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| Identifier: | 05QUITO978 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05QUITO978 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Quito |
| Created: | 2005-04-29 19:50:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV EC OAS |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000978 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USOAS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2015 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EC, OAS SUBJECT: WELCOMING FM PARRA TO WASHINGTON REF: QUITO 932 Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reason 1.4 (b) 1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Ecuador's new foreign minister, Antonio Parra, will travel to Washington to participate in the election of the next OAS Secretary General (slated for May 2). Parra, currently in Santiago for the Community of Democracies gathering, arrives in Washington May 1, accompanied by acting MFA Multilateral Affairs chief Julio Prado. The FM seeks a call on the Deputy Secretary, whom we understand will be unavailable, and will visit AID Assistant Administrator Adolfo Franco. Ecuador's Washington embassy likely will request further bilats, perhaps with the Undersecretary for Political Affairs or additional non-State principals. Since Parra seems the most approachable, U.S.-friendly figure in the Alfredo Palacio administration, we recommend granting reasonable meeting requests. Parra has spent little time in office and is unlikely to be fully schooled on key bilateral issues. END SUMMARY. 2. (C) Parra, a Guayaquil native, assumed command of the Foreign Ministry April 21. He, Administration Secretary General Luis Herreria, and Government Minister Mauricio Gandara composed the first tranche of ministers Palacio named. In an April 26 courtesy call with the Ambassador (Reftel), Parra emphasized his personal affinity for the U.S. and Ecuador's desires for close bilateral relations. As the United States was Ecuador's largest foreign investor, donor, and export market, there was no alternative to engagement, he reasoned. Unlike fellow Cabinet member Rafael Correa, the left-leaning economy minister, Parra believed Ecuador should continue with free trade talks. He also voiced support for a money laundering crackdown and assistance for northern border residents to wean them from narco-economy dependency. 3. (C) "Open-minded, easy-going and approachable" describes our first impressions of Parra, an opinion shared by Embassy contacts. Unfortunately, "uninformed, untested, and poorly staffed" fit as well. Nonetheless, we rate him the likely voice of reason in the Cabinet. As such, a Washington "charm offensive" seems in order, a lesser version of that extended in February 2003 to a visiting Gutierrez (which helped turn the then-populist U.S.-friendly). While we don't necessarily want to embrace a government whose manner of arrival was dubious, we do want to help move its few U.S.-friendly members in the correct direction. Points to cover in high-level meetings with FM Parra might include: -- The United State remains a steadfast ally of Ecuador, our nations bound by social, economic, and people-to-people ties; -- We never broke relations with Ecuador, despite the unexpected change in administrations; don't get caught up in "recognition" nonsense; -- Requesting and welcoming OAS assistance was the right move; the Mission's agenda was top-notch, its interlocutors spanned the spectrum, and the meetings were productive. We look forward to seeing the analysis and after-action report; -- A positive development from the recent crisis is the increased attention from your neighbors and friends; suggest you re-inforce ties with responsible governments in Colombia, Chile, Brazil, and Spain; -- You have the USG's support for measures designed to strengthen Ecuadorian democracy, shore up stability, and secure Ecuador from harmful spillover from the Colombian conflict. 5. (C) As the "adult" in the Palacio Administration, Parra has a special responsibility to ensure that meeting the Ecuadorian public's short-term demands leaves intact heretofore good relations with the United States. We might make the following points: -- We understand Palacio must distance himself from Gutierrez if he is to survive politically; be careful with populist turns, however; -- A couple of Cabinet choices concern us, although we're determined to work with, not against them; -- Government Minister Gandara is free to voice his anti-U.S. opinions, but we worry his attitude might threaten excellent bilateral law enforcement cooperation; -- Similarly, Finance Minister Correa's anti-free trade, anti-IMF stance has left investors, IFIs skittish; -- As Ecuador's pre-eminent foreign relations expert, you are well-placed to rein both in. 6. (C) Correa's comments have spiked fears that Ecuador will pull out of the Andean Free Trade Agreement negotiations or, by demanding the accord be approved in a referendum, will strangle it slowly. Signing the FTA remains a USG regional priority, and we would rather Ecuador stay engaged. -- We are hearing mixed signals on the FTA's future in Ecuador; -- Our ambassador in Quito reports that you see "no other choice" but to sign; how are you pushing to save the agreement? -- Resolving commercial disputes (Oxy, primarily) and reforming labor code necessary before any accord gets inked; 7. (C) And why not push our pol-mil and law enforcement agenda? Gutierrez deserved credit for okaying deployment of Ecuadorian engineers to Haiti and for buttressing the Colombian border, but failed us on Article 98. -- Kudos to Ecuador for contributing engineers to the UN-led Haiti peacekeeping mission; hope to see further Ecuadorian engagement in the hemisphere; -- Your troops there need protection from politically motivated persecution, as do ours; our Article 98 efforts don't seek immunity or impunity, but only protections from a faulty International Criminal Court; -- Colombian narcoterrorism poses great threats to Ecuador, a point shared by your armed forces and police. There is no "neutrality" between an elected government (Uribe's) and armed gangs; -- Inflammatory media play to the contrary, Ecuador and the United States have done great work together from your base in Manta to prevent further Colombian narcotrafficking inroads in Ecuador; -- Money laundering can undermine an economy as surely as drug trafficking itself. We commend draft legislation pending in Congress that gives Ecuador the tools to combat it. KENNEY
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