US embassy cable - 05DAMASCUS2165

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 002165 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2015 
TAGS: ECON, EFIN, PGOV, PREL, SY 
SUBJECT: ASAD FIRES PRO-REFORM ADVISOR 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen Seche, Reasons 1.4 b/d 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  On April 14, President Bashar al-Asad 
sacked his French-educated and reform-promoting advisor Dr. 
Nibras al-Fadil.  Asad himself reportedly convinced Fadil to 
return to Syria in 2003, after more than twenty years abroad, 
to assist in moving the country forward.  However, rumors of 
Fadil's dismissal began circulating months ago in response to 
public statements he had made that were critical of the 
existing system and the slow pace of judicial, financial and 
economic reforms.  The timing of Fadil's departure, less than 
two months before the much anticipated Ba'th Party 
Conference, suggests he may have been pressing too hard for 
approval of his reform proposals.  In response, those 
favoring the status-quo or more modest changes may have 
demanded his ouster.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (U) On April 14, Minister of Presidential Affairs Dr. 
Ghassan Laham informed Dr. Nibras al-Fadil that President 
Asad has instructed that his contract as an advisor to the 
Presidential Palace be canceled, according an article in the 
April 22 edition of the London-based, Arabic language daily 
Al-Hayat.  The article mentioned that Fadil had played an 
important role in EU-Syria Association Agreement negotiations 
and had worked as a coordinator on financial, judicial and 
administrative reform.  He is expected to return to France 
where his wife and children live. 
 
3.  (U)  Fadil was quoted in the same article as saying that 
he hoped Syria would benefit from the economic reform plans 
(completed in February 2005), financial reform plans 
(completed in July 2004) and judicial reform plans (completed 
in August 2003) that he had submitted to President Asad 
during his tenure as a presidential advisor.  He also 
reportedly said that he regretted not having been able to be 
more involved because of the nature of his job, the absence 
of job specifications, lack of authority, and the weakness of 
available resources. 
 
4.  (C) Rumors had been circulating for months that Fadil 
would soon be fired, starting from the time of an October 
2004 interview with al-Hayat in which he asserted that 
judicial reform would not be possible "without a political 
dimension," "defining the future of the country was not the 
monopoly of any party," and "wrong practices that have 
accumulated and become entrenched over the past 
decades...must be corrected in a firm and bold manner." 
Fadil also reportedly told a group of Syrian expatriates in 
Dubai in March that, at its current pace, economic reform in 
Syria would need about a 100 years.  There has also been the 
suggestion that Fadil's continued work as a private 
consultant may have complicated his position as presidential 
advisor.  (Note:  Many Syrian public employees supplement 
their meager government salaries by working other jobs so, in 
principle, Fadil's private consulting work should not have 
been a problem, provided he did nothing to would reflect 
badly on the President or other senior Syrian officials.  One 
contact said Fadil had used Asad's name improperly to attract 
business in the Gulf for his consulting practice, angering 
the President, but we have no corroboration of this claim.) 
Citing current tensions in Syrian-French relations, another 
contact asserted that Fadil's close ties to France may have 
been a contributing factor. 
 
5.  (C)  Comment:  Fadil's post-dismissal remarks betray his 
frustration with having worked so hard on so much for so long 
but, in the end, seeing very little happen.  He was viewed by 
many as perhaps the most important advocate of reforms in the 
SARG with regular access to Asad.  With the upcoming Ba'th 
Party Congress, Fadil may have concluded it was time to press 
harder on securing agreement on some or most of his 
proposals,  However, as a French-educated expatriate more 
than twenty years outside of Syria, he lacked a political 
base beyond his relationship with Asad to support him.  The 
same had been true for former World Bank official and now 
former Minister of Economy Ghassan al-Rifai, another 
reform-minded shining light who quickly vanished from the 
scene, his reputations in tatters.  Some are now saying that 
another one of the best apples has been removed from the top 
of the crate, and the rotten ones below are generating little 
enthusiasm from potential buyers.  The lesson many reform 
supporters are drawing is that sticking one's neck out for 
reform in Syria, whether economic or political, remains 
professionally risky and sometimes dangerous, even when the 
reformers are close to Asad himself. 
 
SECHE