US embassy cable - 05KUWAIT1834

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KUWAITI SHIITE POLITICAL BLOCS BUOYED BY WAVE OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Identifier: 05KUWAIT1834
Wikileaks: View 05KUWAIT1834 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kuwait
Created: 2005-05-03 12:33:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL PINR KISL KU SOLI
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001834 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PINR, KISL, KU, SOLI 
SUBJECT: KUWAITI SHIITE POLITICAL BLOCS BUOYED BY WAVE OF 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 1406 
     B. KUWAIT 0036 
     C. 04 KUWAIT 3546 
     D. 04 KUWAIT 1346 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  The often mistrusted Shi'a population has 
slowly increased the intensity of its calls for reform since 
the liberation of Iraq, winning some concessions from the 
GOK, but losing ground in the face of active Salafi 
opposition.  Although most Kuwaiti Shiites claim to identify 
themselves first and foremost as Kuwaitis, institutionalized 
discrimination and a rise in Sunni extremism have combined to 
ensure that sectarian interests are rarely absent in Shi'a 
political and economic calculations.  Despite holding just 
five of fifty seats in the National Assembly, Shiite 
political blocs have remained active in Kuwaiti political 
life, and have organized themselves into formidable forces 
for the advancement of Shia rights. End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Spurred largely by the liberation of Iraq and the 
resulting empowerment of Iraq's Shi'a majority, Kuwaiti Shi'a 
have been increasingly active in their calls for an expansion 
of Shiite rights, and their efforts have yielded significant 
successes.  Over the past two years, the GOK has approved a 
larger than usual number of Shiite mosque applications, 
allowed for a public reenactment of the battle of Karbala 
during Ashoura in 2004, established a Waqf based upon Shiite 
Maliki jurisprudence, (Note: Waqfs are religious endowments 
governed by Islamic rules.  End Note.) and allowed Shiite 
clerics more airtime on state television during Ramadan and 
other religious holidays. 
 
3. (S) The changes have been sought and won by an 
increasingly active and expanding Shi'a political community, 
which includes five members of Kuwait's 50 member National 
Assembly, two of whom replaced hardline Shiite predecessors 
during the 2003 election cycle.  Although formal parties are 
not provided for under Kuwait's 1962 constitution, there are 
at least four Shiite political groupings active in Kuwaiti 
political life: 
 
National Islamic Alliance (NIA):  Considered extremists 
within the broader Shi'a community, the members of the 
National Islamic Alliance are known to be supporters of the 
Iranian regime and believers in the principle of 'welayat e 
faqih.' (Note: Welayat e faqih, also sometimes spelled 
velayat e faquih, is rule by a religious leader known as the 
faqih.  The principle forms the basic underpinning of the 
system of government in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where 
the faqih -- currently Ayatollah Sayid Ali Khamenei -- is 
also known as the Supreme Leader.  End Note.)  According to a 
knowledgeable Shiite political analyst, NIA is made up of 
"hardliners" who "always express the Iranian point of view." 
Historically, NIA has been one of the most active of Kuwait's 
Shiite political blocs.  After Kuwait's liberation from Iraq, 
the NIA sought the role of mouthpiece of Kuwaiti Shi'a and 
was even successful in enlisting moderates such as current MP 
Yousef Al-Zalzalah, who does not share NIA's extreme views 
and left shortly thereafter in 1992.  Prominent members of 
NIA include ousted MPs Dr. Abdul Mohsen Jamal, Adnan 
Abdulsamid and Dr. Nasser Sarkoh, and former Municipal 
Council member Ahmed Lari.  Although still active, NIA's 
credibility was greatly damaged during the 2003 election 
cycle, when moderates Saleh Ashour and Dr. Yousef Zalzah, 
both Shi'a, swept their candidates out of office. 
 
Shiite Clerics Congregation: Founded by outspoken Shiite 
Cleric Sayed Mohammed Bakr Al-Mohri in 2000, this grouping 
has worked consistently and vocally for the expansion of 
Shi'a political rights, mostly through Al-Mohri's editorials 
and television appearances.  The bloc does not appear to have 
a clear platform other than the advancement of sectarian 
interests, and according to some Kuwaiti political observers 
may have links to Iran.  They have no representation in the 
National Assembly. 
 
Islamic National Consensus Movement (INCM): Founded in 2001 
and supported by a broad range of moderate Kuwaiti Shiites, 
INCM believes in pluralism and diversity.  Led by its U.S 
educated Secretary General, Dr. Nizar J. Mulla-Joma, the INCM 
held its annual conference on April 25, where speakers 
preached "the rejection of extremism" and called for 
sectarian unity.  Although one observer claims the group at 
one time "shyfully" adopted the principle of 'welayat e 
faqih,' post is unable to confirm this. 
 
Peace and Justice Grouping:  The Peace and Justice Grouping, 
founded in 2003, is based on the nonviolent teachings of Imam 
Shirazi, stressing pluralism, respect for democracy and 
consitutional government.  Led by Secretary General Abdul 
Hussein Al-Sultan, Peace and Justice claim to have no outside 
political links and throughly reject 'welayat e faqih.' 
 
4. (C) In addition to established political blocs, Kuwait's 
six living former Shiite Ministers have informally banded 
together to advise younger Shi'a on how to best engage in the 
political process.  Former Minister of Oil Abdulmuttaleb 
Al-Kazemi told Poloff April 19 that the time for his group's 
actions had come "because there is now light at the end of 
the tunnel" for Shi'a, region-wide.  Citing the liberation of 
Iraq as "90 percent" of the motivation for the timing of his 
re-engagement in the political process, and thanking the U.S. 
for its role in supporting political reform in the region, Al 
Kazemi said he became "fed up" with the lack of Shi'a 
political advances over the past two decades and decided to 
act.  Al Kazemi said the Shia population was still suffering 
under an unofficial but well-established policy of 
discrimination developed in the early eighties, when the 
loyalty of all Shi'a was questioned due to fears that Iran 
would export its Islamic Revolution. 
 
5. (C) Largely restricted from positions deemed critical to 
national security, such as in Kuwait State Security and the 
National Guard, and discriminated against religiously and 
politically, Kuwait's Shi'a have generally operated in the 
economic realm without restriction.  A number of large Shiite 
families -- Dashti, Behbehani, Marafie, Bhukamseen, Al-Wazzan 
and others -- have leveraged their positions as members of 
the Kuwaiti urban elite to amass huge fortunes.  (Note: Those 
families that lived inside the old city walls prior to the 
discovery of oil are considered to be of the urban elite by 
many Kuwaitis.  They often refer to themselves as 'real 
Kuwaitis,' in an effort to emphasize their distinction from 
the desert-dwelling bedouins, many of whose families arrived 
in Kuwait much later.  End Note.)  Although they have a heavy 
presence in some economic sectors (hotels being one of the 
most prominent examples), there is no prominent Shiite news 
daily.  However, post assesses that local dailies do cover 
Shiite issues fairly and acurately. 
 
6. (C) Although Shiite groups have made great strides in 
recent years and in the long term will probably continue to 
do so, the GOK's struggle against extremist elements has 
pitted the rights of Shi'a against vocal opposition from 
conservative Sunni elements, the most extreme of which 
consider the entire Shi'a sect infidels.  In its effort to 
appease Salafi elements, the GOK allowed the January 2005 
grilling by Islamist MPs and subsequent resignation of Shiite 
Information Minister Mohammed Abulhassan (ref. b), leaving 
Shiites without representation in the cabinet for the first 
time since 1975.  In addition, the GOK curbed some of the 
freedoms it had granted in 2004, denying the Shiite Clerics 
Congregation's request to again stage a public reenactment of 
the Battle of Karbala in 2005. 
 
7. (C) The April, 2005 call for the resignation of Health 
Minister Dr. Mohammed Ahmed Jarallah, spearheaded by Shiite 
MPs and an Awazim tribal MP -- both groups which currently 
lack representation in the cabinet -- was seen by some as an 
attempt by the Shia to force open a vacancy which could then 
be filled by one of their members (ref. b).  The GOK has not 
yet named a new Minister, although Shiite MP Dr. Yousef 
Al-Zalzalah, who is known to have refused two cabinet 
positions previously offered him, is widely spoken of as a 
possible candidate. 
 
8. (C) Comment:  Despite the current standoff between the GOK 
and Islamist elements, and infrequent attempts by PM Shaykh 
Sabah to curry favor with Sunni conservatives by dragging his 
feet on Shiite requests, Kuwait's Shi'a are likely to make 
significant gains, as long as there is cause for optimism in 
Iraq and a continued focus on regional reform.  At a recent 
Shiite political gathering, Poloff was approached by a former 
minister, who thanked the U.S. for the withdrawal of Syrian 
forces from Lebanon.  "None of this would have happened 
without the United States," he said. 
 
8. (U) Baghdad Minimize Considered. 
 
********************************************* 
Visit Embassy Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website 
********************************************* 
LEBARON 

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