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| Identifier: | 05TAIPEI2004 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05TAIPEI2004 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | American Institute Taiwan, Taipei |
| Created: | 2005-05-03 08:03:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PREL TW Cross Strait Politics |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002004 SIPDIS STATE PASS AIT/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2015 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TW, Cross Strait Politics SUBJECT: SOONG CONFIDANTE ON UPCOMING PRC VISIT REF: TAIPEI 01977 Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D) 1. (C) Summary: PFP Chairman James Soong is reportedly under pressure from Chen Shui-bian's recent "revelations" of their private conversations and from KMT efforts to portray KMT Chairman Lien Chan's visit to the PRC as enjoying the backing of the United States. While Soong is personally comfortable with the often unpredictable Chen, other Soong confidantes fear their Chairman is being "duped." One of them requested the U.S. to temper its public support of Lien and offer similar gestures of support for Soong before he departs May 5 for the PRC. The PFP reportedly intends to plant a question with a sympathetic Taiwan reporter at the May 3 State Department press briefing and hopes the Department Spokesman will respond positively. End Summary. PFP Panics, Soong Relaxed ------------------------- 2. (C) People First Party (PFP) Legislator Daniel Hwang (Yih-jiau) told AIT that President Chen Shui-bian's May 1 revelation of his recent contacts with PFP Chairman James Soong has complicated and even marred Soong's impending PRC visit. Hwang surmised that Chen's unilateral revelation was probably motivated by fear of being sidelined by the international and domestic attention on Lien's PRC visit, as well as a product of Chen's efforts to drive a wedge between the KMT and PFP and to siphon off Pan-Blue voters from the PFP in the May 14 National Assembly election. Hwang noted that Soong had told him of his private telephone conversation with Chen but did not reveal the substance of that conversation. Describing the setting of their conversation, Hwang told AIT that when he accompanied Soong on a trip to Yunlin County to visit the incarcerated former magistrate Chang Jung-wei, Soong took a small wooden box out of his pocket and told Hwang that it contained a tiny note with a direct hotline phone number to President Chen. Hwang said he was bemused by Soong's "cuteness." 3. (C) Hwang told AIT that Chen had advised Soong that he intended to make public their recent conversations, and that Soong opposed this but did not think he could stop Chen. Despite Chen's forewarning, Soong was still caught off guard when the news broke on May 2 and gave instructions for the PFP to downplay the contacts. Accordingly, PFP Secretary General Chin Ching-sheng stressed to AIT that the reported April 20 Chen-Soong meeting was totally unplanned. Chin explained that he had been in a meeting in the home of Presidential Office Secretary General Yu Shyi-kun discussing details of Soong's PRC trip when they came to a question requiring Chen's decision. Yu telephoned Chen for an answer, but Chen responded that the issue could best be resolved if he and Soong met personally at Yu's home. 4. (C) Hwang told AIT that while Soong personally feels comfortable working with Chen, Hwang and many other PFP leaders find it nerve wracking, fearing that Soong might be "duped" by Chen. Given both Chen and Soong's volatile personalities, Hwang said he feels he is dealing with an unpredictable situation, like crossing a river blindly without knowing the depth. For this reason, Hwang is trying to control media coverage of Soong's PRC trip in order to avoid having the trip backfire on the PFP. 5. (C) Hwang noted that to the layman Lien Chan's trip to Mainland China might appear successful, but most professional observers do not see that Lien achieved anything concrete. Hwang noted that both he and James Soong assessed Lien's performance in his Beijing University speech, meeting with Hu Jintao, and public remarks in Xian as 60 out of 100. Plea for U.S. Support --------------------- 6. (C) On April 25, Hwang requested an urgent meeting with AIT to protest the KMT leak of the AIT Director's April 21 meeting with Lien Chan, to the KMT's advantage. Hwang pointed out that the KMT had "spun" a United Daily News story that intimated the U.S. might publicly criticize Chen Shui-bian if Chen did not sanction Lien's PRC trip. On the other hand, Hwang complained, despite enormous media pressure on Soong and himself to confirm the Director's meeting with Soong, the PFP had refused comment. Hwang said that the April 22 China Times story that reported the Director-Soong meeting ran without PFP's consent, as evidenced by the fact that the newspaper reported the wrong date for the meeting. 7. (C) Hwang further characterized the State Department Spokesman's April 18 response to a press question on Lien's PRC visit as tantamount to U.S support and blessing for Lien. It is in the USG interest to be more "even-handed" in its support for Lien and Soong, Hwang argued, asking whether the USG could gave "similar" support for Soong's May 5-12 PRC visit. 8. (C) Hwang was truly surprised when AIT pointed out that the exchange between the journalist and Spokesman was spontaneous, not orchestrated as he had intimated. He responded that he had assumed the Department planted the question in order to raise Lien's profile. Thus, the intent of his requested meeting with AIT was to ask if the Department could provide Soong with the same support. "The question really was spontaneous and coincidental?" he asked once again. When AIT replied affirmatively, he promised to relay that to Soong. After a moment of thought, he asked AIT whether the Spokesman would voice similar support for Soong if the PFP were to ask a sympathetic journalist to raise a question about Soong's PRC trip. Without waiting for a reply, Hwang said that this is just what PFP intended to do and to please inform the Department to expect such a question on May 3. Comment: Pre-Travel Jitters --------------------------- 9. (C) Despite PFP discomfort over Chen's May 1 claim that he had entrusted Soong to deliver a "special message" to Hu Jintao, Soong is unlikely to disclaim any role as quasi-Chen messenger, particularly given media reports from Beijing reporting that Hu Jintao would welcome Soong's explanation of the Chen administration's cross-Strait policy direction. Regarding a possible PFP media plant at Department press briefings, AIT recommends the Department maintain its balanced public formulations in support of dialogue that facilitates resolution of cross-Strait differences and that leads to dialogue with representative of the duly elected leadership in Taiwan. PAAL
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