US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI1977

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001977 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CH, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MOVES TO REGAIN CONTROL OVER 
CROSS-STRAIT AGENDA 
 
REF: TAIPEI 1968 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: President Chen Shui-bian moved on May 1 to 
regain control over the cross-Strait agenda in the wake of 
the Lien Chan visit to Beijing.  Chen announced that he will 
use the upcoming visit of People First Party (PFP) Chairman 
James Soong to convey a message to PRC President Hu Jintao, 
although the specific contents of the message remain a 
mystery even to close confidantes of the two leaders.  Senior 
officials in both camps have confirmed that Soong has agreed 
to press Beijing to reopen dialogue with the Chen government 
and will ask the PRC to consider a new formulation to 
supplant Beijing's "1992 consensus."  Chen has also invoked 
USG backing for his cross-Strait initiative, telling 
reporters that the USG pressured the KMT to coordinate with 
the government ahead of Lien's visit to Beijing. 
Presidential advisors say Chen is citing USG and PFP support 
to reassure the public of his authority and to quiet 
criticism from his pro-independence fundamentalist base over 
his "soft" stance towards the Lien trip.  While downplaying 
the significance of Lien's meetings in Beijing, Chen refuted 
comments over the weekend by officials in his government 
suggesting that the "five point" consensus achieved on April 
29 violated the law.  Chen publicly thanked Lien for sticking 
to his promise not to sign any formal documents with his PRC 
counterparts.  End Summary. 
 
Chen Goes on the Offensive with "Special Message" 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
2. (C) President Chen offered a series of media interviews 
before and during his May 1 flight to the Marshall Islands to 
discuss recent cross-Strait developments.  Chen reiterated 
his call for Beijing to engage in dialogue with his 
government and revealed that he has asked PFP Chairman James 
Soong to deliver a message to Hu Jintao during his upcoming 
trip to Beijing.  Presidential Office contacts confirmed that 
Chen met Soong on April 20 at the official residence of 
Presidential Office Secretary General Yu Shyi-kun.  PFP 
Secretary General Chin Ching-sheng told AIT that Soong was 
 
SIPDIS 
asked to pass a message, but said he did not know the 
contents.  Lin You-chang, a member of the Presidential 
Office's working group on contacts with the PFP, told AIT 
that during the April 20 meeting, Chen and Soong broke off 
from the main discussion, which focused on the special 
defense procurement budget, and held a one-on-one pull aside 
on Soong's upcoming visit. 
 
3. (C) NSC Senior Advisor for cross-Strait affairs Chen 
Chung-hsin told AIT that the contents of the Soong message 
have been kept extraordinarily close hold.  However, Chen 
dismissed some of the wilder media speculation over the 
contents of the talks.  Chen said that the President is aware 
that he can not use Soong's visit to achieve a major 
cross-Strait breakthrough.  Instead, the government hopes 
that Soong will convey to Beijing that the President is 
serious in his desire to ease tensions and establish 
dialogue.  PFP Policy Chief Vincent Chang (Hsien-yao), the 
party's lead negotiator with Beijing, told AIT on April 29 
that he has been instructed by Soong to press Beijing on the 
importance of engaging the Taipei government.  Chang said 
that the PFP is walking a fine line between using its 
relationship with the President to enhance its cache in 
Beijing and avoiding the appearance of serving as a special 
envoy.  Soong confidante and PFP Legislator Daniel Hwang 
(Yi-jiau) told AIT on May 2 that Chen's public revelations 
over recent Chen-Soong contacts caught the PFP off guard, and 
may put the party in a difficult position with Beijing. 
 
4. (C) Nevertheless, the PFP's Chang, who departed for 
Beijing on May 1, told AIT that he would continue to press 
his PRC interlocutors to find a more flexible formula to 
break the "1992 consensus" logjam.  Chang said that the PFP 
formally endorses the "1992 consensus," but is sympathetic to 
the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) stance on the issue. 
 "Technically speaking, we know that the '1992 consensus' was 
invented by the KMT in 2000 and so does Beijing," Chang 
continued, "so we are pressing our PRC counterparts to find 
some formulation that will allow the two sides to finesse the 
issue and resume a formal dialogue."  Chang bemoaned, 
however, that the PRC has thus far rejected any attempts at 
facilitating contacts with the Chen administration.  "They 
keep insisting that Chen cannot be trusted and that they just 
want to wait his term of office out," Chang asserted, "but we 
will continue to tell them that there will be no cross-Strait 
stability until they engage the Taiwan government." 
 
Influencing the Hearts and Minds 
-------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) In addition to playing up the Soong visit, Chen also 
used his May 1 press remarks to claim USG support for his 
government's position on cross-Strait contacts.  Chen told 
reporters that the U.S. passed two messages to Lien Chen 
before his departure for the Mainland: the need for support 
over the special defense procurement budget and caution in 
dealing with Beijing.  Chen added that the U.S. urged Lien to 
coordinate with the government before hand in order to avoid 
falling into the PRC's "united front" traps.  NSC and 
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) officials told AIT that Chen's 
references to Washington's views were aimed at refuting KMT 
public claims that the USG had pressured Chen to endorse 
Lien's mission.  MAC Chief Secretary Jan Jyh-horng said that 
the KMT and Taiwan media's portrayal of the USG position 
threatened to leave the government appearing weak and 
isolated.  NSC officials noted that by citing USG and PFP 
backing, Chen could also resist criticism from Chen's dark 
Green supporters angered over his soft line on Lien Chan's 
visit. 
 
6. (C) Revelations over alleged USG support notwithstanding, 
deep Green critics responded negatively to Chen's May 1 
statement that Lien Chan's meeting with Hu Jintao did not 
violate any Taiwan law.  While stating that his government 
may not be able to accept the conclusions reached between the 
KMT and PRC, Chen publicly thanked Lien for keeping his 
promise not to sign any formal documents in Beijing.  Chen's 
comments directly contradicted statements by other officials, 
especially MAC Chairman Joseph Wu, in the immediate aftermath 
of the Lien-Hu meeting.  MAC's Jan acknowledged that Wu went 
beyond his instructions when he publicly asserted on April 29 
that Lien's "five point" agreement may have violated Taiwan 
law (Reftel).  The KMT's Spokesman Chang Jung-kung welcomed 
Chen's clarification, but accused the President of using MAC 
and the DPP party headquarters as part of a "good cop/bad cop 
routine."  Chang also disputed Chen's characterization of the 
USG view on Lien's visit, reiterating the KMT's position that 
the U.S. endorsed the KMT for "doing what the DPP has failed 
to do." 
 
Strategy: Boost Soong, Humor Lien 
--------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) NSC officials say the President will continue to 
maintain a moderate tone towards Lien in order to keep the 
door open to a Chen-Lien meeting soon after the May 14 
National Assembly election.  NSC Deputy SecGen Henry Ko told 
AIT that the strategy is to accept Lien's trip as a purely 
"personal visit" while focusing on the government's efforts 
to pursue a "substantive" dialogue with Beijing, starting 
with conveying goodwill through Soong.  Ko said that the 
government is considering convening a major conference on 
cross-Strait relations on May 7-8.  The proposed meeting 
would provide a forum for the President to clearly articulate 
his cross-Strait agenda.  Ko said that there is considerable 
confusion within the DPP over what the President is trying to 
achieve and whether he is in control of the agenda in the 
wake of the PRC's latest outreach to the opposition.  Ko 
stated that Chen needed a venue to outline clearly that his 
second term administration would stay the centrist course he 
set out on earlier in the year. 
 
Comment: Taking the Initiative, but Can He Keep It? 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
8. (C) With Lien's historic summit meeting coming to a close, 
Chen is moving quickly to reassert control over the 
cross-Strait political agenda.  Thus far, officials remain 
cautiously optimistic that Beijing is willing to offer Soong 
more in substantive terms than Lien, since Soong has at least 
tacit support from the President.  If this is the case, and 
Beijing's reaction to the PFP feelers does not suggest room 
for optimism, Chen may yet succeed in turning the Soong trip 
into a major victory.  However, Chen will also need to manage 
his own and Soong's expectations for a short-term 
breakthrough.  Beijing may yet intentionally downgrade 
Soong's treatment in order to send a negative message to the 
President and help the KMT maintain momentum.  If this 
happens, Chen will have a harder time explaining to his own 
supporters how he let Beijing and the KMT deprive the DPP of 
the cross-Strait agenda. 
PAAL