US embassy cable - 05PARIS2946

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002946 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL, SY, LE, PTER, FR 
SUBJECT: GOF AGREES ON NEED SUSTAIN PRESSURE ON SYRIA, WITH 
CAVEATS ON HIZBALLAH 
 
REF: STATE 78006 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Charles Neary, reasons 1.4 (b 
) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Senior MFA and Elysee officials described the 
GoF as fully agreeing with our message on sustaining pressure 
on Syria (reftel), except for two points: the timing of 
Hizballah disarmament, with France favoring a gradual 
approach, and EU designation of Hizballah, which France 
continues to oppose.  Elysee officials asserted that 
Hizballah's disarmament should not be a precondition of 
Hizballah's entry into politics, but instead would be the 
eventual result of such politicization.  Elysee officials 
also stressed the need to keep the U.S.-French demarche on 
Lebanon "prudent" and focused on Lebanon's independence and 
sovereignty vice hostility to Syria, which had allowed us to 
maximize support in Lebanon and among Arab moderates.  Elysee 
officials also counseled against raising issues such as a 
separate Lebanese peace with Israel, which would make life 
difficult for the Lebanese opposition.  MFA officials 
confirmed French intent to participate in the EU election 
observer mission and French support for keeping the EU 
association agreement with Syria on long-term hold.  End 
summary. 
 
ELYSEE VIEW: WHY WE CAN'T ALIENATE HIZBALLAH 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Visiting NEA DAS Elizabeth Dibble discussed reftel 
points on sustaining pressure on Syria and maintaining 
momentum towards free and fair Lebanese elections in separate 
meetings with Presidential Technical Advisor on the Middle 
East/Americas Dominique Boche and MFA A/S-equivalent Jean 
Francois Thibault April 29.  Poloff also discussed reftel 
points with MFA DAS-equivalent for the Levant Christian 
Jouret April 28.  Boche initially stressed that U.S.-French 
cooperation on Lebanon had achieved results unthinkable even 
a few months ago -- withdrawal of Syrian troops, a new 
Lebanese government chosen by consensus, and elections likely 
to take place within constitutional deadlines.  He emphasized 
that the reasons for this success were that we had been 
"careful" in presentation of our demarche, made clear that we 
were not seeking to destabilize the region or Syria, and 
focused our message on attaining a free, democratic Lebanon. 
Keeping our ambitions limited, according to Boche, permitted 
us to get the support of the Lebanese people and Arab 
moderates, chiefly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 
 
3. (C) Boche added that the U.S. and France had not achieved 
all our objectives in Lebanon, and we needed to remain 
vigilant to the covert Syrian security forces which stayed 
behind, as well potential disturbances launched by loyalists 
or the Palestinian camps, which remained under Syrian 
control.  There also remained forces hostile to the 
U.S.-French effort within the Lebanese government, namely 
President Lahoud, who wielded considerable nuisance power. 
For this reason, Boche reasoned, we needed to keep as many 
Lebanese as possible on our side, and take great care not to 
antagonize Hizballah.  The GoF had sought to make Hizballah 
understand that France accepts Hizballah as a political 
reality and representative of the Shi'a community, the most 
populous grouping in Lebanon.  The GoF had also advised 
Hizballah that it needed to choose the political track, and 
"abandon ambiguities," such as its plan of national 
resistance or actions in Palestinian territories.  The GoF 
had made clear to Hizballah that the door was open for them 
to become a normal political force in Lebanon, and wanted to 
proceed on a step-by-step basis.  In the GoF view, 
disarmament should not be the precondition of Hizballah's 
entry into politics, but instead would be the logical 
consequence of its politicization.   Boche asserted that we 
had little alternative to the French approach, as there was 
no force or entity present which could disarm Hizballah, and 
alienating Hizballah ran the risk of pushing the Shi'a 
community into the pro-Syrian camp and undermining the 
current political dynamic in Lebanon.  He added that there 
had been some positive evolution in Hizballah behavior, with 
it pronouncing in favor of elections, and members of its 
parliamentary delegation voting for Mikati; he concluded that 
Hizballah appeared to be reflecting on its future. 
 
4. (C) Boche also advised that the U.S. and France should not 
undermine dialogue between communities in Lebanon, or put 
"our Lebanese friends" in a difficult situation by opening 
old differences.  He cited specifically language in a draft 
U.S.-France joint statement on the Middle East which referred 
to a Lebanon "at peace with its neighbors," cautioning that 
such a wording was an immediate "red flag" to Lebanese, 
recalling the May 17, 1983 separate peace with Israel which 
propelled Lebanon into civil war.  Boche added that, 
similarly, we should not make things difficult for our 
moderate Arab allies, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who could 
not continue to play a constructive role unless we made clear 
that we were not seeking to antagonize Syria, and that we 
accepted that post-withdrawal Lebanon and Syria would have a 
strategic, albeit more equal relationship.  Boche added that 
Iran had shown it could play a positive role on Lebanon and 
had passed messages of moderation to Hizballah.  He noted 
that Iranian President Khatami had told Chirac earlier this 
month that Iran would support efforts to strengthen Lebanese 
sovereignty as long as these measures did not harm Lebanese 
or Syrian stability. 
 
5. (C) DAS Dibble responded by stressing we agreed on most, 
but not all, points.  On the timing for Hizballah 
disarmament, the U.S. was willing to accept a sequenced 
approach and address the issue after elections, however we 
continued to view disarmament as a precondition of Lebanon's 
achieving full independence and sovereignty and did not 
accept that Hizballah could retain both armed and political 
roles .  It remained essential, at the same time, for the 
international community to keep pressure on Syria, and warn 
President Asad against trying to use his covert agents, 
loyalists or the Palestinian camps to stir up trouble.  Boche 
fully agreed, and noted that France had not given any 
satisfaction to Syria for its troop withdrawal, and had 
merely "taken note" of the move while calling for UN 
verification.  He added that Syria's diplomatic isolation was 
made possible by the "prudence" of the U.S. and French 
demarche on Lebanon, which was something which the Arabs, 
Russia, and China could support. 
 
MFA ON HIZBALLAH DISARMAMENT, ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT, OBSERVERS 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
6. (C) MFA A/S-equivalent Thibault, in his separate meeting 
with Dibble April 29, stressed the importance of U.S. and 
French cooperation on Lebanon, which had achieved remarkable 
successes but was not yet complete.  He noted that the U.S. 
and France were on the same page on Syria, and the need to 
continue to isolate the Asad regime so it didn't slip "slip 
into its old ways."  On Hizballah, Thibault stressed that the 
GoF shared the objective of disarmament but differed with the 
U.S. on the means and timing.  The GoF agreed with the USG 
that a free, independent Lebanon should not have private 
militias on its soil; then again, he added, in the real 
world, we needed to look to political realities.  The GoF 
continued to view EU designation of Hizballah as 
counterproductive and potentially undermining Lebanon's 
stability. 
 
7.  (C) Further on disarming and disbanding Hizballah, Jouret 
stressed that the GoF agreed totally that there is no role 
for an armed Hizballah in the new Lebanon and that Hizballah 
must disappear as an armed force.  The question remained how 
long would this process take, and how would it proceed. 
Jouret added that the GoF was telling Hizballah directly that 
times were changing, and Hizballah must change its doctrines 
and behavior.  At the same time, France viewed Hizballah as 
having a popular base in Lebanon and was ready to help 
Hizballah find its place in Lebanese society.  He added that, 
although the GoF hadn't broached the issue to Hizballah, 
there might be utility in a special economic development plan 
for southern Lebanon, which would help create jobs and 
restructure the economy, to accompany the disarmament 
process. On EU designation of Hizballah, Jouret said the GoF 
remained opposed and viewed this as largely a U.S.-Israeli 
effort, noting that the GoI had demarched the GoF on the 
issue a few days earlier. 
 
8. (C) Jouret said France agreed that the EU should continue 
to keep the association agreement with Syria on hold.  He 
commented that even if the accord made it to the next step of 
the procedural process, referral to ratification by member 
countries, France was prepared to hold out as long as 
necessary, ten years or more, to keep the agreement frozen. 
On election monitors, Jouret confirmed that there would be 
French participation in the EU observer mission.  He added 
that it remained likely that French parliamentarians, 
particularly those maintaining a longtime interest in 
Lebanon, might decide on their own to observe the elections, 
and the GoF would not stop them. Such parliamentarians, he 
noted, were largely Aoun supporters, who tended to perceive 
Maronites as representative of all Lebanese. 
 
9. (U) This message was cleared by NEA DAS Dibble. 
ROSENBLATT