US embassy cable - 05VIENNA1425

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AUSTRIAN WEAPONS DELIVERY TO IRAN - MFA RESPONSE

Identifier: 05VIENNA1425
Wikileaks: View 05VIENNA1425 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Vienna
Created: 2005-05-02 07:27:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tags: PGOV PINR AU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENNA 001425 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, PM, EUR/RPM, EUR/AGS AND INR/EU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, AU 
SUBJECT: AUSTRIAN WEAPONS DELIVERY TO IRAN - MFA RESPONSE 
 
REFS:  A) 04 VIENNA 4354  B) 04 VIENNA 4393  C) VIENNA 37 
D) VIENNA 165  E) VIENNA 331  F) VIENNA 406 
 
This message is sensitive but unclassified. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Green Party foreign policy spokeswoman 
Ulrike Lunacek submitted a parliamentary inquiry to 
Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik on February 24, 2005 
asking for an explanation of the GOA's approval of the 
shipment of 800 Steyr 50 caliber high-powered rifles to 
Iran.  Lunacek quotes Article 3 of the Austrian War 
Materiel Act (Kriegsmaterialgesetz) regulating weapons 
exports, according to which the Interior Ministry has the 
authority to issue export permits "in agreement with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs" and "after consulting the 
Ministry of Defense" provided that such issuance is 
consistent with other obligations under international 
law. 
Lunacek's inquiry quotes the Austrian business weekly 
"Wirtschaftsblatt" to the effect that the 12.4 kilogram 
sniper rifle could be used against vehicles and, given 
its ability to penetrate "thumb-thick steel," also 
against tanks.  The Green motion then reiterates the 
other stipulations of the War Materiel Act: 
 
-- The export, import or transit of war material does not 
run counter to obligations under international law or to 
Austrian foreign policy interests; 
 
-- Export or transit does not take place to a region in 
which there is armed conflict, where such a conflict 
threatens to break out, or where other dangerous tensions 
exist; 
 
-- Export or transit must not take place to a destination 
country where, based on serious and repeated human rights 
violations, the danger exists that the supplied war 
materiel will be used for the suppression of human 
rights; 
 
-- Proper consideration is given to embargo resolutions 
by the Security Council of the United Nations; 
 
-- Import, export and transit do not conflict with 
concerns for public or military security; 
 
-- There are no other comparable, serious concerns. 
 
2. (SBU) Below is a working translation of the questions 
submitted by the Green MPs with the corresponding answers 
provided by minister Plassnik April 26: 
 
Question 1: Prior to issuance of the export license, was 
your concurrence obtained?  If so, on what grounds did 
you agree to this license? 
Answer: My ministry was in agreement, because the export 
request did not run counter to the conditions to be 
assessed by the foreign ministry for issuance according 
to Article 3 of the War Materiel Act. 
 
Question 2: Who on the part of the Iranian government 
signed the end-user certificate? 
Question 3: What end use has been stated on this end-user 
certificate? 
Answer to questions 2 and 3: Providing answers to 
questions on concrete business transactions in connection 
with the Federal Law on the Import, Export and Transit of 
War Materiel does not fall within the purview of the 
Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
 
Question 4: Do you consider Iran a country where an armed 
conflict exists, where such a conflict threatens to break 
out, or where other dangerous tensions exist? 
Answer: No. 
 
Question 5: Do you consider Iran a country where serious 
and repeated human rights violations have occurred and 
are occurring? 
Question 6: If yes: do you think there is a danger that 
the supplied war materiel may be used against the Iranian 
population? 
Answer to questions 5 and 6: The human rights situation 
in Iran has been and remains problematic.  It is being 
actively addressed by Austria and the EU both in 
bilateral and in international fora.  There are no 
indications that the war materiel concerned could be used 
to suppress human rights along the lines of Article 3, 
Paragraph 1 Numeral 3 of the War Materiel Act. 
 
Question 7: Since when has the Austrian government again 
been giving positive assessments to export license 
applications for Iran under the War Materiel Act? 
Answer: Export requests are not evaluated on the basis of 
countries, but always case-by-case, on the basis of both 
domestic and international legal obligations. 
 
Question 8: How do other countries treat such requests by 
Iran? 
Answer: The annual EU report compiled on the basis of the 
EU Code of Conduct for weapons exports is published on 
the homepage of the EU Council and contains in its annex 
export statistics collected from the reports of EU member 
states.  The 5th annual report (2002) shows that 99 
export requests to Iran were granted EU-wide for goods 
included in the Joint List of Military Equipment. 
According to the 6th annual report (2003), 14 such 
requests from EU partners were approved. 
 
Question 9: Is there a link between current diplomatic 
efforts by some EU countries to achieve compliance by the 
Iranian government in the area of nuclear weapons 
technology, and new weapons deliveries to Iran? 
Answer: No. 
 
Question 10: In the event that the complete shipment of 
800 rifles has not yet taken place, are you prepared to 
change your evaluation of this export, and urge the 
Interior Ministry also to change its position so that it 
rescinds the license? 
Answer: Issuance, denial or subsequent amendment of 
export licenses in connection with the Federal Law on 
Import, Export and Transit of War Materiel does not fall 
within the purview of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
3. (SBU) COMMENT:  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs has provided a minimal response to the 
inquiry.  We consider it unlikely that there will be 
significant further repercussions of the sniper rifle 
transaction in Parliament. 
 
BROWN 

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