rotate employed forces. Rhetorically he continued: Where will they come from? What will be the quality of the troops? What will they do? Where will they get logistics support? How long will it take? To this he added "The EU logistics plan was never followed." Supporting his boss, an officer of the EUMS added "They (the AU) provide a man, a uniform and boots only." Perruche then summarized the challenge "It's education and culture." 17. (SBU) The NATO side then asked, "Where would NATO fit in in a complementary way?" Responding for the EU side, BG Brauss the J-3 said "It's hard to say, but if two NATO participants join the mission next week (1-4 May) you'll get an idea. The answer will be subject to your assessment in coordination with the EU." 18. (SBU) Next, an officer of the IMS asked about expansion of the mission saying that if the AU PSC has already decided to expand the mission, isn't that a fait accompli? Christian Manahl of the Council Secretariat replied that in the AU "politics does not equal reality." He stressed that it will take much longer than the AU thinks giving all of us time to address the current shortfalls. His advice, consistent with all those present from the EU side, was "don't rush to Phase II." Feith added that this is high politics in the AU: "Konar should get the same message at the EU and NATO." Perhaps, Feith suggested, NATO could take a tougher approach by saying "we'll help with lift when we see improvement in Phase I." Supporting this view, the EUMS said that if we all stick to the same line on establishing the logistic support first then expansion, we can work with the AU together. 19. (SBU) For NATO, ASG Kobieracki said that NATO is looking for information on ongoing bilateral support to the AU as NATO will be considering all options. The EU side offered to provide their matrix on this point. Next, Kobieracki asked, in the spirit of complementarity and transparency if it would be possible for two NATO observers to join the UN, EU, US, CA trip to Addis 1-4 May? Pieter Feith responded that he was "authorized to say 'most welcome'." He did suggest, however, that NATO register directly with the AU and that the EU would provide the contact details for this. Feith then offered an admittedly more political message saying he assumed NATO would be broadly in line with the EU approach as this is a first opportunity to really work in harmony. He quickly added that he assumed the AU would naturally want to talk about expansion to Phase II with NATO. In closing this issue, Feith commented that "you'll get all the cooperation of friends." In response, Kobieracki reiterated that NATO has as of yet no common policy as it is still in the exploratory stage and that the NATO representatives in Addis will do nothing to undermine the specific EU line and will publicly support the EU general line. 20. (U) There being no other questions, the meeting adjourned after one hour and five minutes. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED McKinley .
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