US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA4167

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 004167 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PHUM, SNAR, KJUS, CO, AUC 
SUBJECT: MEDELLIN'S REINSERTION PROGRAM 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) In December 2003, 874 members of the Cacique Nutibara 
Bloc (BCN) demobilized in Medellin.  Since that time, the 
Mayor of Medellin's office has been implementing a 
reinsertion program that has provided education and unpaid 
employment for almost the entire bloc.  Community outreach 
and psychological counseling are integral parts of the 
program.  Murder in Medellin has dropped by about two thirds 
since 2002.  Although concerns about behind-the-scenes 
paramilitary influence over the city and slow judicial 
processing remain, Medellin's program is tracking and 
re-socializing the participants.  With significant 
adjustments, the basic structure could be applied to the 
national government's reinsertion program, which is 
responsible for 4,000 ex-paramilitaries and should receive 
several thousand more.  End Summary. 
 
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Medellin's Program 
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2. (C) In December 2003, 874 members of BCN demobilized in 
Medellin.  Mayor Sergio Fajardo's office designed and funded 
its own reinsertion program rather than rely on the national 
government's program.  Unpaid public works projects and 
education courses are required to receive a monthly stipend 
of approximately USD 260.  An additional USD 80 per 
participant each month is used for social services and 
education.  In contrast, the GOC's program provides a stipend 
of USD 150 per month and is trying to budget an additional 
USD 160 per participant each month for reinsertion services. 
 
 
3. (C) The Medellin program focuses on work, education, and 
psychological assistance to re-socialize the former 
paramilitaries to civilian life. 
 
-- Employment: As of April 2005, 807 were involved in unpaid 
public works projects.  Twenty are exempt from the work 
requirement because they are disabled or deemed to be too 
high a security risk.  Of the 807, 32 of the highest 
performers were hired as paid employees.  The reinsertion 
program tries to expose participants to a wide array of 
employment opportunities and the importance of education.  To 
track this, reinsertion officers ask the beneficiaries on a 
monthly basis what careers interest them.  In December 2003, 
655 did not answer the survey, none were interested in higher 
education, and only 94 wanted to finish high school.  By 
February 2005, 350 were interested in the arts, 78 in social 
work, 127 in higher education, and 382 in finishing high 
school. 
 
-- Education: 488 are in primary or secondary school classes 
and 106 are in post-high school vocational training (sales, 
cooking, woodworking, construction, and auto mechanics) or 
college preparation with the National Apprenticeship Agency. 
Twenty-nine are studying at a university. 
 
-- Psychological Assistance: The Mayor's office contracted 
ten psychologists, who have conducted one-on-one interviews 
with 811 former BCN members.  For more serious problems, 
psychological attention is available in local clinics to 
former BCN members, their families, and community members. 
At least 311 have used these services. 
 
-- Tracking: 855 BCN members are being closely tracked by the 
electronic tracking and monitoring system (designed by IOM, 
the International Organization for Migration, a USAID 
grantee).  There are 10 tracking officers, each with a case 
load of about 85 members.  They conduct periodic personal 
interviews, home visits, and serve as the main point of 
contact with the local government. 
 
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Community Outreach 
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4. (C) The program is also designed to help local communities 
adjust.  Many neighborhoods had been under de-facto 
paramilitary control before the demobilization.  In areas 
where the ex-BCN members live, over 9,000 residents have 
participated in "human development" workshops, over 4,600 in 
community integration activities, and 2,400 in forums on 
preventing domestic violence. On behalf of the Mayor's 
office, IOM conducted a poll among residents living in 
neighborhoods with the demobilized.  According to the 
results, 76 percent think the presence of ex-BCN members is 
beneficial to their neighborhood and 84 percent think the 
Mayor's office is effectively facilitating reinsertion. 
However, 46 percent believe some demobilized will, or already 
have, returned to illicit activity. 
 
5. (U) Violence and crime are at all time lows in Medellin, a 
city of about 3.5 million people.  In 2001, there were 3,479 
murders compared to 3,721 in 2002, 2,013 in 2003, and 1,177 
in 2004.  Murder rates for the first three months of 2005 are 
about half of what they were the year before.  These murder 
rates would leave Medellin on par with U.S. cities such as 
Baltimore or Memphis. 
 
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Those Not Participating 
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6. (U) Of the original 874, 58 are not receiving benefits: 30 
are in jail for crimes committed before or after they 
demobilized, 20 have died violently or accidentally, one was 
ineligible because he had demobilized and received 
reinsertion benefits prior to 2003, and the bloc's seven 
commanders are ineligible on the grounds of being BCN 
"representative leaders." 
 
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The Challenges 
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7. (C) Some problems remain: 
 
-- Insufficient Time: Fajardo decided the original 18-month 
program was too short and extended it until the end of his 
term in 2007.  He told poloffs that many former 
paramilitaries need intensive re-socialization to teach them 
to live under state control and not take the law into their 
own hands.  Until this re-socialization is complete, placing 
them in private sector jobs would be a liability.  The 
extension will help ensure that the demobilized are trained 
and monitored for an additional two years, but will be a 
large expense. 
 
-- Slow Judicial Processing:  At least 630 members have been 
issued clearance from the Department of Administrative 
Security (DAS) certifying there are no warrants for their 
arrest.  Upon demobilizing, 388 had open cases against them. 
Of these, 205 still have pending charges.  None of the BCN 
members have been officially pardoned under Law 782.  Local 
officials from the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia) and 
judges have complained about a lack of guidance in 
determining which crimes are pardonable.  According to Law 
782, demobilized members of an illegal armed group can be 
pardoned for the political crimes of rebellion, sedition, 
conspiracy to commit a crime, and other connected, minor 
crimes.  The local prosecutor is responsible for determining 
which crimes are connected based on general guidance from the 
criminal code.  Another point of confusion is that, according 
to the criminal code, paramilitarism is a common, rather than 
political, crime, and cannot be pardoned. 
 
-- AUC Presence:  AUC commander Diego Murrillo continues to 
dominate parts of the city despite being in the concentration 
zone in Santa Fe de Ralito.  Fajardo told poloffs that he is 
aware that drug traffickers, especially Murrillo, have 
maintained a presence, but that the security forces are 
committed to driving them out of the region. 
 
-- Other Demobilized: There are several hundred 
paramilitaries, who demobilized from other blocs, living in 
Medellin and participating in the GOC's reinsertion program. 
The national program is less organized and does not offer as 
many services as the Mayor's program.  Fajardo said the 
inconsistency has not caused problems thus far, but that he 
was watching it carefully. 
 
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Lessons Learned 
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8. (C) The Medellin reinsertion program is well-structured 
and facilitates close monitoring of participants by requiring 
work and study in exchange for the stipend.  The model would 
need to be adjusted to function in other areas with large 
concentrations of former paramilitaries.  Medellin is a 
cosmopolitan metropolitan area with a relatively high per 
capita income (almost 20 percent higher than the national 
average) and a vigorous local economy.  Medellin also has a 
localized group of demobilized, a relatively wealthy 
municipal government, and extensive institutional 
infrastructure.  Most of the other areas in which the 
demobilized would be rehabilitated are in relatively poor 
rural areas producing bananas or traditional crops for local 
production.  They do not have sufficient local funds or 
infrastructure to provide the same reinsertion services. 
Finding qualified professionals to help integrate the 
demobilized or deserters will be a challenge.  Resources and 
personnel would have to be brought in from national 
government agencies or other sources.  Given the national 
priority placed on this effort, the human resources could be 
found, but the financial drain on the federal budget will be 
enormous and the Medellin experience implies that it will be 
a multi-year effort. 
 
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Comment 
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9. (C) Medellin's program has advantages the national program 
does not, especially a higher level of literacy and a more 
homogenous sample.  Even so, it took more than a year for the 
program to really take hold. 
WOOD